2:58 a.m.
On 30 June 2016 at 16:25, Marek Posolda <mposolda(a)redhat.com> wrote:
I am adding some OIDC specs JIRAs with possibility how to fix them. I
am
including those, which will be easy to fix and I can look into them later
today or tomorrow before PTO :
https://issues.jboss.org/browse/KEYCLOAK-3189 - Add 'typ' to JWT header
+1
<https://issues.jboss.org/browse/KEYCLOAK-3190>
https://issues.jboss.org/browse/KEYCLOAK-3190 - Add 'kid' to JWT header
+1
https://issues.jboss.org/browse/KEYCLOAK-3217 - UserInfo endpoint not
accessible by POST request secured with Bearer header
+1
https://issues.jboss.org/browse/KEYCLOAK-3147 - OpenID Connect auth
request redirect_uri behaviour not according to spec
+1 To just require redirect_uri in either case
We need separate JIRAs for scope=openid and another one for removal of ID
token when scope=openid isn't used
<https://issues.jboss.org/browse/KEYCLOAK-3222>
https://issues.jboss.org/browse/KEYCLOAK-3222 - WellKnown endpoint
doesn't return supported types of client authentication
+1
https://issues.jboss.org/browse/KEYCLOAK-3219 - WellKnown endpoint
doesn't support claims_supported
Maybe this one isn't so straightforward due to protocol mappers?
All of those are quite straightforward and easy to fix IMO.
Besides that, there are those 2, which I first rather want to confirm what
exactly to do:
- https://issues.jboss.org/browse/KEYCLOAK-3221 Tokens not invalidated if
an attempt to reuse code is made
We have just single-use code (which is good), however OAuth2 specs
recommends to invalidate existing tokens if an attempt to reuse code is
done. And one OIDC test is in WARNING state because of it (it tries to
access UserInfo endpoint with the accessToken issued with the reused code).
I can see 2 possibilities to fix:
a) Invalidate just single clientSession where "code" attempt reuse was made
b) Logout whole userSession
It looks to me that (a) is sufficient solution. The potential issue with
(b) is, that if attacker can steal code, it gives him the possibility to
trigger global logout of user from all apps. WDYT?
I think option (a) is the correct approach. I interpret the spec to state
that tokens associated with the specific code should be invalidated. Option
(b) seems a bit over the top and not necessary I also wonder if there's
non-malicious situations where an application could try to exchange a code
twice, for example after a timeout or an automated connection retry?
- https://issues.jboss.org/browse/KEYCLOAK-3218 Support for "max_age" in
AuthorizationEndpoint and "auth_time" claim on IDToken
The possibility to implement is :
- Add new note AUTH_TIME to UserSessionModel. It will be time when
authentication of user was fully finished (including requiredActions).
Session note is used just so we don't need to change the model ;)
- If "max_age" parameter was requested, the "auth_time" will be added
to
IDToken (or I will re-check specs if we should rather always add it to
IDToken)
- I am also thinking about adding hook to CookieAuthenticator, so that if
max_age parameter was used and userSession authTime is too "old", the
CookieAuthenticator will be ignored and user will need to re-authenticate
with other authenticators (username/password form etc). Then authTime will
be updated on userSession once authentication is finished.
+1 Sounds good
WDYT?
That will leave us with bigger things for OIDC Basic certification ( scope
parameter support, possibly 'claims' param support and 'acr' support).
Marek
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