]
Jesper Skov commented on JBIDE-24642:
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Including them on the download page would also be fine. This is what I see at e.g.
.
Anywhere that is hosted elsewhere/differently than the actual (possibly mirrored) files
would suffice in my view.
Whichever makes it the simplest to do, but including the checksums at all three places
would also work :)
Cheers!
Please include sha256 checksums in announcements
------------------------------------------------
Key: JBIDE-24642
URL:
https://issues.jboss.org/browse/JBIDE-24642
Project: Tools (JBoss Tools)
Issue Type: Feature Request
Components: build, website
Reporter: Jesper Skov
Assignee: Nick Boldt
Fix For: LATER
I would like to be able to verify checksums on downloaded JBoss artifacts - both EAP and
eclipse-related binaries.
Or even better, verify a signature.
Today, when I want to use a JBossTools release, I would download
http://download.jboss.org/jbosstools/static/oxygen/development/updates/co...
And my only opportunity to verify the file is by downloading the sha256 file that lies
next to it:
http://download.jboss.org/jbosstools/static/oxygen/development/updates/co...
If a hacker manages to replace the updatesite archive with compromised files, I assume
they will have the brains to also update the checksum file next to it.
So the current checksum can really only be used to verify the integrity of the downloaded
file.
Not that its contents is untampered.
If the jar-files in the archive were signed, it would be less of an issue...
Signed artifacts would be best. But would probably take some effort to put in place.
A simpler remedy would be to include the checksums in the announcement. This would give
an additional factor of security for those who care about that.