I agree we shouldn't allow relative redirect URLs.
We should also improve our wildcard matching to only allow one level, for example:
We don't check the redirect_uri in the access token request either. I've created
From: "Bill Burke" <bburke(a)redhat.com>
To: keycloak-dev(a)lists.jboss.org
Sent: Thursday, 8 January, 2015 2:31:59 AM
Subject: Re: [keycloak-dev] oauth vulnerabilities
Read this one, specifically that attack on github (you have to scroll
down a bit):
http://intothesymmetry.blogspot.ch/2014/10/beware-what-you-click.html
wildcard redirect uri patterns are pretty scary!
On 1/7/2015 8:14 PM, Bill Burke wrote:
>
http://intothesymmetry.blogspot.ch/2015/01/top-5-oauth-2-implementation.html
>
> I think we're pretty good, the ones I worry about is relative urls in
> redirect URI checks i.e.
>
> "http://cloud.com/provisioned/good-site/../hacker-site"
>
> I'll log a bug for this if you agree that relative redirect URLs
> shouldn't be allowed. (Those containing "." and "..")
>
> Another really dangerous thing that we do is have full-scope-allowed set
> to true by default. If a rogue client gets registered, they pretty much
> have access to every single application the user can access with all of
> their privileges.
>
--
Bill Burke
JBoss, a division of Red Hat
http://bill.burkecentral.com
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