Sure, I'm not against the initial design/scope. Just tried to make comments
about other aspects that, to me, are related or how it can be leveraged to
also achieve other things.
So, what Stian plans mentioned in one of his replies is fine for me.
On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 9:47 AM Stan Silvert <ssilvert(a)redhat.com> wrote:
Pedro,
My only concern is getting this nailed down so we can move forward with
the new account console.
It sounds like Stian's proposal is simpler, but covers fewer use cases.
Is that correct?
Would it be practical to implement Stian's plan and then implement your
proposal at a later date?
On 3/21/2019 8:05 AM, Pedro Igor Silva wrote:
> In addition to everything you said.
>
> * It is not only about making changes to account, but updating tokens
with
> information from required actions, which not necessarily need to be
> persisted.
>
> * For back-end applications, we could also associate these required
actions
> with scopes. If we could have a required action as "Re-authenticate" or
> "Provide 2nd factor", that would also help with step-up authentication.
As
> an alternative to OIDC acr related parameters/claims. I don't think it
> makes sense to bring to the client concerns that are really tied to the
> scopes of a resource server. As I said, clients should ask for scopes and
> Keycloak should do whatever is necessary to grant these (via consent, via
> additional steps/actions). Consider what you mentioned at the end of your
> design document at "Require Re-Authentication". Couldn't we leverage
AIA
> for step-up and ask the user for a more stronger credential ?
>
> * Claims gathering flow is simple. The Keycloak server would return the
> endpoint to where the client should redirect the user. After obtaining
> information from the user, Keycloak would issue a ticket (instead of
code).
> The endpoint returned by Keycloak would contain the action associated
with
> a resource. The endpoint could be the same as what you are using for AIA.
>
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 4:13 AM Stian Thorgersen <sthorger(a)redhat.com>
> wrote:
>
>> Pedro,
>>
>> I really don't understand what your points are and what you propose we
do
>> here.
>>
>> The use-case we're addressing is the following:
>>
>> As a user I would like to initiate an action associated with my account
>> through a front-end application so that I can make changes to my
account,
>> for example to register a WebAuthn security key with my account.
>>
>> Further, we want an action to be implemented once and re-usable in
>> login/registration flows as well as from applications managing user
>> accounts, incuding our new account console. That means our new account
>> console needs to be able to invoke an action in the login flow,
otherwise
>> we would have to implement actions as react/rest also.
>>
>> Now the solution I have proposed is simple. It allows an application to
>> request an action being invoked after the user has authenticated. Think
of
>> it as a "required action" on-demand. It can be implemented with a few
lines
>> of code and easily tested. It is very easy to use as it just means
adding
>> an extra query param to the login flows, which makes it very easy to use
>> both for confidential and non-confidential clients.
>>
>> It is not trying to cover claims gathering use-case from UMA. I see no
>> connection to this and step-up authentication. These both already have
>> clearly defined protocols. Neither can be used to address the above
>> use-case.
>>
>> So please come with a concrete proposal as I have no clue what your
>> objections are.
>>
>> On Wed, 20 Mar 2019 at 19:37, Pedro Igor Silva <psilva(a)redhat.com>
wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2019 at 1:33 PM Stian Thorgersen
<sthorger(a)redhat.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, 20 Mar 2019 at 17:19, Pedro Igor Silva
<psilva(a)redhat.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2019 at 12:28 PM Stian Thorgersen <
sthorger(a)redhat.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, 20 Mar 2019 at 16:02, Pedro Igor Silva
<psilva(a)redhat.com>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Fri, Mar 8, 2019 at 4:17 AM Stian Thorgersen <
sthorger(a)redhat.com>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Thu, 7 Mar 2019 at 19:09, Pedro Igor Silva
<psilva(a)redhat.com>
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Mar 7, 2019 at 12:33 PM Stian Thorgersen
<
>>>>>>>>> sthorger(a)redhat.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Is it this stuff you're thinking about:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
https://docs.kantarainitiative.org/uma/wg/uma-core-2.0-20.html#claim-redi...
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> From that it does a get including the ticket as
a query
parameter.
>>>>>>>>>> I don't like the idea of sending tickets as
query params as
they could be
>>>>>>>>>> logged. For the application initiated action it
would have to
be an ID
>>>>>>>>>> token sent as the ticket. Or as I mentioned
before perhaps we
have a way of
>>>>>>>>>> creating a ticket that can only be used to
initiate an action.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Why you need to send the id token if the client
already got an id
>>>>>>>>> token and, considering browser flow, there is a
cookie that can
be used by
>>>>>>>>> Keycloak to identify the client/user ?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Cookie doesn't authenticate the client, only the
user.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> But the identity cookie has the user session and from it we
can
check
>>>>>>> whether or not the client initiating the action (client_id)
has a
>>>>>>> authenticated client session, no ?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> That only proves that the client_id belongs to a client that
has
>>>>>> obtained a token. It doesn't authenticate the client in any
way.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Q- Why is authentication of the client required? IMO it is not
>>>>>> required.
>>>>>>
>>>>> Sure, but the client obtained token and is authenticated, thus
acting
>>>>> on behalf of the user. If the client is already acting on behalf of
a user,
>>>>> we don't need to authenticate it.
>>>>>
>>>> That's not correct. All we know is that a client with the same
client_id
>>>> has obtained a token. Anyone can use the same client_id to initiate an
>>>> action.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps what we could do is:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> 1. By default any application can initiate an
action
>>>>>>>>>> 1.1. To initiate an action there's no need
for a ticket of any
>>>>>>>>>> sort, just a regular oauth flow
>>>>>>>>>> 2. Later add support if demand to limit what
applications can
>>>>>>>>>> initiate actions
>>>>>>>>>> 2.1 Same as before if the action being initiated
is open for
>>>>>>>>>> everyone then no need for a ticket
>>>>>>>>>> 2.2 If the action being initiated is only
permitted by some
>>>>>>>>>> applications we would need some form of
authentication.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> For 2.2 I have 3 suggestions in mind:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> a. Just include id_token as a ticket query param
like UMA claim
>>>>>>>>>> redirect does
>>>>>>>>>> b. Add support to obtain an initiate action
ticket from a
endpoint
>>>>>>>>>> using an id token as bearer token
>>>>>>>>>> c. Add a note into client session with a
initiate action ticket
>>>>>>>>>> for clients that can initiate actions and map
this into the id
token.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Not sure ...
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> If you think about it, the part interested in
obtaining the
claims
>>>>>>>>> after an action is completed is not the client but
the audience
of the
>>>>>>>>> token, the resource server. In this case, the UMA
approach seems
more
>>>>>>>>> appropriate because the resource server is in
control about what
actions
>>>>>>>>> the client should initiate in order to fulfill the
constraints
imposed by
>>>>>>>>> the resource server to access its protected
resources. Where
these
>>>>>>>>> constraints could be a DOB in the token or a higher
security
level.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The app initiating actions in the server is not the
goal, but the
>>>>>>>>> tool to obtain additional claims from the server
...
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> However, for some applications acting as both client
and resource
>>>>>>>>> server (e.g.: a monolithic jee) can avoid all the
ticket dance
and just
>>>>>>>>> redirect the user to the server as you pointed out
in 1.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Perhaps there's a case for that, but that would be
claims
gathering,
>>>>>>>> not application initiated actions.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Application initiated actions are more a tool for folks
to add
>>>>>>>> actions for the user account into their own GUIs, and as
such
should be a
>>>>>>>> simple protocol. OAuth incremental scopes for example
doesn't
have any
>>>>>>>> flows between app and service, but rather just allows
the app to
get the
>>>>>>>> scopes it out of bounds knows it needs for specific
actions.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I think claims gathering and AIA are pretty much the same
thing.
Both
>>>>>>> are querying the user for additional information. Despite if
you
are
>>>>>>> initiating an action to request user's DOB or update a
password,
they are
>>>>>>> steps that the user must perform in order to enrich its
security
context
>>>>>>> and be able to continue using both client and resource
server.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The point I'm trying to make is that AIA can solve other
problems
>>>>>>> too. You would still solve the original problem from your
design
document
>>>>>>> as defined in the motivation section. While you would also
help
with
>>>>>>> step-up authentication and UMA claims gathering. Another
point is
related
>>>>>>> to the party interested in the action. Is it the client or
the
resource
>>>>>>> server (the API)?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If the client (which honestly I don't see much use as
most apps
seem
>>>>>>> to be a combination of front-end + back-end, where the
functionality is
>>>>>>> provided by the back-end and protected by a bearer token)
then you
may just
>>>>>>> consider passing the "kc_action" parameter and
have the action
initiated.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If the resource server, you could associate the required
actions
with
>>>>>>> the scopes. So when a client requests a specific scope,
Keycloak
will start
>>>>>>> the action(s) and query the user for some information prior
to
issuing the
>>>>>>> access token.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Still, if the resource server, the resource server could
respond to
>>>>>>> the client (e.g: UMA flow) indicating that it needs more
info,
then the
>>>>>>> client will just redirect the user to the location provided
in the
response
>>>>>>> to initiate the actions.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> I don't understand what your point is or what you are
proposing
here.
>>>>>>
>>>>> And I do understand your point of view. I just think that it can do
>>>>> much more than address new account management console requirements.
>>>>>
>>>>> Based on your design document, I understand what you described in
the
>>>>> Motivation section. But again, instead of considering the "two
things" that
>>>>> originated the idea behind AIA, I think we can take the opportunity
and do
>>>>> much more. As they seem related to me. Especially after your DOB
example.
>>>>>
>>>> I don't see the additional use-cases you are mentioning as related
at
>>>> all.
>>>>
>>> How it is not related ? The audience of the information gathered during
>>> the AIA does impact where the token with the information will be used.
If I
>>> need a DOB to access some page in my front-end, this is one thing. If I
>>> need DOB to access some resource protected by a resource server it is
>>> another thing. Both require tokens with different audiences, the former
>>> will probably be an ID Token where the latter the access token.
>>>
>>> In OAuth2 the scopes represent the permissions to access protected
>>> resources. Thus, it does make sense to have required actions that can
>>> challenge a user when requesting scopes. Considering your DOB example,
if
>>> my client wants to access resource /api/age/check why you want the
client
>>> to request kc_action=dob if the scope "dob" is what he needs to
access
the
>>> API ? Otherwise, you are making the client aware of things that are
really
>>> related to the resource server. It is OK the client ask for scope
"age", it
>>> is how OAuth2 authorization model works.
>>>
>>> UMA leverages OAuth2 in a way that the permission ticket makes the
client
>>> really dumb about what it needs to access protected resources. With
UMA,
>>> the client will just receive a ticket and with that ticket it can
perform
>>> the necessary actions to make a successful authorization request to the
>>> server.
>>>
>>>
>>>> * Step-up authentication has already clear parameters in OIDC/OAuth to
>>>> request high level of authentication. On the implementation side
it's
about
>>>> invoking additional parts of the authentication flow, not to initiate
an
>>>> required action that has nothing to do with the authentication flow.
>>>>
>>> Can we consider a required action as a prompt for 2nd factor, for
>>> instance ?
>>>
>>>
>>>> * Claims gathering in UMA is about asking the user for additional
>>>> claims. AIA can be used as a poor-mans workaround to lack of claims
>>>> gathering, but end of the day it's completely different. AIA will
allow an
>>>> app to invoke the action update_DOB, while claims gaterhing will
allow the
>>>> application to request the claim DOB.
>>>>
>>> Not sure, if the difference is due to updating a piece of info, both
>>> flows request the user for the info. Is just a matter of updating or
not
>>> updating the info.
>>>
>>>
>>>> I don't see what additional things we need to consider for
something
>>>> that is in the end very simple and can be implemented in a couple
hours
>>>> including tests if we don't try to make it more complicated.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, 7 Mar 2019 at 16:19, Stian Thorgersen
<
sthorger(a)redhat.com>
>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, 7 Mar 2019 at 13:39, Pedro Igor
Silva <
psilva(a)redhat.com>
>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 6, 2019 at 3:45 PM Stian
Thorgersen <
>>>>>>>>>>>> sthorger(a)redhat.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, 6 Mar 2019 at 17:39, Pedro
Igor Silva <
>>>>>>>>>>>>> psilva(a)redhat.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 6, 2019 at 1:30 PM
Stian Thorgersen <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sthorger(a)redhat.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Why do you think
authentication/authorization is required?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The user will be prompted
before making an action and it's
an action they
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> do against RH-SSO and not
automatically visible/exposed to
the client.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The client is making the request
and even though the user is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> at the Keycloak server to
perform the action, admins may
want to restrict
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which clients are allowed to
perform such actions. That is
what I mean by
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some level of authorization.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You could even consider not
authenticating the client at
all,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but still allow admins to
enforce which clients should be
allowed to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> initiate actions on the server.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> I can't see how enforcing which
clients is allowed to
initiate
>>>>>>>>>>>>> actions will work without
authenticating the client.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Maybe the word authenticate seems too
much to what we are
>>>>>>>>>>>> discussing. This is more a validation of
the client making
the request.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Considering that, I'm saying that
you could just rely on
client_id and
>>>>>>>>>>>> redirect uris (the client is already
authenticated and if
doing browser
>>>>>>>>>>>> authentication the cookie is already
present) and possibly
add some level
>>>>>>>>>>>> of authorization to enforce which
clients can perform actions
(instead of
>>>>>>>>>>>> just relying on the authenticated
session). Redirect uris are
really
>>>>>>>>>>>> important because you want to make sure
the redirect uri is
valid before
>>>>>>>>>>>> redirecting the user.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The plan is to use the auth endpoint, so
client_id and
>>>>>>>>>>> redirect_uris are already being checked.
It's just a standard
OAuth flow.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> IMO that's fine as long as there's
no need to limit what
clients
>>>>>>>>>>> can initiate actions. If that's needed
then we need something
more
>>>>>>>>>>> complicated that properly authenticates the
client, as anyone
could just
>>>>>>>>>>> use the client_id and redirect_uri from a
different
application to get the
>>>>>>>>>>> action initiated (although wouldn't then
have the user
redirected back to
>>>>>>>>>>> the app of course).
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, 6 Mar 2019 at 14:31,
Pedro Igor Silva <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> psilva(a)redhat.com>
wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One way is to follow
authorization code constraints like
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> checking the client_id
and redirect_uri (assuming the
user will be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> redirected back after
the action completes). But still,
we could also add
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some level
authorization.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> authorization code
constraints doesn't work as anyone can
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> just use the client_id and
redirect_uri from a different
client.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I may be missing the whole flow.
I would ask then what
happens
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> after the user performs an
action. Is he/her redirected
back to the client
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ? If so, client_id +
redirect_uri do work to make sure that
the client is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known and that the user will be
redirected back to a valid
URI.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> It's just a standard OAuth flow,
so app would get new tokens.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Say the user hasn't entered a
DOB in the profile and the
client wants that,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> then they can request the user to
enter a DOB, which would
then result in
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the DOB being available in the
token.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> This flow seems very closely related
with the Claims Gathering
>>>>>>>>>>>> Flow from UMA specs. We could probably
review what is there
and see if it
>>>>>>>>>>>> can help to solve this problem of app
initiated actions.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Go for it ;)
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Only viable option I can
think of is to add an endpoint
where
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the application can request
a token to initate an action.
So flow would be:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 1. App sends POST { action:
<action-id> } with ID Token as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bearer token in header to a
new endpoint. This would
return a single use
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> token.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 2. App can now do the
redirect protocol as before, but
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead of
"?action=<action>" they would do
"?action-token=<action token>"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In the JS adapter we can add
a action(actionId) function
that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would get the action token
before redirecting the user.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Not sure what you mean about
level authorization.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 6, 2019 at
10:25 AM Stian Thorgersen <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sthorger(a)redhat.com>
wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The issue is more
around how to authenticate clients and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also the fact that
clients wanting to initiate actions
may be public
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clients. We also
don't want to invent a new protocol for
this, but rather
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> just rely on the
OIDC flows.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So with those
constraints how would you authenticate the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> client?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, 6 Mar 2019
at 14:23, Pedro Igor Silva <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
psilva(a)redhat.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> IMO, we should
have some level of authorization for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clients
initiating an action. This could be as simple
as leveraging authz
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in order to
define white/black lists of clients.
Similar to what a KC
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> extension does
in regards to authentication.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Mar 5,
2019 at 3:15 PM Stian Thorgersen <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
sthorger(a)redhat.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Was hoping
for some more feedback from the list on this
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> one.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Especially
around not having any authentication of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clients
wanting to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> initiate an
action. I feel reasonable comfortable about
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not securing
it and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requiring
actions to prompt the user before doing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> anything,
but welcome
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> others
opinion on it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, 28
Feb 2019 at 11:07, Peter Skopek <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
pskopek(a)redhat.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Since
there is no "silent" application initiated
action
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (always
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prompts
user) possible and actions are predefined at
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> keycloak I
see no
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> need for
the client/application restriction mechanism.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed,
Feb 27, 2019 at 4:23 PM Stian Thorgersen <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
sthorger(a)redhat.com>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Keycloak currently has required actions that are used
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to prompt
the user
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
perform an action associated with their account after
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
authenticating, but
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
prior to being redirected to the application.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Examples include: configure OTP, update profile,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> validate
email, etc.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One
issue here is these actions have to be manually
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> registered
with the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
users account, but can not be initiated by
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> applications
themselves. As an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
example it may not be required by all users to verify
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their email,
but
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> only
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> when
they use specific applications.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Keycloak also needs to initiate actions from the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> account
management
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
console. Examples: updating email address should
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> require
verifying the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
email, configuring OTP, etc.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> With
that in mind we are proposing to introduce
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Application
Initiated
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Actions. An Application Initiated Action behind the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> scenes is
just a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Required Action, but it is initiated by an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> application
and depending on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
action may be optional for the user to complete
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (where the
user can
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> select
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
cancel which would return the user back to the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
application).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> No
Application Initiated Actions should perform any
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> updates to
the users
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
account without prompting the user first. For example
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an
application
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
initiated action that is used to link an existing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> account to a
social
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
provider should ask the user first if they want to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> link to the
provider.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> To
make it easy for applications to integrate these I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would like
to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
leverage the standard OAuth flows that applications
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> use to
authenticate
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
users. So to initiate verify-email action the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> application
would redirect
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
authentication endpoint and add kc_action=<action
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> alias>
query
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
parameter.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One
open question I have right now is. Assuming all
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Application
Initiated
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Actions always prompt the user first do we need to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> add some
mechanism in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
place to restrict what clients/applications are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> permitted to
initiate an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
action? Requiring that would make it harder to use
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for
applications.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One
thing I would also like to add is the ability for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an
Application
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Initiated Action to require the user to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
re-authenticate prior to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
performing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
action. For example update password should
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> require the
user to enter
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
current password, while verify email should not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (as it
simply sends
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
email with a link to continue).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
_______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
keycloak-dev mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
keycloak-dev(a)lists.jboss.org
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/keycloak-dev
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
_______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> keycloak-dev
mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
keycloak-dev(a)lists.jboss.org
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/keycloak-dev
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
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