[keycloak-dev] Storage protection

[Bruno Oliveira]

Sorry if my e-mail gave to you a wrong impression. I was just asking about
the interface to generate the secret.


On Thu, Jan 30, 2014 at 11:51 AM, Stian Thorgersen <stian at redhat.com> wrote:

> BTW the interface I proposed wouldn't work with a HSM, they do the
> encryption/decryption on board don't they? So it would be something like:
>
> public EncryptionProvider {
>
>   public void generateKeys(RealmModel realm);
>
>   public byte[] encrypt(byte[] b);
>
>   public byte[] decrypt(byte[] b);
>
>   public byte[] sign(byte[] b);
>
> }
>
> or something along those lines ;)
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> > From: "Bruno Oliveira" <bruno at abstractj.org>
> > To: "Bill Burke" <bburke at redhat.com>, "Stian Thorgersen" <
> stian at redhat.com>
> > Cc: keycloak-dev at lists.jboss.org
> > Sent: Thursday, 30 January, 2014 1:22:35 PM
> > Subject: Re: [keycloak-dev] Storage protection
> >
> > I think that's just fine, where developers will store their private keys
> is
> > their decision: db, text file or fancy hardwares.
> >
> > My only suggestion is to generate these keys with some KDF function,
> maybe
> > during the first application setup? What do you have in mind Stian?
> command
> > line, web interface, integrate with jboss-cli?
>
> First app startup I'd say. OOTB experience should be as simple as
> possible. Probably just bootstrap it in:
> https://github.com/keycloak/keycloak/blob/master/server/src/main/java/org/keycloak/server/KeycloakServerApplication.java
>
> and set the location to ${jboss.config.dir}/keycloak.secret or something?
>
> >
> > --
> > abstractj
> >
> > On January 30, 2014 at 8:12:44 AM, Stian Thorgersen (stian at redhat.com)
> wrote:
> > > > We should do it as an SPI to make it extensible. This would allow
> > > admins to integrate it best into how they manage sensitive data.
> > > I don't know what common practices are, but I imagine there are
> > > many ways to do it.
> > >
> > > As I said before I think our options OOTB are either to just store
> > > in clear-text, or generate a master password and write to a known
> > > location (/standalone/data/realm.secret?).
> > > Anything more than that would make it hard to use for development.
> > >
> > > I believe it is safer store a master password in a file (and an
> additional
> > > layer of defence to storing in clear-text to RDBMS, which can
> > > be compromised through SQL-injection attacks that non-shared
> > > file systems are not prone to).
> > >
> > > The master password location can be configurable through a system
> > > property. Admins can place this file on an encrypted location,
> > > this would be recommended. I don't think its any better to provide
> > > the master password as a argument or system property at startup
> > > than it is to store it in a file on an encrypted drive. The reason
> > > being is that if someone gains admin access to the server, they
> > > will be able to read the file, sure, but they can also get the
> arguments
> > > used to start the server just as easily. If the server is turned
> > > of neither properties or an encrypted drive will help them. Admins
> > > already have mechanisms in place to manage encrypted drives
> > > on servers, so we'd rely on them to know how to do that themselves.
> > >
> > > For future and more improved solutions we can add whatever mechanisms
> > > users are asking for through the SPI. Enterprises can also implement
> > > their own.
> > >
> > > The SPI could be something as simple as:
> > >
> > > public interface PrivateKeyProvider {
> > > public PEM getPrivateKey(RealmModel realm);
> > > }
> >
> >
>



-- 

-- 
"The measure of a man is what he does with power" - Plato
-
@abstractj
-
Volenti Nihil Difficile
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