[aerogear-dev] Security for "Device Registration"

Sun May 19 05:10:10 EDT 2013

1a)
would perhaps,... add some "monitoring" if an unreasonalble about of "new
devices" is registered, but that means we need some sort of analysis
component (not for the first iteration) :)

whoops, typos ===>
we could perhaps,... add some "monitoring" if an unreasonable amount of
"new devices" is registered, but that means we need some sort of analysis
component (not for the first iteration) :)

On Sun, May 19, 2013 at 11:08 AM, Matthias Wessendorf <matzew at apache.org>wrote:

> Concerns with both approaches
>
>
> 1)
> It would be possible to register new devices, if the pub/private key (or
> the accessKey:secret combination) would be hacked.
>
> HOWEVER, the "hacker" has to know how to generate VALID tokens for the
> different push-networks. Apple and Google will NOT accept incorrect tokens,
> and IMO this as a minimal risk.
> Similar for SimplePush. The SimplePush Network/Server, generates UUIDv4
> key, for every channel, so IMO.... it's hard to "hijack" that as well.
> => But I may be just naive.
>
>
> 1a)
> would perhaps,... add some "monitoring" if an unreasonalble about of "new
> devices" is registered, but that means we need some sort of analysis
> component (not for the first iteration) :)
>
>
> 2) hacker can update device info
> If the pub/private key (or the accessKey:secret combination) are being
> compromised. it is possible to update informations for a certain device.
> IF... he know the "token".
> So... it's than very simple that the hacker can update informations for
> his phone (since that token is VERY easy to read, via the platform APIs).
> IMO not a big deal. If he updates his iPhone metadata (e.g. changing "iOS"
> to "Android"). If he changes his token, he looks himself out -> No longer
> receives "push notification messages"
>
> 2a)
> A hacker could update device infomations for other devices. BUT !!!! he
> has to know the token of other devices, registered with our server. This
> means, he needs access to those devices.
> => IMO as well not a big risk..
>
>
>
> Summary:
> I think, if we really have a "extra"  pub/private key (or the accessKey:secret
> combination) for "device (un)registration", and not allowing this  pub/private
> key (or the accessKey:secret combination) on other HTTP calls (e.g.
> register Push Application, register mobile Varian, sending): The risk is
> IMO minimal.
>
>
>  Thoughts ?
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sun, May 19, 2013 at 10:58 AM, Matthias Wessendorf <matzew at apache.org>wrote:
>
>> Another idea....
>>
>> We generate, for EACH variant, an "access-key" with a generated
>> secret(password). This accessKey:secret combination would be, similar to
>> the previous email, ONLY be able to perform updates for "device
>> (un)registration".
>>
>> It would be NOT possible to use this combination for sending messages to
>> a device, (read: our HTTP send interface would not allow this
>> accessKey:secret combination).
>>
>>
>> Not, sure, but this is (I guess) a bit simpler, initially, instead of
>> using private/public key approach.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, May 18, 2013 at 12:48 AM, Matthias Wessendorf <matzew at apache.org>wrote:
>>
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>> once the app is installed on the phone (or launched in a browser),
>>> we (as discussed in the spec/mailing list) need to upload the "device
>>> token" (or channelID) from the actual device/channel to the Unified Push
>>> Server.
>>>
>>>
>>> My questions:
>>> Is it safe, if every "Mobile Variant" has a Private/Public Key ???
>>>
>>> The UP server keeps the private one.
>>> Once we register a new mobile variant (e.g. HR for Android, HR for iPad,
>>> HR for iPhone, ...) EACH variant has ONE Private/Public key
>>>
>>>
>>> The Public Key of this combo would be "coded" into the actual mobiel
>>> application...
>>>
>>> On EVERY iOS app, it would use the PubKey from the iOS Variant, on EVERY
>>> JS-app, it would use the PubKey from the SimplePush Variant, etc
>>>
>>>
>>> So, that means EVERY installation (on the devices) would have that
>>> pbulci key...
>>>
>>> Would that be (extremely) odd, if "1 Mio Russian hacker" would have that
>>> public key, used on the device, to perform some sort of "auth" (e.g. via
>>> HTTP BASIC (just saying.....)) against the server, in order to upload the
>>> "device token" ??
>>>
>>>
>>> Note: This Private/Public key would/should be EXCLUSIVE for "device
>>> registration". And really ONLY.. :-)
>>>
>>> So that this "Private/Public key" pair can NOT be used (==invalid) for
>>> sending messages to the installations, or creating the Push-Applications /
>>> Mobile Variant Constructs.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Greetings,
>>> Matthias
>>>
>>> --
>>> Matthias Wessendorf
>>>
>>> blog: http://matthiaswessendorf.wordpress.com/
>>> sessions: http://www.slideshare.net/mwessendorf
>>> twitter: http://twitter.com/mwessendorf
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Matthias Wessendorf
>>
>> blog: http://matthiaswessendorf.wordpress.com/
>> sessions: http://www.slideshare.net/mwessendorf
>> twitter: http://twitter.com/mwessendorf
>>
>
>
>
> --
> Matthias Wessendorf
>
> blog: http://matthiaswessendorf.wordpress.com/
> sessions: http://www.slideshare.net/mwessendorf
> twitter: http://twitter.com/mwessendorf
>

-- 
Matthias Wessendorf

blog: http://matthiaswessendorf.wordpress.com/
sessions: http://www.slideshare.net/mwessendorf
twitter: http://twitter.com/mwessendorf
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