[aerogear-dev] Passphrase encryption - round III

[Matthias Wessendorf]

+1

Oh, the same generated config file could be used for encrypting things for
other variants (e.g. the Google API key), at a later time, right ?



On Fri, Apr 4, 2014 at 3:49 PM, Bruno Oliveira <bruno at abstractj.org> wrote:

> Good morning slackland, yesterday I had a hangout with Matthias and we
> agreed that the whole key agreement thing would bring more complexity from
> the developer's pespective. That's the reason why the client with airline
> was dropped.
>
> Here comes the new proposal:
> https://gist.github.com/abstractj/ef1e3d53619796f4e87e
>
> # Passphrase encryption for UPS
>
> **Note**: This is NOT a replacement for SSL
>
> ## Scenario
>
> - Developers wants to upload passphrase and certificate for iOS variants.
> The passphrase must be stored encrypted and restored in clear while sending
> messages.
>
> ## Jira references
>
> - https://issues.jboss.org/browse/AGPUSH-565 (*Dropped*). After a hangout
> with Matthias, we agreed that would complicate the developer's workflow.
> - https://issues.jboss.org/browse/AGPUSH-358
>
> ## Proposal
>
> Today we can't guarantee that our developers will have an [HSM](
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware_security_module) to manage
> encryption keys. Neither we can store the private keys in a separated
> database, for the push server.
>
> If somehow the database is compromised, private keys could be exposed and
> most of the sensitive data decrypted.
>
> The suggestion is to make use of a *KDF function* per application to
> encrypt passphrases, not perfect, but helps (like we did in the past for
> password reset). Where encryption key means:
>
> ```
> PK = PBKDF2(Secret Key, Salt)
> ```
>
> *Secret Key*: In the ideal world, users would be required to provide a
> password for encryption. In this scenario we don't want them to be prompted
> to input the password, or add extra parameters to the UPS endpoints. So the
> suggestion is to provide secret key configured on the server and protected
> by the ACL's from the operating system
>
> *Salt*: 16 bytes non-deterministic used to encrypt/decrypt the data on the
> server per application and stored into the database.
>
> ![](
> http://photon.abstractj.org/cdraw_460528_pixels_20140404_103644_20140404_103648.jpg
> )
>
> ### Secret key configuration
>
> The file can be generated and checked if something exists during the
> application start up.
>
> - config.properties
>
> ```
> secret_key =
> "d9eb5171c59a4c817f68b0de27b8c1e340c2341b52cdbc60d3083d4e8958532" \
>
>  "18dcc5f589cafde048faec956b61f864b9b5513ff9ce29bf9e5d58b0f234f8e3b"
> ```
>
> or
>
> - config.json
>
> ```
> {"secret_key":"d9eb5171c59a4c817f68b0de27b8c1e340c2341b52cdbc60d3083d4e8958532"
> \
>
>  "18dcc5f589cafde048faec956b61f864b9b5513ff9ce29bf9e5d58b0f234f8e3b"}
>  ```
>
> ### Sending push messages
>
> Passphrases must be reversible for Apple, that's why we make use of
> symmetric encryption here.
>
> ![](
> http://photon.abstractj.org/cdraw_537346_pixels_20140404_104245_20140404_104247.jpg
> )
>
> # REST API
>
>
> ## Register push app
>
> ```POST    |    rest/applications```
>
> ### HTTP request
>
>   Remain unchanged
>
> ### HTTP response
>
>   Remain unchanged
>
> ## iOS Variant
>
> ### HTTP request
>
>   Remain unchanged
>
> ### HTTP response
>
>   Remain unchanged
>
> ## Sender
>
> ### HTTP request
>
>   Remain unchanged
>
> ### HTTP response
>
>   Remain unchanged
>
>
> # Clients
>
> No changes at the client side.
>
>
> Thoughts?
>
> --
> abstractj
>
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-- 
Matthias Wessendorf

blog: http://matthiaswessendorf.wordpress.com/
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