Read the spec once again and agree to your point that access code can only be used once.
Regarding "iss", as long as realm name is replaced by URL, it should be good. I
will do some more testing today, mostly on validating the signature of the token and will
let you know if I find any discrepancies.
Thanks once again, for the response and explanation.
On Thursday, October 30, 2014 8:53 PM, Bill Burke <bburke(a)redhat.com> wrote:
Section 3 does mention that the issuer is a URL using HTTPS, but this
URL does not have to match the token endpoint URL. It is just a unique
identifier for the issuer. That's it.
Maybe I'm just not understanding OIDC, but what you are describing for
"aud" and "azp" doesn't make sense to me. An ID Token is not an
token. Its not something you pass around to use for authz. Neither do
you pass around access codes. Access codes are only usable once.
Keycloak just doesn't support multiple audiences. When an oauth client
is registered, a set of valid redirect uri patterns are associated with
it. You cannot associate a client with another client. The ID Token
will only ever contain one client_id in the "aud" and the "azp" will
always be blank because its an optional setting.
We support narrowed "trust" by role scope mappings. When an access
token is created for a specific client, it is only granted permissions
that are configured for that client's scope. For example:
* Service 'A' has roles of "user" and "admin"
* Service 'B' has roles of "admin" and "analyst"
* User has a role mapping of A.user, A.admin, B.admin, B.analyst
* Oauth client "C" is registered with a role scope mapping of A.user
* Oauth client 'C' initiates a token request on behalf of the User, it
gets an access token only with a permission of 'A.user' even though the
user has other permissions. So it wouldn't be able to access Service 'B'
On 10/30/2014 6:42 PM, Raghuram wrote:
Hi Bill - here is my understanding of the spec:
Section 18.104.22.168 of the core spec says that clients must validate the id tokens. The third
point of the same section says that "aud" can contain more than 1 element in
which case the fourth point says that the client should verify that "azp" is
present and the fifth point says azp should be verified against the client id
Now when an oauth client registers, it can specify multiple redirect Uris, corresponding
to diff oauth clients that wish to participate in a single sign on. When a user tries to
access first client and he is authenticated, the client just gets a code. If the code is
passed to the second client ( the first client could be web app and the second client
could be a database service) then the second client could get an Idtoken. The auth server
(key cloak in this case) would then list all the client ids in "aud" and specify
the second client in "azp" which will be validated by the second client.
The above is a valid use case in our organization ( authentication delegation). It gives
flexibility to the apps ( especially sensitive ones) to pick the apps they trust rather
than just participate in an organization wide single sign on.
Section 3 (openID provider metadata) of the discovery spec mentions that issuer is a url
Hope I make sense.
Sent from my iPhone
> On Oct 30, 2014, at 4:58 PM, Bill Burke <bburke(a)redhat.com> wrote:
> Ivan, btw, looking at the library you are using, validation of the ID token is
>> On 10/30/2014 4:15 PM, Raghuram wrote:
>> I tested with libraries based on Apache Oltu and even I noticed that realm name
is being sent in the Idtoken under "iss". "aud" is null when I
included multiple redirect Uris which is breaking the validation (as per openid spec).
"azp" is not being sent (it is optional unless more than 1 client is registered)
- expect that to be sent once I register two clients.
> "aud" has been fixed in master.
> "iss" still is the realm name. This is just a unique identifier for the
realm. And there is nothing in the spec that I could find that states that it must match
the token endpoint URL. It just has to be a URL that uniquely identifies the issuer. It
is something that is configured, or, found during OIDC discovery.
> Your interpretation of AZP is not my interpretation of AZP. #1. AZP is optional, we
don't have to include it at all. #2 It would only have the value of the client that
requested the token. In Keycloak, ID Tokens are generated and only given to one
>> Used /account for userinfo end point that didn't work. Will provide more
feedback as I continue to test
> As I said before, we do not support userinfo yet. Our access tokens are Json Web
Signatures signed by the realm and the content is an extended version of ID Tokens that
contains additional keycloak metadata.
>> Fyi -My libraries were tested completely against a server implementation based on
Mitre's open Id connect and they are good.
> It's on the roadmap to expand our OIDC support beyond the minimal requirements
and to validate it against other implementations. Just haven't gotten to it yet.
> Bill Burke
> JBoss, a division of Red Hat
JBoss, a division of Red Hat