<div dir="ltr">Another idea....<div><br></div><div style>We generate, for EACH variant, an "access-key" with a generated secret(password). This accessKey:secret combination would be, similar to the previous email, ONLY be able to perform updates for "device (un)registration".</div>
<div style><br></div><div style>It would be NOT possible to use this combination for sending messages to a device, (read: our HTTP send interface would not allow this accessKey:secret combination).</div><div style><br></div>
<div style><br></div><div style>Not, sure, but this is (I guess) a bit simpler, initially, instead of using private/public key approach.</div><div style><br></div><div style><br></div><div style><br></div><div style><br></div>
<div style><br></div><div style><br></div><div style><br></div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Sat, May 18, 2013 at 12:48 AM, Matthias Wessendorf <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:matzew@apache.org" target="_blank">matzew@apache.org</a>></span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div>Hi,</div><div><br></div><div>once the app is installed on the phone (or launched in a browser),</div>
<div>we (as discussed in the spec/mailing list) need to upload the "device token" (or channelID) from the actual device/channel to the Unified Push Server.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>My questions:</div><div>Is it safe, if every "Mobile Variant" has a Private/Public Key ???</div><div><br></div><div>The UP server keeps the private one.</div><div>Once we register a new mobile variant (e.g. HR for Android, HR for iPad, HR for iPhone, ...) EACH variant has ONE Private/Public key</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>The Public Key of this combo would be "coded" into the actual mobiel application...</div><div><br></div><div>On EVERY iOS app, it would use the PubKey from the iOS Variant, on EVERY JS-app, it would use the PubKey from the SimplePush Variant, etc</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>So, that means EVERY installation (on the devices) would have that pbulci key...</div><div><br></div><div>Would that be (extremely) odd, if "1 Mio Russian hacker" would have that public key, used on the device, to perform some sort of "auth" (e.g. via HTTP BASIC (just saying.....)) against the server, in order to upload the "device token" ??</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div>Note: This Private/Public key would/should be EXCLUSIVE for "device registration". And really ONLY.. :-)</div><div><br></div><div>So that this "Private/Public key" pair can NOT be used (==invalid) for sending messages to the installations, or creating the Push-Applications / Mobile Variant Constructs.</div>
<div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>Greetings,</div><div>Matthias</div><span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><div><br></div>-- <br>Matthias Wessendorf <br><br>blog: <a href="http://matthiaswessendorf.wordpress.com/" target="_blank">http://matthiaswessendorf.wordpress.com/</a><br>
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</blockquote></div><br><br clear="all"><div><br></div>-- <br>Matthias Wessendorf <br><br>blog: <a href="http://matthiaswessendorf.wordpress.com/" target="_blank">http://matthiaswessendorf.wordpress.com/</a><br>sessions: <a href="http://www.slideshare.net/mwessendorf" target="_blank">http://www.slideshare.net/mwessendorf</a><br>
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