Not sure what you're proposing. Are you saying that we shouldn't authenticate
clients at all?
----- Original Message -----
From: "Bill Burke" <bburke(a)redhat.com>
To: keycloak-dev(a)lists.jboss.org
Sent: Sunday, 2 March, 2014 10:25:21 PM
Subject: Re: [keycloak-dev] why authenticate clients?
Ugh sorry, rephrase:
"I don't think there is a need for authenticated clients if you're
doing..."
On 3/2/2014 5:24 PM, Bill Burke wrote:
> A good read:
>
>
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.2.1
>
> I was thinking about our current client-secret requirement. I don't
> think there is any security hole if you are doing the OAuth protocol
> over SSL, you are validating redirect_uris and the client sends its
> "client_id" when obtaining an access token.
>
> * Keycloak server ensures the access code is transmitted to a valid site
> by verifying/validating the redirect_uri sent.
> * Since you're using HTTPS, the browser ensures the site is valid by
> checking it's cert.
> * If you send the "client_id" when obtaining the access token, the auth
> server can verify that there was no access code substitution.
>
> One of the uses described in 3.2.1 is that it is easier to reset a
> client's credentials than invalidating all the refresh tokens sent to
> it. I'm not so sure that is true. If there were a per-app/per-oauth
> client Not-Before setting, we could check this on a refresh request.
>
> Any counter arguments to these assumptions? I'm going to see if anybody
> on the oauth email list will verify these assumptions.
>
>
--
Bill Burke
JBoss, a division of Red Hat
http://bill.burkecentral.com
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