I am sorry to join this so late.
My concern is, that in the design, it was mentioned that consent will be
always required from the user. I understand that this simplifies the
flow as it's more secure and not need to authenticate the client.
However from the usability perspective, it doesn't look so nice to me.
For example assume that in the application, the user just clicked on the
button "Link my account with Facebook" . Then after login with Facebook,
he will see another splash screen like "Application XY wants to link
your account with Facebook", which he needs to confirm. It may be
especially bad for usability in this case with linking social accounts,
as user may see one splash screen shown by Facebook "Application
keycloak wants to access your Facebook profile and email" and then
immediately another splash screen shown by Keycloak "Application Foo
wants to link your account with Facebook" .
Maybe I am wrong, but my guess is, that our users will very quickly come
with requirement "Can I ommit to show the splash screen?" . It is bit
similar to the "Consent Required" switch, which I guess most people have
OFF for their clients. So IMO I would rather count with this from the
beginning and count with the fact, that we will need to ommit consent
screen and hence verify client.
With regards to this, It seems that we may need also to specify if
client is:
- Allowed to initiate action
- Allowed to initate action with the consent required
- Allowed to initate action with no-consent required
Maybe the "Consent required" switch can be on instead on the action
itself, but the will still need to restrict if client is allowed or not
to perform the action.
With regards to the flow, I suggest that KC will require full
OIDC/OAuth2 flow. In other words, when KC redirects back to the client,
the client will be required to send code-to-token request. And the
action (EG. Keycloak user linked with Facebook) is done *after* the
whole flow (including code-to-token flow) is finished. That should be
sufficient to verify the client and at the same time, it will allow us
to add some more things to tokens (EG. some facebook details) . Downside
is, that it will be harder to implement though as the SPI will likely
need another callback after code-to-token flow to "finish" the action...
Last thing, I was thinking about using "scope" parameter to reference
those actions instead of have proprietary "kc_action" thing. The we
don't need any extensions of OIDC. It may simplify things like consents
etc. Also client will be able to have something similar like we have in
"Client Scopes" tab - the list of action, which he is allowed to
initiate. But I am not sure about this last point and maybe it's better
to keep things separated...
Marek
On 21/03/2019 14:07, Pedro Igor Silva wrote:
Sure, I'm not against the initial design/scope. Just tried to
make comments
about other aspects that, to me, are related or how it can be leveraged to
also achieve other things.
So, what Stian plans mentioned in one of his replies is fine for me.
On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 9:47 AM Stan Silvert <ssilvert(a)redhat.com> wrote:
> Pedro,
>
> My only concern is getting this nailed down so we can move forward with
> the new account console.
>
> It sounds like Stian's proposal is simpler, but covers fewer use cases.
> Is that correct?
>
> Would it be practical to implement Stian's plan and then implement your
> proposal at a later date?
>
> On 3/21/2019 8:05 AM, Pedro Igor Silva wrote:
>> In addition to everything you said.
>>
>> * It is not only about making changes to account, but updating tokens
> with
>> information from required actions, which not necessarily need to be
>> persisted.
>>
>> * For back-end applications, we could also associate these required
> actions
>> with scopes. If we could have a required action as "Re-authenticate"
or
>> "Provide 2nd factor", that would also help with step-up
authentication.
> As
>> an alternative to OIDC acr related parameters/claims. I don't think it
>> makes sense to bring to the client concerns that are really tied to the
>> scopes of a resource server. As I said, clients should ask for scopes and
>> Keycloak should do whatever is necessary to grant these (via consent, via
>> additional steps/actions). Consider what you mentioned at the end of your
>> design document at "Require Re-Authentication". Couldn't we
leverage AIA
>> for step-up and ask the user for a more stronger credential ?
>>
>> * Claims gathering flow is simple. The Keycloak server would return the
>> endpoint to where the client should redirect the user. After obtaining
>> information from the user, Keycloak would issue a ticket (instead of
> code).
>> The endpoint returned by Keycloak would contain the action associated
> with
>> a resource. The endpoint could be the same as what you are using for AIA.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 4:13 AM Stian Thorgersen <sthorger(a)redhat.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Pedro,
>>>
>>> I really don't understand what your points are and what you propose we
> do
>>> here.
>>>
>>> The use-case we're addressing is the following:
>>>
>>> As a user I would like to initiate an action associated with my account
>>> through a front-end application so that I can make changes to my
> account,
>>> for example to register a WebAuthn security key with my account.
>>>
>>> Further, we want an action to be implemented once and re-usable in
>>> login/registration flows as well as from applications managing user
>>> accounts, incuding our new account console. That means our new account
>>> console needs to be able to invoke an action in the login flow,
> otherwise
>>> we would have to implement actions as react/rest also.
>>>
>>> Now the solution I have proposed is simple. It allows an application to
>>> request an action being invoked after the user has authenticated. Think
> of
>>> it as a "required action" on-demand. It can be implemented with a
few
> lines
>>> of code and easily tested. It is very easy to use as it just means
> adding
>>> an extra query param to the login flows, which makes it very easy to use
>>> both for confidential and non-confidential clients.
>>>
>>> It is not trying to cover claims gathering use-case from UMA. I see no
>>> connection to this and step-up authentication. These both already have
>>> clearly defined protocols. Neither can be used to address the above
>>> use-case.
>>>
>>> So please come with a concrete proposal as I have no clue what your
>>> objections are.
>>>
>>> On Wed, 20 Mar 2019 at 19:37, Pedro Igor Silva <psilva(a)redhat.com>
> wrote:
>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2019 at 1:33 PM Stian Thorgersen
<sthorger(a)redhat.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, 20 Mar 2019 at 17:19, Pedro Igor Silva
<psilva(a)redhat.com>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 20, 2019 at 12:28 PM Stian Thorgersen <
> sthorger(a)redhat.com>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Wed, 20 Mar 2019 at 16:02, Pedro Igor Silva
<psilva(a)redhat.com>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Fri, Mar 8, 2019 at 4:17 AM Stian Thorgersen <
> sthorger(a)redhat.com>
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On Thu, 7 Mar 2019 at 19:09, Pedro Igor Silva
<psilva(a)redhat.com>
>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Mar 7, 2019 at 12:33 PM Stian Thorgersen
<
>>>>>>>>>> sthorger(a)redhat.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Is it this stuff you're thinking about:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>
https://docs.kantarainitiative.org/uma/wg/uma-core-2.0-20.html#claim-redi...
>>>>>>>>>>> From that it does a get including the
ticket as a query
> parameter.
>>>>>>>>>>> I don't like the idea of sending tickets
as query params as
> they could be
>>>>>>>>>>> logged. For the application initiated action
it would have to
> be an ID
>>>>>>>>>>> token sent as the ticket. Or as I mentioned
before perhaps we
> have a way of
>>>>>>>>>>> creating a ticket that can only be used to
initiate an action.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Why you need to send the id token if the client
already got an id
>>>>>>>>>> token and, considering browser flow, there is a
cookie that can
> be used by
>>>>>>>>>> Keycloak to identify the client/user ?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Cookie doesn't authenticate the client, only the
user.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> But the identity cookie has the user session and from it
we can
> check
>>>>>>>> whether or not the client initiating the action
(client_id) has a
>>>>>>>> authenticated client session, no ?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That only proves that the client_id belongs to a client that
has
>>>>>>> obtained a token. It doesn't authenticate the client in
any way.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Q- Why is authentication of the client required? IMO it is
not
>>>>>>> required.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> Sure, but the client obtained token and is authenticated, thus
acting
>>>>>> on behalf of the user. If the client is already acting on behalf
of
> a user,
>>>>>> we don't need to authenticate it.
>>>>>>
>>>>> That's not correct. All we know is that a client with the same
> client_id
>>>>> has obtained a token. Anyone can use the same client_id to initiate
an
>>>>> action.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps what we could do is:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> 1. By default any application can initiate an
action
>>>>>>>>>>> 1.1. To initiate an action there's no
need for a ticket of any
>>>>>>>>>>> sort, just a regular oauth flow
>>>>>>>>>>> 2. Later add support if demand to limit what
applications can
>>>>>>>>>>> initiate actions
>>>>>>>>>>> 2.1 Same as before if the action being
initiated is open for
>>>>>>>>>>> everyone then no need for a ticket
>>>>>>>>>>> 2.2 If the action being initiated is only
permitted by some
>>>>>>>>>>> applications we would need some form of
authentication.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> For 2.2 I have 3 suggestions in mind:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> a. Just include id_token as a ticket query
param like UMA claim
>>>>>>>>>>> redirect does
>>>>>>>>>>> b. Add support to obtain an initiate action
ticket from a
> endpoint
>>>>>>>>>>> using an id token as bearer token
>>>>>>>>>>> c. Add a note into client session with a
initiate action ticket
>>>>>>>>>>> for clients that can initiate actions and map
this into the id
> token.
>>>>>>>>>> Not sure ...
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> If you think about it, the part interested in
obtaining the
> claims
>>>>>>>>>> after an action is completed is not the client
but the audience
> of the
>>>>>>>>>> token, the resource server. In this case, the UMA
approach seems
> more
>>>>>>>>>> appropriate because the resource server is in
control about what
> actions
>>>>>>>>>> the client should initiate in order to fulfill
the constraints
> imposed by
>>>>>>>>>> the resource server to access its protected
resources. Where
> these
>>>>>>>>>> constraints could be a DOB in the token or a
higher security
> level.
>>>>>>>>>> The app initiating actions in the server is not
the goal, but the
>>>>>>>>>> tool to obtain additional claims from the server
...
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> However, for some applications acting as both
client and resource
>>>>>>>>>> server (e.g.: a monolithic jee) can avoid all the
ticket dance
> and just
>>>>>>>>>> redirect the user to the server as you pointed
out in 1.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Perhaps there's a case for that, but that would
be claims
> gathering,
>>>>>>>>> not application initiated actions.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Application initiated actions are more a tool for
folks to add
>>>>>>>>> actions for the user account into their own GUIs, and
as such
> should be a
>>>>>>>>> simple protocol. OAuth incremental scopes for example
doesn't
> have any
>>>>>>>>> flows between app and service, but rather just allows
the app to
> get the
>>>>>>>>> scopes it out of bounds knows it needs for specific
actions.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I think claims gathering and AIA are pretty much the same
thing.
> Both
>>>>>>>> are querying the user for additional information. Despite
if you
> are
>>>>>>>> initiating an action to request user's DOB or update
a password,
> they are
>>>>>>>> steps that the user must perform in order to enrich its
security
> context
>>>>>>>> and be able to continue using both client and resource
server.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The point I'm trying to make is that AIA can solve
other problems
>>>>>>>> too. You would still solve the original problem from your
design
> document
>>>>>>>> as defined in the motivation section. While you would
also help
> with
>>>>>>>> step-up authentication and UMA claims gathering. Another
point is
> related
>>>>>>>> to the party interested in the action. Is it the client
or the
> resource
>>>>>>>> server (the API)?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> If the client (which honestly I don't see much use as
most apps
> seem
>>>>>>>> to be a combination of front-end + back-end, where the
> functionality is
>>>>>>>> provided by the back-end and protected by a bearer token)
then you
> may just
>>>>>>>> consider passing the "kc_action" parameter and
have the action
> initiated.
>>>>>>>> If the resource server, you could associate the required
actions
> with
>>>>>>>> the scopes. So when a client requests a specific scope,
Keycloak
> will start
>>>>>>>> the action(s) and query the user for some information
prior to
> issuing the
>>>>>>>> access token.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Still, if the resource server, the resource server could
respond to
>>>>>>>> the client (e.g: UMA flow) indicating that it needs more
info,
> then the
>>>>>>>> client will just redirect the user to the location
provided in the
> response
>>>>>>>> to initiate the actions.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I don't understand what your point is or what you are
proposing
> here.
>>>>>> And I do understand your point of view. I just think that it can
do
>>>>>> much more than address new account management console
requirements.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Based on your design document, I understand what you described in
the
>>>>>> Motivation section. But again, instead of considering the
"two
> things" that
>>>>>> originated the idea behind AIA, I think we can take the
opportunity
> and do
>>>>>> much more. As they seem related to me. Especially after your DOB
> example.
>>>>> I don't see the additional use-cases you are mentioning as
related at
>>>>> all.
>>>>>
>>>> How it is not related ? The audience of the information gathered during
>>>> the AIA does impact where the token with the information will be used.
> If I
>>>> need a DOB to access some page in my front-end, this is one thing. If I
>>>> need DOB to access some resource protected by a resource server it is
>>>> another thing. Both require tokens with different audiences, the former
>>>> will probably be an ID Token where the latter the access token.
>>>>
>>>> In OAuth2 the scopes represent the permissions to access protected
>>>> resources. Thus, it does make sense to have required actions that can
>>>> challenge a user when requesting scopes. Considering your DOB example,
> if
>>>> my client wants to access resource /api/age/check why you want the
> client
>>>> to request kc_action=dob if the scope "dob" is what he needs to
access
> the
>>>> API ? Otherwise, you are making the client aware of things that are
> really
>>>> related to the resource server. It is OK the client ask for scope
> "age", it
>>>> is how OAuth2 authorization model works.
>>>>
>>>> UMA leverages OAuth2 in a way that the permission ticket makes the
> client
>>>> really dumb about what it needs to access protected resources. With
> UMA,
>>>> the client will just receive a ticket and with that ticket it can
> perform
>>>> the necessary actions to make a successful authorization request to the
>>>> server.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> * Step-up authentication has already clear parameters in OIDC/OAuth
to
>>>>> request high level of authentication. On the implementation side
it's
> about
>>>>> invoking additional parts of the authentication flow, not to
initiate
> an
>>>>> required action that has nothing to do with the authentication flow.
>>>>>
>>>> Can we consider a required action as a prompt for 2nd factor, for
>>>> instance ?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> * Claims gathering in UMA is about asking the user for additional
>>>>> claims. AIA can be used as a poor-mans workaround to lack of claims
>>>>> gathering, but end of the day it's completely different. AIA
will
> allow an
>>>>> app to invoke the action update_DOB, while claims gaterhing will
> allow the
>>>>> application to request the claim DOB.
>>>>>
>>>> Not sure, if the difference is due to updating a piece of info, both
>>>> flows request the user for the info. Is just a matter of updating or
> not
>>>> updating the info.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> I don't see what additional things we need to consider for
something
>>>>> that is in the end very simple and can be implemented in a couple
> hours
>>>>> including tests if we don't try to make it more complicated.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, 7 Mar 2019 at 16:19, Stian Thorgersen
<
> sthorger(a)redhat.com>
>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, 7 Mar 2019 at 13:39, Pedro Igor
Silva <
> psilva(a)redhat.com>
>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 6, 2019 at 3:45 PM Stian
Thorgersen <
>>>>>>>>>>>>> sthorger(a)redhat.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, 6 Mar 2019 at 17:39,
Pedro Igor Silva <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> psilva(a)redhat.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 6, 2019 at 1:30
PM Stian Thorgersen <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sthorger(a)redhat.com>
wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Why do you think
authentication/authorization is required?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The user will be prompted
before making an action and it's
> an action they
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> do against RH-SSO and not
automatically visible/exposed to
> the client.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The client is making the
request and even though the user is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> at the Keycloak server to
perform the action, admins may
> want to restrict
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which clients are allowed to
perform such actions. That is
> what I mean by
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some level of authorization.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You could even consider not
authenticating the client at
> all,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but still allow admins to
enforce which clients should be
> allowed to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> initiate actions on the
server.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I can't see how enforcing
which clients is allowed to
> initiate
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> actions will work without
authenticating the client.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Maybe the word authenticate seems too
much to what we are
>>>>>>>>>>>>> discussing. This is more a validation
of the client making
> the request.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Considering that, I'm saying that
you could just rely on
> client_id and
>>>>>>>>>>>>> redirect uris (the client is already
authenticated and if
> doing browser
>>>>>>>>>>>>> authentication the cookie is already
present) and possibly
> add some level
>>>>>>>>>>>>> of authorization to enforce which
clients can perform actions
> (instead of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> just relying on the authenticated
session). Redirect uris are
> really
>>>>>>>>>>>>> important because you want to make
sure the redirect uri is
> valid before
>>>>>>>>>>>>> redirecting the user.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> The plan is to use the auth endpoint, so
client_id and
>>>>>>>>>>>> redirect_uris are already being checked.
It's just a standard
> OAuth flow.
>>>>>>>>>>>> IMO that's fine as long as
there's no need to limit what
> clients
>>>>>>>>>>>> can initiate actions. If that's
needed then we need something
> more
>>>>>>>>>>>> complicated that properly authenticates
the client, as anyone
> could just
>>>>>>>>>>>> use the client_id and redirect_uri from a
different
> application to get the
>>>>>>>>>>>> action initiated (although wouldn't
then have the user
> redirected back to
>>>>>>>>>>>> the app of course).
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, 6 Mar 2019 at
14:31, Pedro Igor Silva <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> psilva(a)redhat.com>
wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One way is to follow
authorization code constraints like
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> checking the
client_id and redirect_uri (assuming the
> user will be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> redirected back after
the action completes). But still,
> we could also add
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some level
authorization.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> authorization code
constraints doesn't work as anyone can
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> just use the client_id
and redirect_uri from a different
> client.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I may be missing the whole
flow. I would ask then what
> happens
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> after the user performs an
action. Is he/her redirected
> back to the client
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ? If so, client_id +
redirect_uri do work to make sure that
> the client is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known and that the user will
be redirected back to a valid
> URI.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It's just a standard OAuth
flow, so app would get new tokens.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Say the user hasn't entered a
DOB in the profile and the
> client wants that,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then they can request the user to
enter a DOB, which would
> then result in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the DOB being available in the
token.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> This flow seems very closely related
with the Claims Gathering
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Flow from UMA specs. We could
probably review what is there
> and see if it
>>>>>>>>>>>>> can help to solve this problem of app
initiated actions.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Go for it ;)
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Only viable option I can
think of is to add an endpoint
> where
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the application can
request a token to initate an action.
> So flow would be:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 1. App sends POST {
action: <action-id> } with ID Token as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bearer token in header to
a new endpoint. This would
> return a single use
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> token.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 2. App can now do the
redirect protocol as before, but
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead of
"?action=<action>" they would do
> "?action-token=<action token>"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In the JS adapter we can
add a action(actionId) function
> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would get the action
token before redirecting the user.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Not sure what you mean
about level authorization.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, Mar 6, 2019
at 10:25 AM Stian Thorgersen <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
sthorger(a)redhat.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The issue is more
around how to authenticate clients and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also the fact
that clients wanting to initiate actions
> may be public
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clients. We also
don't want to invent a new protocol for
> this, but rather
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> just rely on the
OIDC flows.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So with those
constraints how would you authenticate the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> client?
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Wed, 6 Mar
2019 at 14:23, Pedro Igor Silva <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
psilva(a)redhat.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> IMO, we
should have some level of authorization for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clients
initiating an action. This could be as simple
> as leveraging authz
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in order to
define white/black lists of clients.
> Similar to what a KC
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> extension
does in regards to authentication.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Tue, Mar
5, 2019 at 3:15 PM Stian Thorgersen <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
sthorger(a)redhat.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Was
hoping for some more feedback from the list on this
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> one.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Especially around not having any authentication of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clients
wanting to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> initiate
an action. I feel reasonable comfortable about
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not
securing it and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> requiring
actions to prompt the user before doing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> anything,
but welcome
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> others
opinion on it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu,
28 Feb 2019 at 11:07, Peter Skopek <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
pskopek(a)redhat.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Since
there is no "silent" application initiated
> action
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (always
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
prompts user) possible and actions are predefined at
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> keycloak
I see no
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> need
for the client/application restriction mechanism.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On
Wed, Feb 27, 2019 at 4:23 PM Stian Thorgersen <
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
sthorger(a)redhat.com>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Keycloak currently has required actions that are used
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to prompt
the user
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
perform an action associated with their account after
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
authenticating, but
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
prior to being redirected to the application.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Examples include: configure OTP, update profile,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> validate
email, etc.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
One issue here is these actions have to be manually
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
registered with the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
users account, but can not be initiated by
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
applications themselves. As an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
example it may not be required by all users to verify
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their
email, but
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> only
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
when they use specific applications.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Keycloak also needs to initiate actions from the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> account
management
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
console. Examples: updating email address should
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> require
verifying the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
email, configuring OTP, etc.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
With that in mind we are proposing to introduce
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Application Initiated
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Actions. An Application Initiated Action behind the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> scenes is
just a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Required Action, but it is initiated by an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
application and depending on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
action may be optional for the user to complete
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (where
the user can
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
select
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
cancel which would return the user back to the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
application).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
No Application Initiated Actions should perform any
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> updates
to the users
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
account without prompting the user first. For example
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an
application
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
initiated action that is used to link an existing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> account
to a social
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
provider should ask the user first if they want to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> link to
the provider.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
To make it easy for applications to integrate these I
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> would
like to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
leverage the standard OAuth flows that applications
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> use to
authenticate
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
users. So to initiate verify-email action the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
application would redirect
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
the authentication endpoint and add kc_action=<action
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> alias>
query
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
parameter.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
One open question I have right now is. Assuming all
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Application Initiated
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Actions always prompt the user first do we need to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> add some
mechanism in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
place to restrict what clients/applications are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> permitted
to initiate an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
action? Requiring that would make it harder to use
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for
applications.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
One thing I would also like to add is the ability for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an
Application
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Initiated Action to require the user to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
re-authenticate prior to
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
performing
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
the action. For example update password should
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> require
the user to enter
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
the current password, while verify email should not
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> (as it
simply sends
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> an
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
email with a link to continue).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
_______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
keycloak-dev mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
keycloak-dev(a)lists.jboss.org
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>
https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/keycloak-dev
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
_______________________________________________
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
keycloak-dev mailing list
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
keycloak-dev(a)lists.jboss.org
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/keycloak-dev
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> keycloak-dev mailing list
>> keycloak-dev(a)lists.jboss.org
>>
https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/keycloak-dev
>
> _______________________________________________
> keycloak-dev mailing list
> keycloak-dev(a)lists.jboss.org
>
https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/keycloak-dev
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