4:51 a.m.
On 30 May 2016 at 11:13, Marek Posolda <mposolda(a)redhat.com> wrote:
On 30/05/16 08:02, Stian Thorgersen wrote:
Create a JIRA for ECDSA. I don't think we could/should change the
default, but could be a configuration option for clients.
Added https://issues.jboss.org/browse/KEYCLOAK-3057 with fix version
2.0.0.CR1 for now.
Looking at OpenID Connect spec it looks like ID token should always be
generated in token response [1]. However, it should not be generated in
refresh [2] response.
[1]
<http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#rfc.section.3.1.3.3>
http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#rfc.section.3.1.3.3
[2]
<http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#rfc.section.12.2>
http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#rfc.section.12.2
hmm... I am reading 12.2 that refresh response "might not" contain ID
Token, hence it's nothing bad if it contains it. So looks we are currently
specs compliant if we have IDToken in both code-to-token response and
refresh response.
What I mean is, that flag for skip IDToken generation might be just
optional and disabled by default. So by default, IDToken is available and
all the communication is OIDC compliant. However if someone doesn't need
IDToken and wants to save some performance, he may skip the IDToken
generation.
A week before, I've tried some JProfiler testing of login-logout test and
token generation was the main CPU consumption (I still had just 1
hashIteration during this profiling, with 20000 it will be likely very
different though). I saw 40% of CPU time in TokenManager$
AccessTokenResponseBuilder.build() due there are 3 tokens signature here.
The option to reduce it from 3 to 2 might slightly improve some CPU cycles
"for free" (security won't be reduced).
I'd argue that we should just include ID token from the authorization
response, while never in the refresh response. That results in better
performance without the need for a config option.
Marek
On 27 May 2016 at 19:19, Marek Posolda <mposolda(a)redhat.com> wrote:
> Regarding this, I wonder if we should add support for ECDSA based
> signatures as an alternative to RSA? Just went through some interesting
> blog [1] , which mentions that 256-bits ECDSA has around 9.5 times better
> performance of signature generation than 2048-bits RSA. The time of
> signature verification seems to be slightly worse for ECDSA (see second
> comment), however there is also increased security (256-ECDSA is
> equivalient of 3248 RSA according to blog). Maybe it's something we can
> look at?
>
> Also the optional flag to skip IDToken generation will be good too IMO.
> AFAIK the point of IDToken is the compliance with OIDC specification.
> However in case of Keycloak accessToken usually contains all the info like
> IDToken (+ some more) and it's the accessToken, which is used in REST
> endpoints. So with regards to that, most of the Keycloak-secured
> applications can live just with access+refresh token and don't need ID
> Token at all. So if just 2 tokens needs to be signed instead of 3, we have
> performance gain "for free" (no decrease of security, just one less
useless
> token).
>
> [1]
>
https://blog.cloudflare.com/ecdsa-the-digital-signature-algorithm-of-a-be...
>
> Marek
>
>
> On 24/05/16 15:43, Bill Burke wrote:
>
> Are you sure the performance gains are worth less security? What kind of
> performance are you actually worried about? Network (size of tokens) or
> CPU (signatures/marshaling/unmarshalling)? If anything, these signatures
> are only going to get stronger in future releases.
>
> On 5/24/16 5:46 AM, Matuszak, Eduard wrote:
>
> Hello
>
> Motivated by considerations on how to improve the performance of the
> token generation process I have two questions:
>
>
> - I noticed that Keycloak’s token generation via endpoint
> “auth/realms/ccp/protocol/openid-connect/token” generates a triple of
> tokens (access-, refresh- and id-token). Is there any possibility to
> dispense with the id-token generation?
>
>
>
> - Is there a possibility to cause Keycloak to generate more “simple”
> bearer tokens then complex jwt-tokens?
>
>
>
> Best regards, Eduard Matuszak
>
>
>
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