Why not use optional capabilities? That would more closely match old behavior.
On Sep 18, 2015, at 8:19 AM, David M. Lloyd
<david.lloyd(a)redhat.com> wrote:
While working on moving the EJB subsystem to support Elytron, I
encountered a dilemma regarding cap/req.
Elytron exposes security domains as capabilities. EJB deployments have
the ability to specify which security domain is used for authorization
purposes. This specification is by name.
The dilemma is:
1) Allow EJB deployments to directly reference security domain names,
thus implicitly causing the EJB subsystem to require all or none of the
security domains that are or could be configured
2) Require the EJB subsystem to declare (in the model) what security
domains it uses, thus requiring only security domains that are used
Option 1 seems disadvantageous because if EJB requires no domains, it is
possible to break deployments without getting so much as a warning, but
if it requires all, then you can never make significant changes to your
security domain configuration.
Option 2 requires an extra level of configuration, but on the other
hand, it also allows tricks like providing a "local" name for each
security domain which the deployment can reference, which grants a small
but potentially useful degree of flexibility, and it has a better degree
of in-model referential integrity.
Option 2 also requires that any run-time operation to remove a security
domain from the EJB subsystem be verified against current deployments.
I wonder if we can do this with runtime-only resources and cap/req too?
I guess I've just talked myself into Option 2, but I'm thinking that
this is not going to be the only case like this as we further develop
cap/req-enabled subsystems.
Thoughts?
--
- DML
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