[ http://jira.jboss.com/jira/browse/JBSEAM-2079?page=all ] Shane Bryzak reassigned JBSEAM-2079: ------------------------------------ Assignee: Shane Bryzak -- This message is automatically generated by JIRA. - If you think it was sent incorrectly contact one of the administrators: http://jira.jboss.com/jira/secure/Administrators.jspa - For more information on JIRA, see: http://www.atlassian.com/software/jira

[ http://jira.jboss.com/jira/browse/JBSEAM-2079?page=comments#action_12413048 ] Dan Allen commented on JBSEAM-2079: ----------------------------------- If we decide that this should not be implemented as part of the Seam core, I would like to see an implementation added to the wiki under a "Seam recipe" section. While we may not all agree what is or is not secure, we have to remember that one of Seam's main benefits is that it does not force the hand of the developer (remember the collapsing of the layers thing?). I would like to see an implementation uploaded as an attachment and one of the Seam developers will see that it is added to the wiki. In fact, if I can find the time, I might already have an implementation in the works that I can make available. -- This message is automatically generated by JIRA. - If you think it was sent incorrectly contact one of the administrators: http://jira.jboss.com/jira/secure/Administrators.jspa - For more information on JIRA, see: http://www.atlassian.com/software/jira

[ http://jira.jboss.com/jira/browse/JBSEAM-2079?page=all ] Christian Bauer reopened JBSEAM-2079: ------------------------------------- I'm reopening because it needs to be documented in the reference with a warning: IMPORTANT: Automatic client authentication with a persistent cookie stored on the client machine is dangerous. While convenient for users, any cross-site scripting security hole in your website would have dramatically more serious effects than usual. Without the authentication cookie, the only cookie to steal for an attacker with XSS is the cookie of the current session of a user. This means the attack only works when the user has an open session - which should be a short timespan. However, it is much more attractive and dangerous if an attacker has the possibility to steal a persistent Remember Me cookie that allows him to login without authentication, at any time. Note that this all depends on how well you protect your website against XSS attacks - it's up to you to make sure that your website is 100% XSS safe - a non-trival achievement for any website that allows user input to be rendered on a page. Browser vendors recognized this issue and introduced a "Remember Passwords" feature - today almost all browsers support this. Here, the browser remembers the login username and password for a particular website and domain, and fills out the login form automatically when you don't have an active session with the website. If you as a website designer then offer a convenient login keyboard shortcut, this approach is almost as convenient as a "Remember Me" cookie and much safer. Some browsers (e.g. Safari on OS X) even store the login form data in the encrypted global operation system keychain. Or, in a networked environment, the keychain can be transported with the user (between laptop and desktop for example), while browser cookies are usually not synchronized. To summarize: While everyone is doing it, persistent "Remember Me" cookies with automatic authentication are a bad practice and should not be used. Cookies that "remember" only the users login name, and fill out the login form with that username as a convenience, are not an issue. -- This message is automatically generated by JIRA. - If you think it was sent incorrectly contact one of the administrators: http://jira.jboss.com/jira/secure/Administrators.jspa - For more information on JIRA, see: http://www.atlassian.com/software/jira