[jboss-jira] [JBoss JIRA] (JGRP-2021) ENCRYPT: prevent messages from non-members

ENCRYPT: prevent messages from non-members ------------------------------------------ Key: JGRP-2021 URL: https://issues.jboss.org/browse/JGRP-2021 Project: JGroups Issue Type: Feature Request Reporter: Bela Ban Assignee: Bela Ban Fix For: 4.0 Although JGroups provides message encryption ({{ENCRYPT}}) and cluster admission control ({{AUTH}}), it _does not_ prevent malicious attacks. For example, if a rogue node creates a minimal stack without encryption or authentication, then it is possible for that member to * Send messages to the cluster * Capture an existing message from a cluster member P, change it (e.g. the seqno) and resend it spooking P's address * Install a new view including itself * Possibly install a new shared key in {{ENCRYPT}}, thereby being able to _receive_ cluster messages h3. Goals 1. Prevent cluster members from delivering messages from a non-member (exceptions are join requests from new members and merge requests) 2. Prevent a non-member from receiving any cluster messages The first goal also prevents rogue views from getting installed, or new shared secrets from being installed into {{ENCRYPT}}. h3. Proposed solution * Use ENCRYPT for encryption of the payload *and the headers* * Now _every message_ carries an encrypt header * (Let's assume for the moment that {{ENCRYPT}} is configured to use a shared key) * When a message is received, it is decrypted using the shared key (this can only be done by members having the shared key) ** If the message doesn't have an encrypt header, it will be dropped * For some messages that carry their information in the payload rather than the headers, we don't even need to encrypt the entire message (which is faster), e.g. ** Views and MergeViews: they are stored in the payload ({{GMS}}) ** A new secret key sent by the key server is also stored in the payload ({{ENCRYPT}}) * ALTERNATIVE I: ** We encrypt a phrase with the secret key. Everyone who has the shared key will be able to decrypt it and thus pass a message up. Messages from a non-member would be dropped. ** Could the above also be done by the sender _signing_ a phrase with its private key and the receiver decrypting it with the sender's public key, to enforce non-repudiation? ** Hmm, this would be prone to replay attacks, so either the phrase would have to be changed every time, or the ENCRYT header would have to be encrypted as well ({{encrypt_entire_msg==true}}. * ALTERNATIVE II: digital signature ** The sender creates a hash from the message (digest) and encrypts the digest with its secret key, and ships it with the message ** The receiver decrypts the digest, computes the digest from the message and drops the message if the digests don't match ** The diff to the first alternative is that a receiver doesn't even need to deliver the message and stop at (failing) de-serialization. ** Downside: additional work to be done and space used when sending the signature with every message h3. Scenarios to test (ENCRYPTTest) h5. Catching a message from some member P, modifying it and re-sending it on behalf of P * A rogue member R could catch a message from P by simply joining the same multicast group and port * R could then increment the last seqno seen, e.g. 23, to 24 and send the message on behalf of P * However, the decryption won't work because R doesn't have the shared key. Also, modifying the headers and resending the message won't work as R cannot get at the headers because they're encrypted, too * R could still resend the _captured message_ but that's useless as (a) one of the retransmission protocols (UNICAST3 or NAKACK2) will drop the duplicate message h5. Installing a rogue view * This requires {{ENCRYPT}} to sit somewhere below {{GMS}} * R sends a new view consisting of the existing view plus R * If ENCRYPT passes the message up because it doesn't discard message without encrypt header, GMS will install the new view! h5. The rogue node installing a new secret key in all members (ENCRYPT) * R sends a {{SECRETKEY}} msg with a new shared key, encrypted with its public key * Everyone install the new shared secret and R can now receive encrypted messages from cluster members! h5. Non-member R sending a message encrypted with its own secret key * Cluster members would receive that message and decrypt it with their own (different) shared key, leading to garbage in the payload * The message would get delivered to the application but de-serialization would fail as the payload is garbage ** See ALTERNATIVE above to prevent cluster members from delivering messages from rogue members in the first place h4. Properties * Rogue non-member R * Resending of captures (and unmodified) cluster messages by R: YES (however, those messages will get dropped by either {{NAKACK2}} or {{UNICAST3}} as duplicates) * Capturing and resending of messages as _new messages_ by R (e.g. by incrementing the seqno): YES if {{ENCRYPT.encrypt_entire_msg}} is false, NO if true * Reception of cluster messages by R: YES, but R won't be able to read the contents as the payload is encrypted * Cluster members receiving messages from R: YES, but applications will throw an exception trying to read the contents of the payload as it is encrypted, and decryption failed as the secret key was wrong. h4. Issues * How do we handle (unicast) JOINs from non-members? * Ditto for merge requests (unicasts)