In addition to everything you said.
* It is not only about making changes to account, but updating tokens with
information from required actions, which not necessarily need to be
persisted.
* For back-end applications, we could also associate these required actions
with scopes. If we could have a required action as "Re-authenticate" or
"Provide 2nd factor", that would also help with step-up authentication. As
an alternative to OIDC acr related parameters/claims. I don't think it
makes sense to bring to the client concerns that are really tied to the
scopes of a resource server. As I said, clients should ask for scopes and
Keycloak should do whatever is necessary to grant these (via consent, via
additional steps/actions). Consider what you mentioned at the end of your
design document at "Require Re-Authentication". Couldn't we leverage AIA
for step-up and ask the user for a more stronger credential ?
* Claims gathering flow is simple. The Keycloak server would return the
endpoint to where the client should redirect the user. After obtaining
information from the user, Keycloak would issue a ticket (instead of code).
The endpoint returned by Keycloak would contain the action associated with
a resource. The endpoint could be the same as what you are using for AIA.
On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 4:13 AM Stian Thorgersen <sthorger(a)redhat.com>
wrote:
Pedro,
I really don't understand what your points are and what you propose we do
here.
The use-case we're addressing is the following:
As a user I would like to initiate an action associated with my account
through a front-end application so that I can make changes to my account,
for example to register a WebAuthn security key with my account.
Further, we want an action to be implemented once and re-usable in
login/registration flows as well as from applications managing user
accounts, incuding our new account console. That means our new account
console needs to be able to invoke an action in the login flow, otherwise
we would have to implement actions as react/rest also.
Now the solution I have proposed is simple. It allows an application to
request an action being invoked after the user has authenticated. Think of
it as a "required action" on-demand. It can be implemented with a few lines
of code and easily tested. It is very easy to use as it just means adding
an extra query param to the login flows, which makes it very easy to use
both for confidential and non-confidential clients.
It is not trying to cover claims gathering use-case from UMA. I see no
connection to this and step-up authentication. These both already have
clearly defined protocols. Neither can be used to address the above
use-case.
So please come with a concrete proposal as I have no clue what your
objections are.
On Wed, 20 Mar 2019 at 19:37, Pedro Igor Silva <psilva(a)redhat.com> wrote:
>
>
> On Wed, Mar 20, 2019 at 1:33 PM Stian Thorgersen <sthorger(a)redhat.com>
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, 20 Mar 2019 at 17:19, Pedro Igor Silva <psilva(a)redhat.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2019 at 12:28 PM Stian Thorgersen
<sthorger(a)redhat.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, 20 Mar 2019 at 16:02, Pedro Igor Silva <psilva(a)redhat.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, Mar 8, 2019 at 4:17 AM Stian Thorgersen
<sthorger(a)redhat.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Thu, 7 Mar 2019 at 19:09, Pedro Igor Silva
<psilva(a)redhat.com>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Thu, Mar 7, 2019 at 12:33 PM Stian Thorgersen <
>>>>>>> sthorger(a)redhat.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Is it this stuff you're thinking about:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
https://docs.kantarainitiative.org/uma/wg/uma-core-2.0-20.html#claim-redi...
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> From that it does a get including the ticket as a query
parameter.
>>>>>>>> I don't like the idea of sending tickets as query
params as they could be
>>>>>>>> logged. For the application initiated action it would
have to be an ID
>>>>>>>> token sent as the ticket. Or as I mentioned before
perhaps we have a way of
>>>>>>>> creating a ticket that can only be used to initiate an
action.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Why you need to send the id token if the client already got
an id
>>>>>>> token and, considering browser flow, there is a cookie that
can be used by
>>>>>>> Keycloak to identify the client/user ?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Cookie doesn't authenticate the client, only the user.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> But the identity cookie has the user session and from it we can
check
>>>>> whether or not the client initiating the action (client_id) has a
>>>>> authenticated client session, no ?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> That only proves that the client_id belongs to a client that has
>>>> obtained a token. It doesn't authenticate the client in any way.
>>>>
>>>> Q- Why is authentication of the client required? IMO it is not
>>>> required.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Sure, but the client obtained token and is authenticated, thus acting
>>> on behalf of the user. If the client is already acting on behalf of a user,
>>> we don't need to authenticate it.
>>>
>>
>> That's not correct. All we know is that a client with the same client_id
>> has obtained a token. Anyone can use the same client_id to initiate an
>> action.
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Perhaps what we could do is:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> 1. By default any application can initiate an action
>>>>>>>> 1.1. To initiate an action there's no need for a
ticket of any
>>>>>>>> sort, just a regular oauth flow
>>>>>>>> 2. Later add support if demand to limit what applications
can
>>>>>>>> initiate actions
>>>>>>>> 2.1 Same as before if the action being initiated is open
for
>>>>>>>> everyone then no need for a ticket
>>>>>>>> 2.2 If the action being initiated is only permitted by
some
>>>>>>>> applications we would need some form of authentication.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> For 2.2 I have 3 suggestions in mind:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> a. Just include id_token as a ticket query param like
UMA claim
>>>>>>>> redirect does
>>>>>>>> b. Add support to obtain an initiate action ticket from a
endpoint
>>>>>>>> using an id token as bearer token
>>>>>>>> c. Add a note into client session with a initiate action
ticket
>>>>>>>> for clients that can initiate actions and map this into
the id token.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Not sure ...
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If you think about it, the part interested in obtaining the
claims
>>>>>>> after an action is completed is not the client but the
audience of the
>>>>>>> token, the resource server. In this case, the UMA approach
seems more
>>>>>>> appropriate because the resource server is in control about
what actions
>>>>>>> the client should initiate in order to fulfill the
constraints imposed by
>>>>>>> the resource server to access its protected resources. Where
these
>>>>>>> constraints could be a DOB in the token or a higher security
level.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The app initiating actions in the server is not the goal, but
the
>>>>>>> tool to obtain additional claims from the server ...
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> However, for some applications acting as both client and
resource
>>>>>>> server (e.g.: a monolithic jee) can avoid all the ticket
dance and just
>>>>>>> redirect the user to the server as you pointed out in 1.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Perhaps there's a case for that, but that would be claims
gathering,
>>>>>> not application initiated actions.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Application initiated actions are more a tool for folks to add
>>>>>> actions for the user account into their own GUIs, and as such
should be a
>>>>>> simple protocol. OAuth incremental scopes for example doesn't
have any
>>>>>> flows between app and service, but rather just allows the app to
get the
>>>>>> scopes it out of bounds knows it needs for specific actions.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I think claims gathering and AIA are pretty much the same thing.
Both
>>>>> are querying the user for additional information. Despite if you are
>>>>> initiating an action to request user's DOB or update a password,
they are
>>>>> steps that the user must perform in order to enrich its security
context
>>>>> and be able to continue using both client and resource server.
>>>>>
>>>>> The point I'm trying to make is that AIA can solve other
problems
>>>>> too. You would still solve the original problem from your design
document
>>>>> as defined in the motivation section. While you would also help with
>>>>> step-up authentication and UMA claims gathering. Another point is
related
>>>>> to the party interested in the action. Is it the client or the
resource
>>>>> server (the API)?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> If the client (which honestly I don't see much use as most apps
seem
>>>>> to be a combination of front-end + back-end, where the functionality
is
>>>>> provided by the back-end and protected by a bearer token) then you
may just
>>>>> consider passing the "kc_action" parameter and have the
action initiated.
>>>>>
>>>>> If the resource server, you could associate the required actions
with
>>>>> the scopes. So when a client requests a specific scope, Keycloak will
start
>>>>> the action(s) and query the user for some information prior to
issuing the
>>>>> access token.
>>>>>
>>>>> Still, if the resource server, the resource server could respond to
>>>>> the client (e.g: UMA flow) indicating that it needs more info, then
the
>>>>> client will just redirect the user to the location provided in the
response
>>>>> to initiate the actions.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I don't understand what your point is or what you are proposing
here.
>>>>
>>>
>>> And I do understand your point of view. I just think that it can do
>>> much more than address new account management console requirements.
>>>
>>> Based on your design document, I understand what you described in the
>>> Motivation section. But again, instead of considering the "two
things" that
>>> originated the idea behind AIA, I think we can take the opportunity and do
>>> much more. As they seem related to me. Especially after your DOB example.
>>>
>>
>> I don't see the additional use-cases you are mentioning as related at
>> all.
>>
>
> How it is not related ? The audience of the information gathered during
> the AIA does impact where the token with the information will be used. If I
> need a DOB to access some page in my front-end, this is one thing. If I
> need DOB to access some resource protected by a resource server it is
> another thing. Both require tokens with different audiences, the former
> will probably be an ID Token where the latter the access token.
>
> In OAuth2 the scopes represent the permissions to access protected
> resources. Thus, it does make sense to have required actions that can
> challenge a user when requesting scopes. Considering your DOB example, if
> my client wants to access resource /api/age/check why you want the client
> to request kc_action=dob if the scope "dob" is what he needs to access the
> API ? Otherwise, you are making the client aware of things that are really
> related to the resource server. It is OK the client ask for scope "age",
it
> is how OAuth2 authorization model works.
>
> UMA leverages OAuth2 in a way that the permission ticket makes the client
> really dumb about what it needs to access protected resources. With UMA,
> the client will just receive a ticket and with that ticket it can perform
> the necessary actions to make a successful authorization request to the
> server.
>
>
>>
>> * Step-up authentication has already clear parameters in OIDC/OAuth to
>> request high level of authentication. On the implementation side it's about
>> invoking additional parts of the authentication flow, not to initiate an
>> required action that has nothing to do with the authentication flow.
>>
>
> Can we consider a required action as a prompt for 2nd factor, for
> instance ?
>
>
>>
>> * Claims gathering in UMA is about asking the user for additional
>> claims. AIA can be used as a poor-mans workaround to lack of claims
>> gathering, but end of the day it's completely different. AIA will allow an
>> app to invoke the action update_DOB, while claims gaterhing will allow the
>> application to request the claim DOB.
>>
>
> Not sure, if the difference is due to updating a piece of info, both
> flows request the user for the info. Is just a matter of updating or not
> updating the info.
>
>
>>
>> I don't see what additional things we need to consider for something
>> that is in the end very simple and can be implemented in a couple hours
>> including tests if we don't try to make it more complicated.
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Thu, 7 Mar 2019 at 16:19, Stian Thorgersen
<sthorger(a)redhat.com>
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Thu, 7 Mar 2019 at 13:39, Pedro Igor Silva
<psilva(a)redhat.com>
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 6, 2019 at 3:45 PM Stian Thorgersen
<
>>>>>>>>>> sthorger(a)redhat.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, 6 Mar 2019 at 17:39, Pedro Igor Silva
<
>>>>>>>>>>> psilva(a)redhat.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 6, 2019 at 1:30 PM Stian
Thorgersen <
>>>>>>>>>>>> sthorger(a)redhat.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Why do you think
authentication/authorization is required?
>>>>>>>>>>>>> The user will be prompted before
making an action and it's an action they
>>>>>>>>>>>>> do against RH-SSO and not
automatically visible/exposed to the client.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> The client is making the request and even
though the user is
>>>>>>>>>>>> at the Keycloak server to perform the
action, admins may want to restrict
>>>>>>>>>>>> which clients are allowed to perform such
actions. That is what I mean by
>>>>>>>>>>>> some level of authorization.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> You could even consider not
authenticating the client at all,
>>>>>>>>>>>> but still allow admins to enforce which
clients should be allowed to
>>>>>>>>>>>> initiate actions on the server.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I can't see how enforcing which clients
is allowed to initiate
>>>>>>>>>>> actions will work without authenticating the
client.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Maybe the word authenticate seems too much to
what we are
>>>>>>>>>> discussing. This is more a validation of the
client making the request.
>>>>>>>>>> Considering that, I'm saying that you could
just rely on client_id and
>>>>>>>>>> redirect uris (the client is already
authenticated and if doing browser
>>>>>>>>>> authentication the cookie is already present) and
possibly add some level
>>>>>>>>>> of authorization to enforce which clients can
perform actions (instead of
>>>>>>>>>> just relying on the authenticated session).
Redirect uris are really
>>>>>>>>>> important because you want to make sure the
redirect uri is valid before
>>>>>>>>>> redirecting the user.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The plan is to use the auth endpoint, so client_id
and
>>>>>>>>> redirect_uris are already being checked. It's
just a standard OAuth flow.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> IMO that's fine as long as there's no need to
limit what clients
>>>>>>>>> can initiate actions. If that's needed then we
need something more
>>>>>>>>> complicated that properly authenticates the client,
as anyone could just
>>>>>>>>> use the client_id and redirect_uri from a different
application to get the
>>>>>>>>> action initiated (although wouldn't then have the
user redirected back to
>>>>>>>>> the app of course).
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, 6 Mar 2019 at 14:31, Pedro
Igor Silva <
>>>>>>>>>>>>> psilva(a)redhat.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One way is to follow
authorization code constraints like
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> checking the client_id and
redirect_uri (assuming the user will be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> redirected back after the action
completes). But still, we could also add
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some level authorization.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> authorization code constraints
doesn't work as anyone can
>>>>>>>>>>>>> just use the client_id and
redirect_uri from a different client.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I may be missing the whole flow. I would
ask then what happens
>>>>>>>>>>>> after the user performs an action. Is
he/her redirected back to the client
>>>>>>>>>>>> ? If so, client_id + redirect_uri do work
to make sure that the client is
>>>>>>>>>>>> known and that the user will be
redirected back to a valid URI.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> It's just a standard OAuth flow, so app
would get new tokens.
>>>>>>>>>>> Say the user hasn't entered a DOB in the
profile and the client wants that,
>>>>>>>>>>> then they can request the user to enter a
DOB, which would then result in
>>>>>>>>>>> the DOB being available in the token.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> This flow seems very closely related with the
Claims Gathering
>>>>>>>>>> Flow from UMA specs. We could probably review
what is there and see if it
>>>>>>>>>> can help to solve this problem of app initiated
actions.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Go for it ;)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Only viable option I can think of is
to add an endpoint where
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the application can request a token
to initate an action. So flow would be:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 1. App sends POST { action:
<action-id> } with ID Token as
>>>>>>>>>>>>> bearer token in header to a new
endpoint. This would return a single use
>>>>>>>>>>>>> token.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 2. App can now do the redirect
protocol as before, but
>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead of
"?action=<action>" they would do "?action-token=<action
token>"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> In the JS adapter we can add a
action(actionId) function that
>>>>>>>>>>>>> would get the action token before
redirecting the user.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Not sure what you mean about level
authorization.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 6, 2019 at 10:25 AM
Stian Thorgersen <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sthorger(a)redhat.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The issue is more around how
to authenticate clients and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also the fact that clients
wanting to initiate actions may be public
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clients. We also don't
want to invent a new protocol for this, but rather
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> just rely on the OIDC flows.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So with those constraints how
would you authenticate the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> client?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, 6 Mar 2019 at 14:23,
Pedro Igor Silva <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> psilva(a)redhat.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> IMO, we should have some
level of authorization for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clients initiating an
action. This could be as simple as leveraging authz
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in order to define
white/black lists of clients. Similar to what a KC
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> extension does in regards
to authentication.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Mar 5, 2019 at
3:15 PM Stian Thorgersen <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sthorger(a)redhat.com>
wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Was hoping for some
more feedback from the list on this
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> one.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Especially around not
having any authentication of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clients wanting to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> initiate an action. I
feel reasonable comfortable about
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not securing it and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requiring actions to
prompt the user before doing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> anything, but
welcome
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> others opinion on
it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, 28 Feb 2019
at 11:07, Peter Skopek <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
pskopek(a)redhat.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Since there is
no "silent" application initiated action
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (always
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > prompts user)
possible and actions are predefined at
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> keycloak I see no
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > need for the
client/application restriction mechanism.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > On Wed, Feb 27,
2019 at 4:23 PM Stian Thorgersen <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
sthorger(a)redhat.com>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > Keycloak
currently has required actions that are used
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to prompt the user
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > perform an
action associated with their account after
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> authenticating, but
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > prior to
being redirected to the application.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > Examples
include: configure OTP, update profile,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> validate email, etc.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > One issue
here is these actions have to be manually
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> registered with the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > users
account, but can not be initiated by
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> applications
themselves. As an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > example it
may not be required by all users to verify
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their email, but
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > only
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > when they
use specific applications.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > Keycloak
also needs to initiate actions from the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> account management
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > console.
Examples: updating email address should
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> require verifying
the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > email,
configuring OTP, etc.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > With that
in mind we are proposing to introduce
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Application
Initiated
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > Actions. An
Application Initiated Action behind the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> scenes is just a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > Required
Action, but it is initiated by an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> application and
depending on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > action may
be optional for the user to complete
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (where the user can
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > select
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > cancel
which would return the user back to the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> application).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > No
Application Initiated Actions should perform any
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> updates to the users
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > account
without prompting the user first. For example
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an application
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > initiated
action that is used to link an existing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> account to a social
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > provider
should ask the user first if they want to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> link to the
provider.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > To make it
easy for applications to integrate these I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would like to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > leverage
the standard OAuth flows that applications
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> use to authenticate
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > users. So
to initiate verify-email action the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> application would
redirect
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > the
authentication endpoint and add kc_action=<action
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> alias> query
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > parameter.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > One open
question I have right now is. Assuming all
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Application
Initiated
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > Actions
always prompt the user first do we need to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> add some mechanism
in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > place to
restrict what clients/applications are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> permitted to initiate
an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > action?
Requiring that would make it harder to use
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for applications.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > One thing I
would also like to add is the ability for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an Application
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > Initiated
Action to require the user to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> re-authenticate prior
to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > performing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > the action.
For example update password should
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> require the user to
enter
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > the current
password, while verify email should not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (as it simply sends
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > email with
a link to continue).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >
_______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >
keycloak-dev mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >
keycloak-dev(a)lists.jboss.org
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >
https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/keycloak-dev
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
_______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> keycloak-dev mailing
list
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
keycloak-dev(a)lists.jboss.org
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/keycloak-dev
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>