Sure, my question and arguments were related with Client A asking for a
token to access Service B. Service B -> Service C is what you are doing
with token exchange.
Otherwise, you will need to use token exchange in Client A to ask a token
for Service B. Where Client A is not even a resource server, thus a "aud"
claim referencing Client A is useless.
On Tue, Aug 15, 2017 at 12:58 PM, Bill Burke <bburke(a)redhat.com> wrote:
I disagree Pedro. Needs to be based scopes and/or audience. In our
original example, Service B only knows he wants to talk to Service C.
Shouldn't have to know the set of scopes he needs to "downgrade" to talk
to
C.
The original OAuth spec assumed that the browser would be involved.
Scopes are useful in that sense as the IDP can ask for consent. There's no
way to ask for consent from the user in a service to service invocation.
Hence, we have the token-exchange Draft in OAuth WG and this is why that
spec offers both scope and audience as parameters.
On 8/15/17 9:48 AM, Pedro Igor Silva wrote:
IMO, we should do it based on scopes. That is how OAuth2 is supposed to
work, specially when AS is 1:N to resource servers. Clients would need to
ask for a scope which can be mapped to a specific resource server / client
application.
There are other options that we can consider, but using scopes seems more
aligned with the specs.
On Tue, Aug 15, 2017 at 10:44 AM, Stian Thorgersen <sthorger(a)redhat.com>
wrote:
> 'aud' is broken:
>
https://issues.jboss.org/browse/KEYCLOAK-1201
>
> Big question is how do you control what the list of "clients" in the aud
> should be? Manually? Based on scope (what about full scope and loads of
> clients, what about when there are no client roles)?
>
> On 15 August 2017 at 14:41, Pedro Igor Silva <psilva(a)redhat.com> wrote:
>
>>
>> On Mon, Aug 14, 2017 at 10:42 AM, Bill Burke <bburke(a)redhat.com> wrote:
>>
>>> CLI tool I wrote doesn't allow token exchange, yet, but you're
correct,
>>> I'm thinking of using it to perform token exchange.
>>>
>>> Our ID tokens are not signed right now. Also you still need client to
>>> client exchange so that you can "downgrade" a token to talk to an
untrusted
>>> service. I've also added new fine-grain permissions
"exchange-from" and
>>> "exchange-to".
>>>
>>> For example, lets say Client A gets token and invokes on service B
>>> which needs to invoke on untrusted service C.
>>>
>>
>> When Client A gets token to invoke Service B, how the "aud" claim in
the
>> token looks like for you ? Is it referencing Service B ?
>>
>> Asking because I noticed that our access tokens are being issued using
>> the authenticated client in "aud" claim where it should contain (or in
>> addition to other audiences) the target service. A typical scenario for
>> bearer token authentication. Also, our BearerTokenRequestAuthenticator
>> does not seem to validate audience.
>>
>> Considering the flow you described, Client A would need a token with
>> Service B as a valid audience in order to be able to start the flow.
>>
>
>