[wildfly-dev] HTTP/2 out of the box in Wildfly 10.1
Jason T. Greene
jason.greene at redhat.com
Tue Jun 7 08:03:17 EDT 2016
> On Jun 7, 2016, at 7:01 AM, Jason T. Greene <jason.greene at redhat.com> wrote:
>
>
>
>
>> On Jun 7, 2016, at 6:55 AM, Darran Lofthouse <darran.lofthouse at jboss.com> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>> On 07/06/16 12:47, Jason T. Greene wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>> On Jun 7, 2016, at 6:33 AM, Darran Lofthouse <darran.lofthouse at jboss.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> On 07/06/16 12:24, Jason T. Greene wrote:
>>>>> Long term I think we want management using TLS, but that can of course
>>>>> come in phases. Assuming 2) is one of those phases to come (either now
>>>>> or later), a following step is that the CLI, and really any remoting
>>>>> client, should prefer TLS with a defaulted trust store location that
>>>>> points to the keystore.
>>>>>
>>>>> With 2) if we have the default of the attribute that forces redirect be
>>>>> true, and our default config be false, then someone that carries over
>>>>> their old config would not have a potential security weakness. If they
>>>>> have a CLI script that adds the https port, it will fail, hopefully
>>>>> sending a signal to look. Although, the user might just assume that oh
>>>>> it's there, I don't have to do anything.
>>>>>
>>>>> Another interesting thing about 2 is that IIRC we have conflicting
>>>>> behavior between the app port which doesn't force upgrade and the
>>>>> management port which does.
>>>>
>>>> In applications you configure which paths require a confidential
>>>> transport guarantee so you can be selective.
>>>>
>>>> For managements all requests come over a single path so if you switch on
>>>> SSL why not use it for the one and only path containing your sensitive
>>>> requests.
>>>
>>> Sure for standard web applications, but for anything using http upgrade that hits the root resource for all apps.
>>
>> But on the management port we still only have a single "app" using HTTP upgrade.
>
> Well technically you have two right. You have /console, and /management but sure they are always constant.
(By pointing this out what I am getting at is that http json clients are distinct from the console, I could technically want different policies for the two, although i do agree that if TLs is available you tend to want it)
>
> I guess My point is just think it's weird that remote EJB (and other proprietary protocols over http upgrade) doesn't redirect and management does.
>
>
>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>> So my preference is 2, because at some point we have to do it anyway,
>>>>> and if we have TLS out of the box might as well use it.
>>>>>
>>>>> On Jun 6, 2016, at 10:48 PM, Stuart Douglas <stuart.w.douglas at gmail.com
>>>>> <mailto:stuart.w.douglas at gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> So while implementing this I have noticed a potential problem that it
>>>>>> would be good to get some feedback on.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If the management interface has SSL by default then the HTTP interface
>>>>>> will always redirect to the HTTPS interface. This effectively breaks
>>>>>> the management API, as clients such as the CLI, Arquillian etc will be
>>>>>> redirected to HTTPS, and then reject the self signed certificate (as
>>>>>> they should).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I am not sure what to do about this, these are the options as I see them:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 1) Don't enable SSL for the management interface (just for the
>>>>>> Undertow subsystem). The management interface can still use this
>>>>>> auto-generation capability, it just won't be enable by default (we
>>>>>> could even leave the cert in the security domain, but just not enable
>>>>>> the https interface).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 2) Disable automatic redirects for HTTP upgrade requests (potentially
>>>>>> controlled by an attribute). This will allow the CLI etc to work, but
>>>>>> at the price of potentially reducing security, as some connections
>>>>>> that would have previously been redirected to use HTTPS will no longer
>>>>>> do this.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 3) Enable it by default and leave it broken. We can setup some kind of
>>>>>> automatic trust store thing so the local CLI works, and can get our
>>>>>> test suite to work with Arquillian in a similar manner. Personally I
>>>>>> think this is a terrible idea, but I am including it for completeness.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Personally I think we should go for 1). Given that this is supposed to
>>>>>> be about developer usability I don't think having management also use
>>>>>> SSL as being that important.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Stuart
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Mon, Jun 6, 2016 at 10:24 PM, Jason T. Greene
>>>>>> <jason.greene at redhat.com <mailto:jason.greene at redhat.com>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Awesome! Another idea I had on how we could get away with it being
>>>>>> in server boot, is to have a pre-boot first time setup task,
>>>>>> either launched from the shell/batch scripts or as a special
>>>>>> pre-step before the AS module loads. We could then report boot
>>>>>> time as the time AFTER first time installation tasks have
>>>>>> completed, which I think is fair because the server hasn't yet
>>>>>> been started.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Jun 5, 2016, at 11:53 PM, Stuart Douglas
>>>>>> <stuart.w.douglas at gmail.com <mailto:stuart.w.douglas at gmail.com>>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I have some initial work on this at:
>>>>>>> https://github.com/stuartwdouglas/wildfly-core/tree/WFCORE-1576
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If you go to https://localhost:9993 it will generate the
>>>>>>> certificate (although all that will be served is a 404 page as
>>>>>>> the console is not installed).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Stuart
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Mon, Jun 6, 2016 at 12:46 PM, Stuart Douglas
>>>>>>> <stuart.w.douglas at gmail.com <mailto:stuart.w.douglas at gmail.com>>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I think that would actually end up being more complex.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Stuart
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Mon, Jun 6, 2016 at 12:45 PM, Jason T. Greene
>>>>>>> <jason.greene at redhat.com <mailto:jason.greene at redhat.com>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Another option could be a post boot task. So it's still
>>>>>>> eager but don't block completed start. We'd still need to
>>>>>>> block Tls ports though. So maybe this does not help
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Jun 5, 2016, at 9:31 PM, Stuart Douglas
>>>>>>> <stuart.w.douglas at gmail.com
>>>>>>> <mailto:stuart.w.douglas at gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> 2048 bits adds close to a second to first boot on my
>>>>>>>> machine (obviously subsequent boots are unaffected).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> This is probably a bit much, I will work on getting a
>>>>>>>> POC for the lazy loading approach implemented.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Stuart
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Mon, Jun 6, 2016 at 12:27 PM, Jason T. Greene
>>>>>>>> <jason.greene at redhat.com
>>>>>>>> <mailto:jason.greene at redhat.com>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> We should really be generating 2048 bit keys.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I don't like adding to our boot time, we have
>>>>>>>> already seen it grow and this would be yet another case.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Jun 5, 2016, at 8:57 PM, Stuart Douglas
>>>>>>>> <stuart.w.douglas at gmail.com
>>>>>>>> <mailto:stuart.w.douglas at gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> So I just did up a very quick prototype that
>>>>>>>>> generates self signed certificates on startup and
>>>>>>>>> it looks like the difference in startup time is
>>>>>>>>> negligible (at least when generating 1024 bit RSA
>>>>>>>>> keys). Even if the difference is measurable it only
>>>>>>>>> affects the very first startup.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I think that in order to simplify the
>>>>>>>>> implementation of this it may be better to simply
>>>>>>>>> generate the key of first startup, instead of
>>>>>>>>> attempting to do it lazily.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Stuart
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Jun 4, 2016 at 12:09 AM, Jason T. Greene
>>>>>>>>> <jason.greene at redhat.com
>>>>>>>>> <mailto:jason.greene at redhat.com>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> What will be default keysize? It has to be
>>>>>>>>>> probably choosen to work also without
>>>>>>>>>> "Java Cryptography Extension (JCE)
>>>>>>>>>> Unlimited Strength Jurisdiction Policy"
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Probably the largest that is supported without
>>>>>>>>>> JCE. It does not matter that much, self signed
>>>>>>>>>> certs are inherently insecure, this is a
>>>>>>>>>> developer usability feature, not something
>>>>>>>>>> that can be used in production.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> IIRC there is actually no limit on RSA key
>>>>>>>>> size, it's only symmetric algs that are
>>>>>>>>> limited, so we could use a standard 2048 bit
>>>>>>>>> key without issue.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Stuart
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Jun 2, 2016 at 10:01 PM, Stuart
>>>>>>>>>> Douglas <stuart.w.douglas at gmail.com
>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:stuart.w.douglas at gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> So I guess we should talk about how
>>>>>>>>>> this should actually work.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> In terms of auto generating the key I
>>>>>>>>>> was thinking we would need to add a
>>>>>>>>>> new attribute to the 'keystore'
>>>>>>>>>> element under the security realm,
>>>>>>>>>> something like
>>>>>>>>>> 'auto-generate-cert-host="localhost"'.
>>>>>>>>>> I am not sure what other options we
>>>>>>>>>> would need, or how configurable we
>>>>>>>>>> should make it, but as this is for
>>>>>>>>>> testing/development purposes I don't
>>>>>>>>>> think we need to expose full control
>>>>>>>>>> over the certificate generation process.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> In terms of the implementation we
>>>>>>>>>> could just implement an SSLContext
>>>>>>>>>> wrapper, that can do the generation
>>>>>>>>>> and then create a 'real' SSLContext
>>>>>>>>>> the first time it is asked to create
>>>>>>>>>> and SSLEngine.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Stuart
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Jun 3, 2016 at 3:19 AM, Jason
>>>>>>>>>> Greene <jason.greene at redhat.com
>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:jason.greene at redhat.com>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Jun 2, 2016, at 11:29 AM, Harold Campbell <hcamp at muerte.net
>>>>>>>>>>> <mailto:hcamp at muerte.net>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, 2016-06-02 at 09:22 +1000, Stuart Douglas wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi All,
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I would like to propose that we add support for HTTP/2 out of the box
>>>>>>>>>>>> in Wildfly 10.1.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> This lowly user desperately wants a release containing the fix to WFLY-
>>>>>>>>>>> 6283 sooner rather than later. I'm sure other people have other pet
>>>>>>>>>>> bugs awaiting release.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I have no opinion on HTTP/2 being added other than to ask that pent up
>>>>>>>>>>> bug fixes be kept in mind.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Hi Harold,
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> That fix is already in master, so
>>>>>>>>>> it will be included in 10.1.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>>>> Jason T. Greene
>>>>>>>>>> WildFly Lead / JBoss EAP Platform
>>>>>>>>>> Architect
>>>>>>>>>> JBoss, a division of Red Hat
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>>>
>>>>>
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