On Fri, Apr 4, 2014 at 12:07 PM, Karel Piwko <kpiwko@redhat.com> wrote:

On Fri, 4 Apr 2014 10:49:53 -0300
Bruno Oliveira <bruno@abstractj.org> wrote:

> Good morning slackland, yesterday I had a hangout with Matthias and we agreed
> that the whole key agreement thing would bring more complexity from the
> developer’s pespective. That’s the reason why the client with airline was
> dropped.
>
> Here comes the new
> proposal: https://gist.github.com/abstractj/ef1e3d53619796f4e87e
>
> # Passphrase encryption for UPS
>
> **Note**: This is NOT a replacement for SSL
>
> ## Scenario
>
> - Developers wants to upload passphrase and certificate for iOS variants. The
> passphrase must be stored encrypted and restored in clear while sending
> messages.
>
> ## Jira references
>
> - https://issues.jboss.org/browse/AGPUSH-565 (*Dropped*). After a hangout
> with Matthias, we agreed that would complicate the developer's workflow.
> - https://issues.jboss.org/browse/AGPUSH-358
>
> ## Proposal
>
> Today we can't guarantee that our developers will have an
> [HSM](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware_security_module) to manage
> encryption keys. Neither we can store the private keys in a separated
> database, for the push server.
>
> If somehow the database is compromised, private keys could be exposed and
> most of the sensitive data decrypted. 
>
> The suggestion is to make use of a *KDF function* per application to encrypt
> passphrases, not perfect, but helps (like we did in the past for password
> reset). Where encryption key means:
>
> ```
> PK = PBKDF2(Secret Key, Salt)
> ```
>
> *Secret Key*: In the ideal world, users would be required to provide a
> password for encryption. In this scenario we don't want them to be prompted
> to input the password, or add extra parameters to the UPS endpoints. So the
> suggestion is to provide secret key configured on the server and protected by
> the ACL's from the operating system

I believe this should be pluggable, not only FS based. For instance, on
AS7/EAP/WF, you'd likely want to use Vault to store sensitive information:

https://access.redhat.com/site/documentation//en-US/JBoss_Enterprise_Application_Platform/6.2/html/Security_Guide/sect-Password_Vaults_for_Sensitive_Strings.html

On other containers/platforms, you might have different options. FileSystem is a
good start, but flexibility of such mechanism rocks.



>
> *Salt*: 16 bytes non-deterministic used to encrypt/decrypt the data on the
> server per application and stored into the database.
>
> 
>
> ### Secret key configuration
>
> The file can be generated and checked if something exists during the
> application start up.
>
> - config.properties
>
> ```
> secret_key =
> "d9eb5171c59a4c817f68b0de27b8c1e340c2341b52cdbc60d3083d4e8958532" \
> "18dcc5f589cafde048faec956b61f864b9b5513ff9ce29bf9e5d58b0f234f8e3b" ```
>
> or
>
> - config.json
>
> ```
> {"secret_key":"d9eb5171c59a4c817f68b0de27b8c1e340c2341b52cdbc60d3083d4e8958532"
> \ "18dcc5f589cafde048faec956b61f864b9b5513ff9ce29bf9e5d58b0f234f8e3b"}
>  ```
>
> ### Sending push messages
>
> Passphrases must be reversible for Apple, that's why we make use of symmetric
> encryption here.
>
> 
>
> # REST API
>
>
> ## Register push app
>
> ```POST    |    rest/applications```
>
> ### HTTP request 
>
>   Remain unchanged 
>
> ### HTTP response 
>
>   Remain unchanged
>   
> ## iOS Variant 
>
> ### HTTP request 
>
>   Remain unchanged 
>
> ### HTTP response 
>
>   Remain unchanged
>
> ## Sender 
>
> ### HTTP request 
>
>   Remain unchanged 
>
> ### HTTP response 
>
>   Remain unchanged
>
>
> # Clients 
>
> No changes at the client side.
>
>
> Thoughts?
>
> --
> abstractj
>
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