On Mon, Jul 31, 2017 at 1:54 PM, Bill Burke <bburke(a)redhat.com> wrote:
On 7/31/17 12:18 PM, Bill Burke wrote:
On 7/31/17 11:35 AM, Pedro Igor Silva wrote:
On Fri, Jul 28, 2017 at 5:24 PM, Bill Burke <bburke(a)redhat.com> wrote:
> I've implemented a simple token exchange API [1] that allows you to
> exchange an access token created for one client to another client. The
> REST API follows the oauth token exchange api [2] very loosely.
>
> subject_token: a keycloak access token
>
> audience: takes a client id
>
> It then converts the access token created for one client and converts it
> to another. It lives under the token endpoint.
>
> The security model is as follows:
>
> * Authenticate calling client the same way as password grant.
>
> * The calling client must have service account enabled
>
> * Service account must have a realm role "token-exchanger" grant edto it
> or, it must have a client role "token-exchanger" granted to it. This
> exchanger client role is a role defined by the target client you are
> exchanging the token to.
>
>
> Is this a good security model? I'm thinking of not creating these roles
> right now and to enable support for exchange would require defining the
> roles specified above.
>
I think roles are too coarse-grained to represent this kind of policy. A
better option would be to explicitly define the clients that are allowed to
exchange tokens for a particular resource server. Eg.:
RS A allows Client B, C and D to exchange their tokens where the target
audience is RS A (or if using "resource", a specific resource in RS A).
I changed it a little. actors are:
* Authenticated client asking for change
* Clients that are the audience of the token being exchanged
* Client you want the token to be exchanged to
So, the authenticated client must be in the audience of the token being
exchanged, or, have permission to exchange from that particular audience.
The authenticated client also must have permission to exchange to the
audience it wants to exchange to.
Good idea to change it to use the fine grain admin permissions. There's a
couple of issues/problems with doing this that I think are easily done:
* public clients can't have service accounts.
* Client Policy looks at kc_client_id attribute which is pulled from the
issuedFor claim in the token. This isn't correct as we permission checks
based on the authenticated client, not the token.
So I'll have to create a new Identity type that either wraps the service
account or ClientModel and sets the "kc_client_id" property.
Our policy evaluation engine is based on the claims within the token. The
"issueFor" is basically the "azp" claim from OIDC. In fact, we
don't even
need that "kc_client_id". We could make this configurable though, and let
users decide whether they want to check the "authenticated client" or
"azp"
?
Btw, I'm about to finish UMA Grant Type, one of the changes I'm doing for
UMA 2.0. My changes will conflict with yours. Are you going to merge your
changes soon ?
Another thing I noticed is that maybe we could have a SPI for custom grant
types. What you did and what I'm doing may justify a specific SPI for
plugging custom grant types. Maybe too much, but maybe a nice to have.
Bill