On 27 November 2015 at 12:16, Vlastimil Elias <velias(a)redhat.com> wrote:
Hi,
On 27.11.2015 11:45, Stian Thorgersen wrote:
On 27 November 2015 at 10:23, Vlastimil Elias < <velias(a)redhat.com>
velias(a)redhat.com> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> I have two proposals for cleanup of 'Change password' screen in Account
> app based on my experience with it:
>
> 1. remove Cancel button - it has no any meaning on this screen/form, it
> only reshowns form with empty fields. And also there is a bug,
> "Password" field is hidden when it is used, which makes whole form
> unusable.
>
+1
OK, I'm going to create JIRA and provide PR for this.
>
> 2. remove validation of current password (remove "Password" field). Two
> reasons for this:
> - security impact of this check is small. If attacker is able to
> compromise Account app then he can always change email and then use
> "Forgot password" feature to change password
> - user created over Identity Provider do not know old password
> (because it is not set) so he is not able to set password using this
> screen
> After we implement support for reauthentication (KEYCLOAK-2076) then we
> should set some reasonable reauth timeout for Account app instead, this
> will make it more secure at all.
>
-1 Reset password over email may not be enabled at all. We already allow
setting password for IdPs login without requiring the existing password.
Fair enough
+1 To suggestion from Thomas - we should ask for password when updating
email at least when recover password over email is enabled.
Makes sense, but what to do if user has no password set at this point?
Don't ask him, or reauthenticate him by other available mechanism?
And there are also other "dangerous" operations in Account app. Eg.
attacker who gains access to it can disable OTP without any recheck. This
should be protected too.
I believe whole Account app should be correctly protected by
reauthentications. Question is if implement it somehow specifically in the
app, or resolve this generally as part of KEYCLOAK-2076.
Yep, you're right there's other dangerous operations as well.
Re-authentication sounds like the correct approach, rather than requesting
the password again. We could have two configurable timeouts in account
management console. One that requires re-auth for anything (~30 min
default), and another that requires re-auth for sensitive operations (~5
min).
One thing with re-auth is that if it happens when a user submits a form,
you then someone have to also remember the values of the form. Currently
account management is stateless.
Vlastimil
It seems to be common practice to ask for current password when updating
the existing password.
>
> If you agree then I can create JIRA issue for this and provide PR.
>
> Vlastimil
>
> --
> Vlastimil Elias
> Principal Software Engineer
> Developer Portal Engineering Team
>
>
>
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--
Vlastimil Elias
Principal Software Engineer
Developer Portal Engineering Team