Re: [keycloak-dev] Application Initiated Actions

On Wed, Mar 6, 2019 at 3:45 PM Stian Thorgersen <sthorger(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: > On Wed, 6 Mar 2019 at 17:39, Pedro Igor Silva <psilva(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: > >> >> >> On Wed, Mar 6, 2019 at 1:30 PM Stian Thorgersen <sthorger(a)redhat.com&gt; >> wrote: >> >>> Why do you think authentication/authorization is required? The user >>> will be prompted before making an action and it's an action they do against >>> RH-SSO and not automatically visible/exposed to the client. >>> >> >> The client is making the request and even though the user is at the >> Keycloak server to perform the action, admins may want to restrict which >> clients are allowed to perform such actions. That is what I mean by some >> level of authorization. >> >> You could even consider not authenticating the client at all, but still >> allow admins to enforce which clients should be allowed to initiate actions >> on the server. >> I can't see how enforcing which clients is allowed to initiate actions > will work without authenticating the client. > Maybe the word authenticate seems too much to what we are discussing. This is more a validation of the client making the request. Considering that, I'm saying that you could just rely on client_id and redirect uris (the client is already authenticated and if doing browser authentication the cookie is already present) and possibly add some level of authorization to enforce which clients can perform actions (instead of just relying on the authenticated session). Redirect uris are really important because you want to make sure the redirect uri is valid before redirecting the user.

>> >> >>> >>> On Wed, 6 Mar 2019 at 14:31, Pedro Igor Silva <psilva(a)redhat.com&gt; >>> wrote: >>> >>>> One way is to follow authorization code constraints like checking the >>>> client_id and redirect_uri (assuming the user will be redirected back after >>>> the action completes). But still, we could also add some level >>>> authorization. >>>> >>> >>> authorization code constraints doesn't work as anyone can just use the >>> client_id and redirect_uri from a different client. >>> >> >> I may be missing the whole flow. I would ask then what happens after the >> user performs an action. Is he/her redirected back to the client ? If so, >> client_id + redirect_uri do work to make sure that the client is known and >> that the user will be redirected back to a valid URI. >> It's just a standard OAuth flow, so app would get new tokens. Say the > user hasn't entered a DOB in the profile and the client wants that, then > they can request the user to enter a DOB, which would then result in the > DOB being available in the token. > This flow seems very closely related with the Claims Gathering Flow from UMA specs. We could probably review what is there and see if it can help to solve this problem of app initiated actions.

> > >> >> >>> >>> Only viable option I can think of is to add an endpoint where the >>> application can request a token to initate an action. So flow would be: >>> >>> 1. App sends POST { action: <action-id> } with ID Token as bearer token >>> in header to a new endpoint. This would return a single use token. >>> 2. App can now do the redirect protocol as before, but instead of >>> "?action=<action>" they would do "?action-token=<action token>" >>> >>> In the JS adapter we can add a action(actionId) function that would get >>> the action token before redirecting the user. >>> >>> Not sure what you mean about level authorization. >>> >>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, Mar 6, 2019 at 10:25 AM Stian Thorgersen <sthorger(a)redhat.com&gt; >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> The issue is more around how to authenticate clients and also the >>>>> fact that clients wanting to initiate actions may be public clients. We >>>>> also don't want to invent a new protocol for this, but rather just rely on >>>>> the OIDC flows. >>>>> >>>>> So with those constraints how would you authenticate the client? >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, 6 Mar 2019 at 14:23, Pedro Igor Silva <psilva(a)redhat.com&gt; >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> IMO, we should have some level of authorization for clients >>>>>> initiating an action. This could be as simple as leveraging authz in order >>>>>> to define white/black lists of clients. Similar to what a KC extension does >>>>>> in regards to authentication. >>>>>> >>>>>> On Tue, Mar 5, 2019 at 3:15 PM Stian Thorgersen <sthorger(a)redhat.com&gt; >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Was hoping for some more feedback from the list on this one. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Especially around not having any authentication of the clients >>>>>>> wanting to >>>>>>> initiate an action. I feel reasonable comfortable about not >>>>>>> securing it and >>>>>>> requiring actions to prompt the user before doing anything, but >>>>>>> welcome >>>>>>> others opinion on it. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Thu, 28 Feb 2019 at 11:07, Peter Skopek <pskopek(a)redhat.com&gt; >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> > Since there is no "silent" application initiated action (always >>>>>>> > prompts user) possible and actions are predefined at keycloak I >>>>>>> see no >>>>>>> > need for the client/application restriction mechanism. >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > On Wed, Feb 27, 2019 at 4:23 PM Stian Thorgersen < >>>>>>> sthorger(a)redhat.com&gt; >>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > Keycloak currently has required actions that are used to prompt >>>>>>> the user >>>>>>> > to >>>>>>> > > perform an action associated with their account after >>>>>>> authenticating, but >>>>>>> > > prior to being redirected to the application. >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > Examples include: configure OTP, update profile, validate >>>>>>> email, etc. >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > One issue here is these actions have to be manually registered >>>>>>> with the >>>>>>> > > users account, but can not be initiated by applications >>>>>>> themselves. As an >>>>>>> > > example it may not be required by all users to verify their >>>>>>> email, but >>>>>>> > only >>>>>>> > > when they use specific applications. >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > Keycloak also needs to initiate actions from the account >>>>>>> management >>>>>>> > > console. Examples: updating email address should require >>>>>>> verifying the >>>>>>> > > email, configuring OTP, etc. >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > With that in mind we are proposing to introduce Application >>>>>>> Initiated >>>>>>> > > Actions. An Application Initiated Action behind the scenes is >>>>>>> just a >>>>>>> > > Required Action, but it is initiated by an application and >>>>>>> depending on >>>>>>> > the >>>>>>> > > action may be optional for the user to complete (where the user >>>>>>> can >>>>>>> > select >>>>>>> > > cancel which would return the user back to the application). >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > No Application Initiated Actions should perform any updates to >>>>>>> the users >>>>>>> > > account without prompting the user first. For example an >>>>>>> application >>>>>>> > > initiated action that is used to link an existing account to a >>>>>>> social >>>>>>> > > provider should ask the user first if they want to link to the >>>>>>> provider. >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > To make it easy for applications to integrate these I would >>>>>>> like to >>>>>>> > > leverage the standard OAuth flows that applications use to >>>>>>> authenticate >>>>>>> > > users. So to initiate verify-email action the application would >>>>>>> redirect >>>>>>> > to >>>>>>> > > the authentication endpoint and add kc_action=<action alias> >>>>>>> query >>>>>>> > > parameter. >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > One open question I have right now is. Assuming all Application >>>>>>> Initiated >>>>>>> > > Actions always prompt the user first do we need to add some >>>>>>> mechanism in >>>>>>> > > place to restrict what clients/applications are permitted to >>>>>>> initiate an >>>>>>> > > action? Requiring that would make it harder to use for >>>>>>> applications. >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > One thing I would also like to add is the ability for an >>>>>>> Application >>>>>>> > > Initiated Action to require the user to re-authenticate prior to >>>>>>> > performing >>>>>>> > > the action. For example update password should require the user >>>>>>> to enter >>>>>>> > > the current password, while verify email should not (as it >>>>>>> simply sends >>>>>>> > an >>>>>>> > > email with a link to continue). >>>>>>> > > _______________________________________________ >>>>>>> > > keycloak-dev mailing list >>>>>>> > > keycloak-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >>>>>>> > > https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/keycloak-dev >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>>> keycloak-dev mailing list >>>>>>> keycloak-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >>>>>>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/keycloak-dev >>>>>>> >>>>>>