Let me add another item: combined with Sebastian's PR [1] we could also turn on encryption by default using a self-signed certificate. We would also need to have an easy option (i.e. a boolean, false by default) on the Hot Rod clients to trust all certs. This means that a Hot Rod client would need to be configured as follows: ConfigurationBuilder clientBuilder = new ConfigurationBuilder(); clientBuilder .security() .authentication() .username("user").realm("realm").password("password") .ssl() .enable().trustAll(true); without having to manually set up callback handlers or trustmanagers. I don't think this would affect the user experience too much. Tristan [1] https://github.com/infinispan/infinispan/pull/5036 On 30/03/2017 14:25, Tristan Tarrant wrote: > Dear all, > > after a mini chat on IRC, I wanted to bring this to everybody's attention. > > We should make the Hot Rod endpoint require authentication in the > out-of-the-box configuration. > The proposal is to enable the PLAIN (or, preferably, DIGEST) SASL > mechanism against the ApplicationRealm and require users to run the > add-user script. > This would achieve two goals: > - secure out-of-the-box configuration, which is always a good idea > - access to the "protected" schema and script caches which is prevented > when not on loopback on non-authenticated endpoints. > > Tristan -- Tristan Tarrant Infinispan Lead JBoss, a division of Red Hat _______________________________________________ infinispan-dev mailing list infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev

Dear all, after a mini chat on IRC, I wanted to bring this to everybody's attention. We should make the Hot Rod endpoint require authentication in the out-of-the-box configuration. The proposal is to enable the PLAIN (or, preferably, DIGEST) SASL mechanism against the ApplicationRealm and require users to run the add-user script. This would achieve two goals: - secure out-of-the-box configuration, which is always a good idea - access to the "protected" schema and script caches which is prevented when not on loopback on non-authenticated endpoints. Tristan -- Tristan Tarrant Infinispan Lead JBoss, a division of Red Hat _______________________________________________ infinispan-dev mailing list infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev

I agree the security out of the box is good. But at the same time we don't want to make Infinispan harder to use for new developers. Out of the box configuration should be "good enough" to start hacking. I would propose to make all the endpoints unprotected (with authentication disabled) on localhost/loopback and protected when calling from the outside world. On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 2:39 PM Tristan Tarrant <ttarrant(a)redhat.com <mailto:ttarrant@redhat.com>> wrote: Dear all, after a mini chat on IRC, I wanted to bring this to everybody's attention. We should make the Hot Rod endpoint require authentication in the out-of-the-box configuration. The proposal is to enable the PLAIN (or, preferably, DIGEST) SASL mechanism against the ApplicationRealm and require users to run the add-user script. This would achieve two goals: - secure out-of-the-box configuration, which is always a good idea - access to the "protected" schema and script caches which is prevented when not on loopback on non-authenticated endpoints. Tristan -- Tristan Tarrant Infinispan Lead JBoss, a division of Red Hat _______________________________________________ infinispan-dev mailing list infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev _______________________________________________ infinispan-dev mailing list infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev

+1 to authentication and encryption by default. This is 2017, that's how *everything* should be configured.

-1 to making it easy to trust all certs. That negates the point of using encryption in the first place and should really never be done. If it's too hard to configure the correct way that we think it would turn users away, that's a usability problem that needs to be fixed. -Dennis On 03/30/2017 09:29 AM, Tristan Tarrant wrote: > While the "unsecure" over loopback is quite tempting, I would prefer to > have homogeneous behaviour with the possibility to disable security > altogether for quick demos. > Otherwise a developer would need to code differently for the local use > case than for the remote one, causing more confusion. > > Tristan > > On 30/03/2017 14:54, Sebastian Laskawiec wrote: >> I agree the security out of the box is good. But at the same time we >> don't want to make Infinispan harder to use for new developers. Out of >> the box configuration should be "good enough" to start hacking. >> >> I would propose to make all the endpoints unprotected (with >> authentication disabled) on localhost/loopback and protected when >> calling from the outside world. >> >> On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 2:39 PM Tristan Tarrant <ttarrant(a)redhat.com >> <mailto:ttarrant@redhat.com>> wrote: >> >> Dear all, >> >> after a mini chat on IRC, I wanted to bring this to everybody's >> attention. >> >> We should make the Hot Rod endpoint require authentication in the >> out-of-the-box configuration. >> The proposal is to enable the PLAIN (or, preferably, DIGEST) SASL >> mechanism against the ApplicationRealm and require users to run the >> add-user script. >> This would achieve two goals: >> - secure out-of-the-box configuration, which is always a good idea >> - access to the "protected" schema and script caches which is prevented >> when not on loopback on non-authenticated endpoints. >> >> Tristan >> -- >> Tristan Tarrant >> Infinispan Lead >> JBoss, a division of Red Hat >> _______________________________________________ >> infinispan-dev mailing list >> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists. jboss.org> >> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> infinispan-dev mailing list >> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >> > _______________________________________________ infinispan-dev mailing list infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev

+1 to authentication and encryption by default. This is 2017, that's how *everything* should be configured. -1 to making it easy to trust all certs. That negates the point of using encryption in the first place and should really never be done. If it's too hard to configure the correct way that we think it would turn users away, that's a usability problem that needs to be fixed. -Dennis On 03/30/2017 09:29 AM, Tristan Tarrant wrote: > While the "unsecure" over loopback is quite tempting, I would prefer to > have homogeneous behaviour with the possibility to disable security > altogether for quick demos. > Otherwise a developer would need to code differently for the local use > case than for the remote one, causing more confusion. > > Tristan > > On 30/03/2017 14:54, Sebastian Laskawiec wrote: >> I agree the security out of the box is good. But at the same time we >> don't want to make Infinispan harder to use for new developers. Out of >> the box configuration should be "good enough" to start hacking. >> >> I would propose to make all the endpoints unprotected (with >> authentication disabled) on localhost/loopback and protected when >> calling from the outside world. >> >> On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 2:39 PM Tristan Tarrant <ttarrant(a)redhat.com >> <mailto:ttarrant@redhat.com>> wrote: >> >> Dear all, >> >> after a mini chat on IRC, I wanted to bring this to everybody's >> attention. >> >> We should make the Hot Rod endpoint require authentication in the >> out-of-the-box configuration. >> The proposal is to enable the PLAIN (or, preferably, DIGEST) SASL >> mechanism against the ApplicationRealm and require users to run the >> add-user script. >> This would achieve two goals: >> - secure out-of-the-box configuration, which is always a good idea >> - access to the "protected" schema and script caches which is prevented >> when not on loopback on non-authenticated endpoints. >> >> Tristan >> -- >> Tristan Tarrant >> Infinispan Lead >> JBoss, a division of Red Hat >> _______________________________________________ >> infinispan-dev mailing list >> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists. jboss.org> >> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> infinispan-dev mailing list >> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >> > _______________________________________________ infinispan-dev mailing list infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev

I agree with Radim, PLAIN authentication without encryption makes it too easy to sniff the password from another machine. I have no idea how expensive SSL encryption is in WildFly, but I think all recent processors have specialized instructions for helping with encryption, so it may not be that bad. Even with encryption, if the client trusts all certs, it may be possible for an attacker to insert itself in the middle and decode everything -- depending on network topology and what kind of access the attacker already has. I think it only makes sense to trust all certs if we also implement something like HPKP [1], to make it more like ssh. [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Public_Key_Pinning Cheers Dan On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 7:07 PM, Wolf Fink <wfink(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: > +1 to make the default secure. > > -1 SSL by default as it makes it slower and I think not most will use it > > -1 easy trust all certs, That sounds to me we close one door and make it > possible to open another one > > > What if we add an example configuration unsecured which can be simple copied > for examples and to start. > > > On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 5:31 PM, Dennis Reed <dereed(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: >> >> +1 to authentication and encryption by default. >> This is 2017, that's how *everything* should be configured. >> >> -1 to making it easy to trust all certs. That negates the point of >> using encryption in the first place and should really never be done. >> >> If it's too hard to configure the correct way that we think it would >> turn users away, that's a usability problem that needs to be fixed. >> >> -Dennis >> >> >> On 03/30/2017 09:29 AM, Tristan Tarrant wrote: >> > While the "unsecure" over loopback is quite tempting, I would prefer to >> > have homogeneous behaviour with the possibility to disable security >> > altogether for quick demos. >> > Otherwise a developer would need to code differently for the local use >> > case than for the remote one, causing more confusion. >> > >> > Tristan >> > >> > On 30/03/2017 14:54, Sebastian Laskawiec wrote: >> >> I agree the security out of the box is good. But at the same time we >> >> don't want to make Infinispan harder to use for new developers. Out of >> >> the box configuration should be "good enough" to start hacking. >> >> >> >> I would propose to make all the endpoints unprotected (with >> >> authentication disabled) on localhost/loopback and protected when >> >> calling from the outside world. >> >> >> >> On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 2:39 PM Tristan Tarrant <ttarrant(a)redhat.com >> >> <mailto:ttarrant@redhat.com>> wrote: >> >> >> >> Dear all, >> >> >> >> after a mini chat on IRC, I wanted to bring this to everybody's >> >> attention. >> >> >> >> We should make the Hot Rod endpoint require authentication in the >> >> out-of-the-box configuration. >> >> The proposal is to enable the PLAIN (or, preferably, DIGEST) SASL >> >> mechanism against the ApplicationRealm and require users to run the >> >> add-user script. >> >> This would achieve two goals: >> >> - secure out-of-the-box configuration, which is always a good idea >> >> - access to the "protected" schema and script caches which is >> >> prevented >> >> when not on loopback on non-authenticated endpoints. >> >> >> >> Tristan >> >> -- >> >> Tristan Tarrant >> >> Infinispan Lead >> >> JBoss, a division of Red Hat >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> infinispan-dev mailing list >> >> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >> >> <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> >> >> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> infinispan-dev mailing list >> >> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >> >> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >> >> >> > >> _______________________________________________ >> infinispan-dev mailing list >> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > > > > _______________________________________________ > infinispan-dev mailing list > infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev _______________________________________________ infinispan-dev mailing list infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev

Unfortunately TLS still slows down stuff (a lot). When I was doing tests for the multi-tenancy router (which is based on TLS/SNI), my average results were like this: Use-caseTypeAvgError initConnectionAndPerform10KPutsSingleServerNoSsl1034.81714.424 initConnectionAndPerform10KPutsSingleServerWithSsl1567.55324.872 initConnectionAndPerform10KPutsTwoServersWithSslSni1563.22934.05 initConnectionOnlySingleServerNoSsl*3.389*0.198 initConnectionOnlySingleServerWithSsl*14.086*0.794 initConnectionOnlyTwoServersWithSslSni*14.722*0.684 perform10KPutsSingleServerNoSsl*4.602*0.585 perform10KPutsSingleServerWithSsl*16.583*0.198 perform10KPutsTwoServersWithSslSni*17.02*0.794 This is nothing new, but initializing Hot Rod connection took was ~4 times slower and putting 10K random strings (UUIDs) was also ~4 times slower. But what's worth to mention, there is no significant difference between TLS and TLS+SNI. As far as I know, it is possible to install specialized hardware to deal with encryption in data centers. It is called SSL Acceleration [1]. However I'm not aware of any special processor instructions that can help you with that. But the implementations are getting better and better, so who knows... But getting back to the original question, I think the problem we are trying to solve (correct me if I'm wrong) is to prevent unauthorized folks to put their hands on a victims data (either pushing something malicious/corrupted to the cache or obtaining something from the cache). Another problem is transmission security - encryption. If we want our new devs to be secured out of the box, I think we should do both - use TLS (without trusting all certificated) and authentication. This makes Infinispan harder to use of course. So the other extremum is to turn both things off. I voted for the latter, making Infinispan super easy to use. But you guys convinced me that we should care about the security in this case too, so I would use PLAIN authentication + TLS. I would also love to see one magic switch, for example `./bin/standalone.sh --dev-mode`, which would turn all security off. Thanks, Sebastian [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SSL_acceleration On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 9:22 PM Dan Berindei <dan.berindei(a)gmail.com <mailto:dan.berindei@gmail.com>> wrote: I agree with Radim, PLAIN authentication without encryption makes it too easy to sniff the password from another machine. I have no idea how expensive SSL encryption is in WildFly, but I think all recent processors have specialized instructions for helping with encryption, so it may not be that bad. Even with encryption, if the client trusts all certs, it may be possible for an attacker to insert itself in the middle and decode everything -- depending on network topology and what kind of access the attacker already has. I think it only makes sense to trust all certs if we also implement something like HPKP [1], to make it more like ssh. [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Public_Key_Pinning Cheers Dan On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 7:07 PM, Wolf Fink <wfink(a)redhat.com <mailto:wfink@redhat.com>> wrote: > +1 to make the default secure. > > -1 SSL by default as it makes it slower and I think not most will use it > > -1 easy trust all certs, That sounds to me we close one door and make it > possible to open another one > > > What if we add an example configuration unsecured which can be simple copied > for examples and to start. > > > On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 5:31 PM, Dennis Reed <dereed(a)redhat.com <mailto:dereed@redhat.com>> wrote: >> >> +1 to authentication and encryption by default. >> This is 2017, that's how *everything* should be configured. >> >> -1 to making it easy to trust all certs. That negates the point

>> using encryption in the first place and should really never be

>> >> If it's too hard to configure the correct way that we think it

>> turn users away, that's a usability problem that needs to be

>> >> -Dennis >> >> >> On 03/30/2017 09:29 AM, Tristan Tarrant wrote: >> > While the "unsecure" over loopback is quite tempting, I would prefer to >> > have homogeneous behaviour with the possibility to disable security >> > altogether for quick demos. >> > Otherwise a developer would need to code differently for the local use >> > case than for the remote one, causing more confusion. >> > >> > Tristan >> > >> > On 30/03/2017 14:54, Sebastian Laskawiec wrote: >> >> I agree the security out of the box is good. But at the same time we >> >> don't want to make Infinispan harder to use for new developers. Out of >> >> the box configuration should be "good enough" to start hacking. >> >> >> >> I would propose to make all the endpoints unprotected (with >> >> authentication disabled) on localhost/loopback and protected

>> >> calling from the outside world. >> >> >> >> On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 2:39 PM Tristan Tarrant <ttarrant(a)redhat.com <mailto:ttarrant@redhat.com> >> >> <mailto:ttarrant@redhat.com <mailto:ttarrant@redhat.com>>>

>> >> >> >> Dear all, >> >> >> >> after a mini chat on IRC, I wanted to bring this to everybody's >> >> attention. >> >> >> >> We should make the Hot Rod endpoint require authentication in the >> >> out-of-the-box configuration. >> >> The proposal is to enable the PLAIN (or, preferably, DIGEST) SASL >> >> mechanism against the ApplicationRealm and require users to run the >> >> add-user script. >> >> This would achieve two goals: >> >> - secure out-of-the-box configuration, which is always a good idea >> >> - access to the "protected" schema and script caches which

>> >> prevented >> >> when not on loopback on non-authenticated endpoints. >> >> >> >> Tristan >> >> -- >> >> Tristan Tarrant >> >> Infinispan Lead >> >> JBoss, a division of Red Hat >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> infinispan-dev mailing list >> >> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> >> >> <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org>> >> >> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> >> infinispan-dev mailing list >> >> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> >> >> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >> >> >> > >> _______________________________________________ >> infinispan-dev mailing list >> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> >> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > > > > _______________________________________________ > infinispan-dev mailing list > infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> > https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev _______________________________________________ infinispan-dev mailing list infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev _______________________________________________ infinispan-dev mailing list infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev

You want to use OpenSSL with Netty: http://netty.io/wiki/requirements-for-4.x.html#wiki-h4-4 Tristan On 31/03/2017 15:55, Sebastian Laskawiec wrote: > Unfortunately TLS still slows down stuff (a lot). When I was doing tests > for the multi-tenancy router (which is based on TLS/SNI), my average > results were like this: > > Use-caseTypeAvgError > initConnectionAndPerform10KPutsSingleServerNoSsl1034.81714.424 > initConnectionAndPerform10KPutsSingleServerWithSsl1567.55324.872 > initConnectionAndPerform10KPutsTwoServersWithSslSni1563.22934.05 > initConnectionOnlySingleServerNoSsl*3.389*0.198 > initConnectionOnlySingleServerWithSsl*14.086*0.794 > initConnectionOnlyTwoServersWithSslSni*14.722*0.684 > perform10KPutsSingleServerNoSsl*4.602*0.585 > perform10KPutsSingleServerWithSsl*16.583*0.198 > perform10KPutsTwoServersWithSslSni*17.02*0.794 > > This is nothing new, but initializing Hot Rod connection took was ~4 > times slower and putting 10K random strings (UUIDs) was also ~4 times > slower. But what's worth to mention, there is no significant difference > between TLS and TLS+SNI. > > As far as I know, it is possible to install specialized hardware to deal > with encryption in data centers. It is called SSL Acceleration [1]. > However I'm not aware of any special processor instructions that can > help you with that. But the implementations are getting better and > better, so who knows... > > But getting back to the original question, I think the problem we are > trying to solve (correct me if I'm wrong) is to prevent unauthorized > folks to put their hands on a victims data (either pushing something > malicious/corrupted to the cache or obtaining something from the cache). > Another problem is transmission security - encryption. If we want our > new devs to be secured out of the box, I think we should do both - use > TLS (without trusting all certificated) and authentication. This makes > Infinispan harder to use of course. So the other extremum is to turn > both things off. > > I voted for the latter, making Infinispan super easy to use. But you > guys convinced me that we should care about the security in this case > too, so I would use PLAIN authentication + TLS. I would also love to see > one magic switch, for example `./bin/standalone.sh --dev-mode`, which > would turn all security off. > > Thanks, > Sebastian > > [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SSL_acceleration > > > On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 9:22 PM Dan Berindei <dan.berindei(a)gmail.com > <mailto:dan.berindei@gmail.com>> wrote: > > I agree with Radim, PLAIN authentication without encryption makes it > too easy to sniff the password from another machine. > > I have no idea how expensive SSL encryption is in WildFly, but I think > all recent processors have specialized instructions for helping with > encryption, so it may not be that bad. > > Even with encryption, if the client trusts all certs, it may be > possible for an attacker to insert itself in the middle and decode > everything -- depending on network topology and what kind of access > the attacker already has. I think it only makes sense to trust all > certs if we also implement something like HPKP [1], to make it more > like ssh. > > [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTP_Public_Key_Pinning > > Cheers > Dan > > > > On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 7:07 PM, Wolf Fink <wfink(a)redhat.com > <mailto:wfink@redhat.com>> wrote: > > +1 to make the default secure. > > > > -1 SSL by default as it makes it slower and I think not most will > use it > > > > -1 easy trust all certs, That sounds to me we close one door and > make it > > possible to open another one > > > > > > What if we add an example configuration unsecured which can be > simple copied > > for examples and to start. > > > > > > On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 5:31 PM, Dennis Reed <dereed(a)redhat.com > <mailto:dereed@redhat.com>> wrote: > >> > >> +1 to authentication and encryption by default. > >> This is 2017, that's how *everything* should be configured. > >> > >> -1 to making it easy to trust all certs. That negates the point of > >> using encryption in the first place and should really never be done. > >> > >> If it's too hard to configure the correct way that we think it would > >> turn users away, that's a usability problem that needs to be fixed. > >> > >> -Dennis > >> > >> > >> On 03/30/2017 09:29 AM, Tristan Tarrant wrote: > >> > While the "unsecure" over loopback is quite tempting, I would > prefer to > >> > have homogeneous behaviour with the possibility to disable > security > >> > altogether for quick demos. > >> > Otherwise a developer would need to code differently for the > local use > >> > case than for the remote one, causing more confusion. > >> > > >> > Tristan > >> > > >> > On 30/03/2017 14:54, Sebastian Laskawiec wrote: > >> >> I agree the security out of the box is good. But at the same > time we > >> >> don't want to make Infinispan harder to use for new > developers. Out of > >> >> the box configuration should be "good enough" to start hacking. > >> >> > >> >> I would propose to make all the endpoints unprotected (with > >> >> authentication disabled) on localhost/loopback and protected when > >> >> calling from the outside world. > >> >> > >> >> On Thu, Mar 30, 2017 at 2:39 PM Tristan Tarrant > <ttarrant(a)redhat.com <mailto:ttarrant@redhat.com> > >> >> <mailto:ttarrant@redhat.com <mailto:ttarrant@redhat.com>>> wrote: > >> >> > >> >> Dear all, > >> >> > >> >> after a mini chat on IRC, I wanted to bring this to > everybody's > >> >> attention. > >> >> > >> >> We should make the Hot Rod endpoint require > authentication in the > >> >> out-of-the-box configuration. > >> >> The proposal is to enable the PLAIN (or, preferably, > DIGEST) SASL > >> >> mechanism against the ApplicationRealm and require users > to run the > >> >> add-user script. > >> >> This would achieve two goals: > >> >> - secure out-of-the-box configuration, which is always a > good idea > >> >> - access to the "protected" schema and script caches which is > >> >> prevented > >> >> when not on loopback on non-authenticated endpoints. > >> >> > >> >> Tristan > >> >> -- > >> >> Tristan Tarrant > >> >> Infinispan Lead > >> >> JBoss, a division of Red Hat > >> >> _______________________________________________ > >> >> infinispan-dev mailing list > >> >> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> > >> >> <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org > <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org>> > >> >> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> _______________________________________________ > >> >> infinispan-dev mailing list > >> >> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> > >> >> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > >> >> > >> > > >> _______________________________________________ > >> infinispan-dev mailing list > >> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> > >> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________ > > infinispan-dev mailing list > > infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> > > https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > _______________________________________________ > infinispan-dev mailing list > infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org <mailto: infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org&gt; > https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > > > > _______________________________________________ > infinispan-dev mailing list > infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > -- Tristan Tarrant Infinispan Lead JBoss, a division of Red Hat _______________________________________________ infinispan-dev mailing list infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev

On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 10:51 AM, Sebastian Laskawiec <slaskawi(a)redhat.com <mailto:slaskawi@redhat.com>> wrote: I think I've just found the reason why we can not migrate in OpenSSL by default :( In server scenario we obtain S*SL*Context (the one from JDK; Netty has similar S*sl*Context) from WildFly. It is already configured along with sercurity realms, domains etc. We then get into this branch of code [1]. In order to do fancy things like SNI we need to remap JDK's SSLContext into Netty's SslContext and the only implementation that can consume SSLContext we have at hand is JdkSslContext. I honestly have no idea how we could refactor this... And that's a shame because OpenSSL is way faster... I tried migrating the SSL engine to Netty's in [1] and hit the same wall. What I was told is that the SSLContext in Wildfly is now (version 11?) a capability under 'org.wildfly.security.ssl-context' and can be replaced, but I did not try doing that. [1] https://issues.jboss.org/browse/ISPN-6990 <https://issues.jboss.org/browse/ISPN-6990> Gustavo _______________________________________________ infinispan-dev mailing list infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev

We actually have more alternatives - e.g. we could use OpenSSL via Boring SSL library [1]. The root problem remains the same - we can use only what we obtain from the WF server. And currently we obtain only JSSE SSLContext... [1] http://netty.io/wiki/forked-tomcat-native.html On Mon, Jun 5, 2017 at 10:34 AM Tristan Tarrant <ttarrant(a)redhat.com <mailto:ttarrant@redhat.com>> wrote: We should use this: https://github.com/wildfly/wildfly-openssl Tristan On 6/1/17 1:17 PM, Gustavo Fernandes wrote: > On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 10:51 AM, Sebastian Laskawiec > <slaskawi(a)redhat.com <mailto:slaskawi@redhat.com> <mailto:slaskawi@redhat.com <mailto:slaskawi@redhat.com>>> wrote: > > I think I've just found the reason why we can not migrate in OpenSSL > by default :( > > In server scenario we obtain S*SL*Context (the one from JDK; Netty > has similar S*sl*Context) from WildFly. It is already configured > along with sercurity realms, domains etc. We then get into this > branch of code [1]. > > In order to do fancy things like SNI we need to remap JDK's > SSLContext into Netty's SslContext and the only implementation that > can consume SSLContext we have at hand is JdkSslContext. > > I honestly have no idea how we could refactor this... And that's a > shame because OpenSSL is way faster... > > > > I tried migrating the SSL engine to Netty's in [1] and hit the same > wall. What I was told is that the SSLContext in Wildfly is now (version > 11?) a capability under 'org.wildfly.security.ssl-context' and > can be replaced, but I did not try doing that. > > > [1] https://issues.jboss.org/browse/ISPN-6990 > <https://issues.jboss.org/browse/ISPN-6990> > > Gustavo > > > _______________________________________________ > infinispan-dev mailing list > infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> > https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > -- Tristan Tarrant Infinispan Lead JBoss, a division of Red Hat _______________________________________________ infinispan-dev mailing list infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev -- SEBASTIANŁASKAWIEC INFINISPAN DEVELOPER Red HatEMEA <https://www.redhat.com/> <https://red.ht/sig> _______________________________________________ infinispan-dev mailing list infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev

Hi all, As per some discussions we had yesterday on IRC w/ Tristan, Gustavo and Sebastian, I've created a docker image snapshot that reverts the change stop protected caches from requiring security enabled [1]. In other words, I've removed [2]. The reason for temporarily doing that is because with the change as is, the changes required for a default server distro require that the entire cache manager's security is enabled. This is in turn creates a lot of problems with health and running checks used by Kubernetes/OpenShift amongst other things.

Judging from our discussions on IRC, the idea is for such change to be present in 9.0.1, but I'd like to get final confirmation from Tristan et al.

Cheers, [1] https://hub.docker.com/r/galderz/infinispan-server/tags/ (9.0.1-SNAPSHOT tag for anyone interested) [2] https://github.com/infinispan/infinispan/blob/master/server/ hotrod/src/main/java/org/infinispan/server/hotrod/ CacheDecodeContext.java#L114-L118 -- Galder Zamarreño Infinispan, Red Hat > On 30 Mar 2017, at 14:25, Tristan Tarrant <ttarrant(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: > > Dear all, > > after a mini chat on IRC, I wanted to bring this to everybody's attention. > > We should make the Hot Rod endpoint require authentication in the > out-of-the-box configuration. > The proposal is to enable the PLAIN (or, preferably, DIGEST) SASL > mechanism against the ApplicationRealm and require users to run the > add-user script. > This would achieve two goals: > - secure out-of-the-box configuration, which is always a good idea > - access to the "protected" schema and script caches which is prevented > when not on loopback on non-authenticated endpoints. > > Tristan > -- > Tristan Tarrant > Infinispan Lead > JBoss, a division of Red Hat > _______________________________________________ > infinispan-dev mailing list > infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev _______________________________________________ infinispan-dev mailing list infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev

-- Galder Zamarreño Infinispan, Red Hat > On 13 Apr 2017, at 09:50, Gustavo Fernandes <gustavo(a)infinispan.org&gt; wrote: > > On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 6:38 AM, Galder Zamarreño <galder(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: > Hi all, > > As per some discussions we had yesterday on IRC w/ Tristan, Gustavo and Sebastian, I've created a docker image snapshot that reverts the change stop protected caches from requiring security enabled [1]. > > In other words, I've removed [2]. The reason for temporarily doing that is because with the change as is, the changes required for a default server distro require that the entire cache manager's security is enabled. This is in turn creates a lot of problems with health and running checks used by Kubernetes/OpenShift amongst other things. > > Judging from our discussions on IRC, the idea is for such change to be present in 9.0.1, but I'd like to get final confirmation from Tristan et al. > > > +1 > > Regarding the "security by default" discussion, I think we should ship configurations cloud.xml, clustered.xml and standalone.xml with security enabled and disabled variants, and let users > decide which one to pick based on the use case. I think that's a better idea. We could by default have a secured one, but switching to an insecure configuration should be doable with minimal effort, e.g. just switching config file. As highlighted above, any secured configuration should work out-of-the-box with our docker images, e.g. WRT healthy/running checks. Cheers, > > Gustavo. > > > Cheers, > > [1] https://hub.docker.com/r/galderz/infinispan-server/tags/ (9.0.1-SNAPSHOT tag for anyone interested) > [2] https://github.com/infinispan/infinispan/blob/master/server/hotrod/src/ma... > -- > Galder Zamarreño > Infinispan, Red Hat > > > On 30 Mar 2017, at 14:25, Tristan Tarrant <ttarrant(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: > > > > Dear all, > > > > after a mini chat on IRC, I wanted to bring this to everybody's attention. > > > > We should make the Hot Rod endpoint require authentication in the > > out-of-the-box configuration. > > The proposal is to enable the PLAIN (or, preferably, DIGEST) SASL > > mechanism against the ApplicationRealm and require users to run the > > add-user script. > > This would achieve two goals: > > - secure out-of-the-box configuration, which is always a good idea > > - access to the "protected" schema and script caches which is prevented > > when not on loopback on non-authenticated endpoints. > > > > Tristan > > -- > > Tristan Tarrant > > Infinispan Lead > > JBoss, a division of Red Hat > > _______________________________________________ > > infinispan-dev mailing list > > infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > > https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > > > _______________________________________________ > infinispan-dev mailing list > infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > > _______________________________________________ > infinispan-dev mailing list > infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev _______________________________________________ infinispan-dev mailing list infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev

On 15 Apr 2017, at 12:57, Wolf Fink <wfink(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: I would think a "switch" can have other impacts as you need to check it in the code - and might have security leaks here So what is wrong with some configurations which are the default and secured. and a "*-dev or *-unsecure" configuration to start easy. Also this can be used in production if there is no need for security On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 4:13 PM, Sebastian Laskawiec <slaskawi(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: I still think it would be better to create an extra switch to run infinispan in "development mode". This means no authentication, no encryption, possibly with JGroups stack tuned for fast discovery (especially in Kubernetes) and a big warning saying "You are in development mode, do not use this in production". Just something very easy to get you going. On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 12:16 PM Galder Zamarreño <galder(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: -- Galder Zamarreño Infinispan, Red Hat > On 13 Apr 2017, at 09:50, Gustavo Fernandes <gustavo(a)infinispan.org&gt; wrote: > > On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 6:38 AM, Galder Zamarreño <galder(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: > Hi all, > > As per some discussions we had yesterday on IRC w/ Tristan, Gustavo and Sebastian, I've created a docker image snapshot that reverts the change stop protected caches from requiring security enabled [1]. > > In other words, I've removed [2]. The reason for temporarily doing that is because with the change as is, the changes required for a default server distro require that the entire cache manager's security is enabled. This is in turn creates a lot of problems with health and running checks used by Kubernetes/OpenShift amongst other things. > > Judging from our discussions on IRC, the idea is for such change to be present in 9.0.1, but I'd like to get final confirmation from Tristan et al. > > > +1 > > Regarding the "security by default" discussion, I think we should ship configurations cloud.xml, clustered.xml and standalone.xml with security enabled and disabled variants, and let users > decide which one to pick based on the use case. I think that's a better idea. We could by default have a secured one, but switching to an insecure configuration should be doable with minimal effort, e.g. just switching config file. As highlighted above, any secured configuration should work out-of-the-box with our docker images, e.g. WRT healthy/running checks. Cheers, > > Gustavo. > > > Cheers, > > [1] https://hub.docker.com/r/galderz/infinispan-server/tags/ (9.0.1-SNAPSHOT tag for anyone interested) > [2] https://github.com/infinispan/infinispan/blob/master/server/hotrod/src/ma... > -- > Galder Zamarreño > Infinispan, Red Hat > > > On 30 Mar 2017, at 14:25, Tristan Tarrant <ttarrant(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: > > > > Dear all, > > > > after a mini chat on IRC, I wanted to bring this to everybody's attention. > > > > We should make the Hot Rod endpoint require authentication in the > > out-of-the-box configuration. > > The proposal is to enable the PLAIN (or, preferably, DIGEST) SASL > > mechanism against the ApplicationRealm and require users to run the > > add-user script. > > This would achieve two goals: > > - secure out-of-the-box configuration, which is always a good idea > > - access to the "protected" schema and script caches which is prevented > > when not on loopback on non-authenticated endpoints. > > > > Tristan > > -- > > Tristan Tarrant > > Infinispan Lead > > JBoss, a division of Red Hat > > _______________________________________________ > > infinispan-dev mailing list > > infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > > https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > > > _______________________________________________ > infinispan-dev mailing list > infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > > _______________________________________________ > infinispan-dev mailing list > infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev _______________________________________________ infinispan-dev mailing list infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev -- SEBASTIAN ŁASKAWIEC INFINISPAN DEVELOPER Red Hat EMEA _______________________________________________ infinispan-dev mailing list infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev _______________________________________________ infinispan-dev mailing list infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev

Currently the "protected cache access" security is implemented as follows: - if authorization is enabled || client is on loopback allow The first check also implies that authentication needs to be in place, as the authorization checks need a valid Subject. Unfortunately authorization is very heavy-weight and actually overkill even for "normal" secure usage. My proposal is as follows: - the "default" configuration files are "secure" by default - provide clearly marked "unsecured" configuration files, which the user can use - drop the "protected cache" check completely And definitely NO to a dev switch. Tristan On 19/04/2017 10:05, Galder Zamarreño wrote: > Agree with Wolf. Let's keep it simple by just providing extra configuration files for dev/unsecure envs. > > Cheers, > -- > Galder Zamarreño > Infinispan, Red Hat > >> On 15 Apr 2017, at 12:57, Wolf Fink <wfink(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: >> >> I would think a "switch" can have other impacts as you need to check it in the code - and might have security leaks here >> >> So what is wrong with some configurations which are the default and secured. >> and a "*-dev or *-unsecure" configuration to start easy. >> Also this can be used in production if there is no need for security >> >> On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 4:13 PM, Sebastian Laskawiec < slaskawi(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: >> I still think it would be better to create an extra switch to run infinispan in "development mode". This means no authentication, no encryption, possibly with JGroups stack tuned for fast discovery (especially in Kubernetes) and a big warning saying "You are in development mode, do not use this in production". >> >> Just something very easy to get you going. >> >> On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 12:16 PM Galder Zamarreño <galder(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: >> >> -- >> Galder Zamarreño >> Infinispan, Red Hat >> >>> On 13 Apr 2017, at 09:50, Gustavo Fernandes <gustavo(a)infinispan.org&gt; wrote: >>> >>> On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 6:38 AM, Galder Zamarreño <galder(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: >>> Hi all, >>> >>> As per some discussions we had yesterday on IRC w/ Tristan, Gustavo and Sebastian, I've created a docker image snapshot that reverts the change stop protected caches from requiring security enabled [1]. >>> >>> In other words, I've removed [2]. The reason for temporarily doing that is because with the change as is, the changes required for a default server distro require that the entire cache manager's security is enabled. This is in turn creates a lot of problems with health and running checks used by Kubernetes/OpenShift amongst other things. >>> >>> Judging from our discussions on IRC, the idea is for such change to be present in 9.0.1, but I'd like to get final confirmation from Tristan et al. >>> >>> >>> +1 >>> >>> Regarding the "security by default" discussion, I think we should ship configurations cloud.xml, clustered.xml and standalone.xml with security enabled and disabled variants, and let users >>> decide which one to pick based on the use case. >> >> I think that's a better idea. >> >> We could by default have a secured one, but switching to an insecure configuration should be doable with minimal effort, e.g. just switching config file. >> >> As highlighted above, any secured configuration should work out-of-the-box with our docker images, e.g. WRT healthy/running checks. >> >> Cheers, >> >>> >>> Gustavo. >>> >>> >>> Cheers, >>> >>> [1] https://hub.docker.com/r/galderz/infinispan-server/tags/ (9.0.1-SNAPSHOT tag for anyone interested) >>> [2] https://github.com/infinispan/infinispan/blob/master/server/hotrod/src/ma... >>> -- >>> Galder Zamarreño >>> Infinispan, Red Hat >>> >>>> On 30 Mar 2017, at 14:25, Tristan Tarrant <ttarrant(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: >>>> >>>> Dear all, >>>> >>>> after a mini chat on IRC, I wanted to bring this to everybody's attention. >>>> >>>> We should make the Hot Rod endpoint require authentication in the >>>> out-of-the-box configuration. >>>> The proposal is to enable the PLAIN (or, preferably, DIGEST) SASL >>>> mechanism against the ApplicationRealm and require users to run the >>>> add-user script. >>>> This would achieve two goals: >>>> - secure out-of-the-box configuration, which is always a good idea >>>> - access to the "protected" schema and script caches which is prevented >>>> when not on loopback on non-authenticated endpoints. >>>> >>>> Tristan >>>> -- >>>> Tristan Tarrant >>>> Infinispan Lead >>>> JBoss, a division of Red Hat >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> infinispan-dev mailing list >>>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >>>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> infinispan-dev mailing list >>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> infinispan-dev mailing list >>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> infinispan-dev mailing list >> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >> -- >> SEBASTIAN ŁASKAWIEC >> INFINISPAN DEVELOPER >> Red Hat EMEA >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> infinispan-dev mailing list >> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >> >> _______________________________________________ >> infinispan-dev mailing list >> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > > > _______________________________________________ > infinispan-dev mailing list > infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > -- Tristan Tarrant Infinispan Lead JBoss, a division of Red Hat _______________________________________________ infinispan-dev mailing list infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev

On 19 Apr 2017, at 12:04, Tristan Tarrant <ttarrant(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: That is caused by not wrapping the calls in PrivilegedActions in all the correct places and is a bug. Tristan On 19/04/2017 11:34, Sebastian Laskawiec wrote: > The proposal look ok to me. > > But I would also like to highlight one thing - it seems you can't access > secured cache properties using CLI. This seems wrong to me (if you can > invoke the cli, in 99,99% of the cases you have access to the machine, > so you can do whatever you want). It also breaks healthchecks in Docker > image. > > I would like to make sure we will address those concerns. > > On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 10:59 AM Tristan Tarrant <ttarrant(a)redhat.com > <mailto:ttarrant@redhat.com>> wrote: > > Currently the "protected cache access" security is implemented as > follows: > > - if authorization is enabled || client is on loopback > allow > > The first check also implies that authentication needs to be in place, > as the authorization checks need a valid Subject. > > Unfortunately authorization is very heavy-weight and actually overkill > even for "normal" secure usage. > > My proposal is as follows: > - the "default" configuration files are "secure" by default > - provide clearly marked "unsecured" configuration files, which the user > can use > - drop the "protected cache" check completely > > And definitely NO to a dev switch. > > Tristan > > On 19/04/2017 10:05, Galder Zamarreño wrote: >> Agree with Wolf. Let's keep it simple by just providing extra > configuration files for dev/unsecure envs. >> >> Cheers, >> -- >> Galder Zamarreño >> Infinispan, Red Hat >> >>> On 15 Apr 2017, at 12:57, Wolf Fink <wfink(a)redhat.com > <mailto:wfink@redhat.com>> wrote: >>> >>> I would think a "switch" can have other impacts as you need to > check it in the code - and might have security leaks here >>> >>> So what is wrong with some configurations which are the default > and secured. >>> and a "*-dev or *-unsecure" configuration to start easy. >>> Also this can be used in production if there is no need for security >>> >>> On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 4:13 PM, Sebastian Laskawiec > <slaskawi(a)redhat.com <mailto:slaskawi@redhat.com>> wrote: >>> I still think it would be better to create an extra switch to > run infinispan in "development mode". This means no authentication, > no encryption, possibly with JGroups stack tuned for fast discovery > (especially in Kubernetes) and a big warning saying "You are in > development mode, do not use this in production". >>> >>> Just something very easy to get you going. >>> >>> On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 12:16 PM Galder Zamarreño > <galder(a)redhat.com <mailto:galder@redhat.com>> wrote: >>> >>> -- >>> Galder Zamarreño >>> Infinispan, Red Hat >>> >>>> On 13 Apr 2017, at 09:50, Gustavo Fernandes > <gustavo(a)infinispan.org <mailto:gustavo@infinispan.org>> wrote: >>>> >>>> On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 6:38 AM, Galder Zamarreño > <galder(a)redhat.com <mailto:galder@redhat.com>> wrote: >>>> Hi all, >>>> >>>> As per some discussions we had yesterday on IRC w/ Tristan, > Gustavo and Sebastian, I've created a docker image snapshot that > reverts the change stop protected caches from requiring security > enabled [1]. >>>> >>>> In other words, I've removed [2]. The reason for temporarily > doing that is because with the change as is, the changes required > for a default server distro require that the entire cache manager's > security is enabled. This is in turn creates a lot of problems with > health and running checks used by Kubernetes/OpenShift amongst other > things. >>>> >>>> Judging from our discussions on IRC, the idea is for such > change to be present in 9.0.1, but I'd like to get final > confirmation from Tristan et al. >>>> >>>> >>>> +1 >>>> >>>> Regarding the "security by default" discussion, I think we > should ship configurations cloud.xml, clustered.xml and > standalone.xml with security enabled and disabled variants, and let > users >>>> decide which one to pick based on the use case. >>> >>> I think that's a better idea. >>> >>> We could by default have a secured one, but switching to an > insecure configuration should be doable with minimal effort, e.g. > just switching config file. >>> >>> As highlighted above, any secured configuration should work > out-of-the-box with our docker images, e.g. WRT healthy/running checks. >>> >>> Cheers, >>> >>>> >>>> Gustavo. >>>> >>>> >>>> Cheers, >>>> >>>> [1] https://hub.docker.com/r/galderz/infinispan-server/tags/ > (9.0.1-SNAPSHOT tag for anyone interested) >>>> [2] > https://github.com/infinispan/infinispan/blob/master/server/hotrod/src/ma... >>>> -- >>>> Galder Zamarreño >>>> Infinispan, Red Hat >>>> >>>>> On 30 Mar 2017, at 14:25, Tristan Tarrant <ttarrant(a)redhat.com > <mailto:ttarrant@redhat.com>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Dear all, >>>>> >>>>> after a mini chat on IRC, I wanted to bring this to > everybody's attention. >>>>> >>>>> We should make the Hot Rod endpoint require authentication in the >>>>> out-of-the-box configuration. >>>>> The proposal is to enable the PLAIN (or, preferably, DIGEST) SASL >>>>> mechanism against the ApplicationRealm and require users to > run the >>>>> add-user script. >>>>> This would achieve two goals: >>>>> - secure out-of-the-box configuration, which is always a good idea >>>>> - access to the "protected" schema and script caches which is > prevented >>>>> when not on loopback on non-authenticated endpoints. >>>>> >>>>> Tristan >>>>> -- >>>>> Tristan Tarrant >>>>> Infinispan Lead >>>>> JBoss, a division of Red Hat >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> infinispan-dev mailing list >>>>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> >>>>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> infinispan-dev mailing list >>>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> >>>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> infinispan-dev mailing list >>>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> >>>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> infinispan-dev mailing list >>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> >>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >>> -- >>> SEBASTIAN ŁASKAWIEC >>> INFINISPAN DEVELOPER >>> Red Hat EMEA >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> infinispan-dev mailing list >>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> >>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> infinispan-dev mailing list >>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> >>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> infinispan-dev mailing list >> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> >> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >> > > -- > Tristan Tarrant > Infinispan Lead > JBoss, a division of Red Hat > _______________________________________________ > infinispan-dev mailing list > infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> > https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > > -- > > SEBASTIANŁASKAWIEC > > INFINISPAN DEVELOPER > > Red HatEMEA <https://www.redhat.com/> > > <https://red.ht/sig> > > > > _______________________________________________ > infinispan-dev mailing list > infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > -- Tristan Tarrant Infinispan Lead JBoss, a division of Red Hat _______________________________________________ infinispan-dev mailing list infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev

On 5 Sep 2017, at 18:03, Katia Aresti <karesti(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: Hi all, I came up to this thread now, at the time I did not understand what we discussed here. Let me tell you my experience of today. I want to create a vert.x application, super simple, that connects to infinispan-server. Everything in open-shift. I take an vert-x example as base, super simple one, that deploys directly a super simple web app with a simple command line. Works fine, I see the "hello world" webapp in my laptop on the openshift and my navigator. I want this time to access to infinispan-server. I go into the interface, and I say "hey, grab the jboss/infinispan-server" image from docker registry. I try to go to the REST console, and oh, I need to authenticate. I go back, and then I read that I need to put 2 env variables. So there it is, now it works. And then I want to go to the console, requires me to put again the user/password. And it does not work. And I don't see how to disable security. And I don't know what to do. And I'm like : why do I need security at all here ? I'm a lambda dev, in a lambda project, considering using infinispan-server for the first time, and at this point, security of the cache I don't care and I don't know why I have to deal with it. I know you acted a ticket and decided to have security on by default. IMHO lambda dev creating the hello world with the docker image provided by jboss... does not care about it. At all. He or she just wants to see everything working as soon as possible. Once they decide to use infinispan, if the cache needs to be secured, which seems to be recommended, they will go into that point (devs and ops) and change the code and the configuration to add the security level they need for their project. I wonder if you want to reconsider the "secured by default" point after my experience. My 2 cents, Katia > On Tue, May 9, 2017 at 2:24 PM, Galder Zamarreño <galder(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: > Hi all, > > Tristan and I had chat yesterday and I've distilled the contents of the discussion and the feedback here into a JIRA [1]. The JIRA contains several subtasks to handle these aspects: > > 1. Remove auth check in server's CacheDecodeContext. > 2. Default server configuration should require authentication in all entry points. > 3. Provide an unauthenticated configuration that users can easily switch to. > 4. Remove default username+passwords in docker image and instead show an info/warn message when these are not provided. > 5. Add capability to pass in app user role groups to docker image easily, so that its easy to add authorization on top of the server. > > Cheers, > > [1] https://issues.jboss.org/browse/ISPN-7811 > -- > Galder Zamarreño > Infinispan, Red Hat > > > On 19 Apr 2017, at 12:04, Tristan Tarrant <ttarrant(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: > > > > That is caused by not wrapping the calls in PrivilegedActions in all the > > correct places and is a bug. > > > > Tristan > > > > On 19/04/2017 11:34, Sebastian Laskawiec wrote: > >> The proposal look ok to me. > >> > >> But I would also like to highlight one thing - it seems you can't access > >> secured cache properties using CLI. This seems wrong to me (if you can > >> invoke the cli, in 99,99% of the cases you have access to the machine, > >> so you can do whatever you want). It also breaks healthchecks in Docker > >> image. > >> > >> I would like to make sure we will address those concerns. > >> > >> On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 10:59 AM Tristan Tarrant <ttarrant(a)redhat.com > >> <mailto:ttarrant@redhat.com>> wrote: > >> > >> Currently the "protected cache access" security is implemented as > >> follows: > >> > >> - if authorization is enabled || client is on loopback > >> allow > >> > >> The first check also implies that authentication needs to be in place, > >> as the authorization checks need a valid Subject. > >> > >> Unfortunately authorization is very heavy-weight and actually overkill > >> even for "normal" secure usage. > >> > >> My proposal is as follows: > >> - the "default" configuration files are "secure" by default > >> - provide clearly marked "unsecured" configuration files, which the user > >> can use > >> - drop the "protected cache" check completely > >> > >> And definitely NO to a dev switch. > >> > >> Tristan > >> > >> On 19/04/2017 10:05, Galder Zamarreño wrote: > >>> Agree with Wolf. Let's keep it simple by just providing extra > >> configuration files for dev/unsecure envs. > >>> > >>> Cheers, > >>> -- > >>> Galder Zamarreño > >>> Infinispan, Red Hat > >>> > >>>> On 15 Apr 2017, at 12:57, Wolf Fink <wfink(a)redhat.com > >> <mailto:wfink@redhat.com>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> I would think a "switch" can have other impacts as you need to > >> check it in the code - and might have security leaks here > >>>> > >>>> So what is wrong with some configurations which are the default > >> and secured. > >>>> and a "*-dev or *-unsecure" configuration to start easy. > >>>> Also this can be used in production if there is no need for security > >>>> > >>>> On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 4:13 PM, Sebastian Laskawiec > >> <slaskawi(a)redhat.com <mailto:slaskawi@redhat.com>> wrote: > >>>> I still think it would be better to create an extra switch to > >> run infinispan in "development mode". This means no authentication, > >> no encryption, possibly with JGroups stack tuned for fast discovery > >> (especially in Kubernetes) and a big warning saying "You are in > >> development mode, do not use this in production". > >>>> > >>>> Just something very easy to get you going. > >>>> > >>>> On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 12:16 PM Galder Zamarreño > >> <galder(a)redhat.com <mailto:galder@redhat.com>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> Galder Zamarreño > >>>> Infinispan, Red Hat > >>>> > >>>>> On 13 Apr 2017, at 09:50, Gustavo Fernandes > >> <gustavo(a)infinispan.org <mailto:gustavo@infinispan.org>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 6:38 AM, Galder Zamarreño > >> <galder(a)redhat.com <mailto:galder@redhat.com>> wrote: > >>>>> Hi all, > >>>>> > >>>>> As per some discussions we had yesterday on IRC w/ Tristan, > >> Gustavo and Sebastian, I've created a docker image snapshot that > >> reverts the change stop protected caches from requiring security > >> enabled [1]. > >>>>> > >>>>> In other words, I've removed [2]. The reason for temporarily > >> doing that is because with the change as is, the changes required > >> for a default server distro require that the entire cache manager's > >> security is enabled. This is in turn creates a lot of problems with > >> health and running checks used by Kubernetes/OpenShift amongst other > >> things. > >>>>> > >>>>> Judging from our discussions on IRC, the idea is for such > >> change to be present in 9.0.1, but I'd like to get final > >> confirmation from Tristan et al. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> +1 > >>>>> > >>>>> Regarding the "security by default" discussion, I think we > >> should ship configurations cloud.xml, clustered.xml and > >> standalone.xml with security enabled and disabled variants, and let > >> users > >>>>> decide which one to pick based on the use case. > >>>> > >>>> I think that's a better idea. > >>>> > >>>> We could by default have a secured one, but switching to an > >> insecure configuration should be doable with minimal effort, e.g. > >> just switching config file. > >>>> > >>>> As highlighted above, any secured configuration should work > >> out-of-the-box with our docker images, e.g. WRT healthy/running checks. > >>>> > >>>> Cheers, > >>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Gustavo. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Cheers, > >>>>> > >>>>> [1] https://hub.docker.com/r/galderz/infinispan-server/tags/ > >> (9.0.1-SNAPSHOT tag for anyone interested) > >>>>> [2] > >> https://github.com/infinispan/infinispan/blob/master/server/hotrod/src/ma... > >>>>> -- > >>>>> Galder Zamarreño > >>>>> Infinispan, Red Hat > >>>>> > >>>>>> On 30 Mar 2017, at 14:25, Tristan Tarrant <ttarrant(a)redhat.com > >> <mailto:ttarrant@redhat.com>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Dear all, > >>>>>> > >>>>>> after a mini chat on IRC, I wanted to bring this to > >> everybody's attention. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> We should make the Hot Rod endpoint require authentication in the > >>>>>> out-of-the-box configuration. > >>>>>> The proposal is to enable the PLAIN (or, preferably, DIGEST) SASL > >>>>>> mechanism against the ApplicationRealm and require users to > >> run the > >>>>>> add-user script. > >>>>>> This would achieve two goals: > >>>>>> - secure out-of-the-box configuration, which is always a good idea > >>>>>> - access to the "protected" schema and script caches which is > >> prevented > >>>>>> when not on loopback on non-authenticated endpoints. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Tristan > >>>>>> -- > >>>>>> Tristan Tarrant > >>>>>> Infinispan Lead > >>>>>> JBoss, a division of Red Hat > >>>>>> _______________________________________________ > >>>>>> infinispan-dev mailing list > >>>>>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > >> <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> > >>>>>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> _______________________________________________ > >>>>> infinispan-dev mailing list > >>>>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > >> <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> > >>>>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > >>>>> > >>>>> _______________________________________________ > >>>>> infinispan-dev mailing list > >>>>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > >> <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> > >>>>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> _______________________________________________ > >>>> infinispan-dev mailing list > >>>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > >> <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> > >>>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > >>>> -- > >>>> SEBASTIAN ŁASKAWIEC > >>>> INFINISPAN DEVELOPER > >>>> Red Hat EMEA > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> _______________________________________________ > >>>> infinispan-dev mailing list > >>>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > >> <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> > >>>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > >>>> > >>>> _______________________________________________ > >>>> infinispan-dev mailing list > >>>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > >> <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> > >>>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > >>> > >>> > >>> _______________________________________________ > >>> infinispan-dev mailing list > >>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > >> <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> > >>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > >>> > >> > >> -- > >> Tristan Tarrant > >> Infinispan Lead > >> JBoss, a division of Red Hat > >> _______________________________________________ > >> infinispan-dev mailing list > >> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> > >> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > >> > >> -- > >> > >> SEBASTIANŁASKAWIEC > >> > >> INFINISPAN DEVELOPER > >> > >> Red HatEMEA <https://www.redhat.com/> > >> > >> <https://red.ht/sig> > >> > >> > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> infinispan-dev mailing list > >> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > >> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > >> > > > > -- > > Tristan Tarrant > > Infinispan Lead > > JBoss, a division of Red Hat > > _______________________________________________ > > infinispan-dev mailing list > > infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > > https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > > > _______________________________________________ > infinispan-dev mailing list > infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev _______________________________________________ infinispan-dev mailing list infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev

And then I want to go to the console, requires me to put again the user/password. And it does not work. And I don't see how to disable security. And I don't know what to do. And I'm like : why do I need security at all here ?

I wonder if you want to reconsider the "secured by default" point after my experience.

My 2 cents, Katia On Tue, May 9, 2017 at 2:24 PM, Galder Zamarreño <galder(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: > Hi all, > > Tristan and I had chat yesterday and I've distilled the contents of the > discussion and the feedback here into a JIRA [1]. The JIRA contains several > subtasks to handle these aspects: > > 1. Remove auth check in server's CacheDecodeContext. > 2. Default server configuration should require authentication in all > entry points. > 3. Provide an unauthenticated configuration that users can easily switch > to. > 4. Remove default username+passwords in docker image and instead show an > info/warn message when these are not provided. > 5. Add capability to pass in app user role groups to docker image easily, > so that its easy to add authorization on top of the server. > > Cheers, > > [1] https://issues.jboss.org/browse/ISPN-7811 > -- > Galder Zamarreño > Infinispan, Red Hat > > > On 19 Apr 2017, at 12:04, Tristan Tarrant <ttarrant(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: > > > > That is caused by not wrapping the calls in PrivilegedActions in all the > > correct places and is a bug. > > > > Tristan > > > > On 19/04/2017 11:34, Sebastian Laskawiec wrote: > >> The proposal look ok to me. > >> > >> But I would also like to highlight one thing - it seems you can't > access > >> secured cache properties using CLI. This seems wrong to me (if you can > >> invoke the cli, in 99,99% of the cases you have access to the machine, > >> so you can do whatever you want). It also breaks healthchecks in Docker > >> image. > >> > >> I would like to make sure we will address those concerns. > >> > >> On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 10:59 AM Tristan Tarrant <ttarrant(a)redhat.com > >> <mailto:ttarrant@redhat.com>> wrote: > >> > >> Currently the "protected cache access" security is implemented as > >> follows: > >> > >> - if authorization is enabled || client is on loopback > >> allow > >> > >> The first check also implies that authentication needs to be in > place, > >> as the authorization checks need a valid Subject. > >> > >> Unfortunately authorization is very heavy-weight and actually > overkill > >> even for "normal" secure usage. > >> > >> My proposal is as follows: > >> - the "default" configuration files are "secure" by default > >> - provide clearly marked "unsecured" configuration files, which the > user > >> can use > >> - drop the "protected cache" check completely > >> > >> And definitely NO to a dev switch. > >> > >> Tristan > >> > >> On 19/04/2017 10:05, Galder Zamarreño wrote: > >>> Agree with Wolf. Let's keep it simple by just providing extra > >> configuration files for dev/unsecure envs. > >>> > >>> Cheers, > >>> -- > >>> Galder Zamarreño > >>> Infinispan, Red Hat > >>> > >>>> On 15 Apr 2017, at 12:57, Wolf Fink <wfink(a)redhat.com > >> <mailto:wfink@redhat.com>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> I would think a "switch" can have other impacts as you need to > >> check it in the code - and might have security leaks here > >>>> > >>>> So what is wrong with some configurations which are the default > >> and secured. > >>>> and a "*-dev or *-unsecure" configuration to start easy. > >>>> Also this can be used in production if there is no need for security > >>>> > >>>> On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 4:13 PM, Sebastian Laskawiec > >> <slaskawi(a)redhat.com <mailto:slaskawi@redhat.com>> wrote: > >>>> I still think it would be better to create an extra switch to > >> run infinispan in "development mode". This means no authentication, > >> no encryption, possibly with JGroups stack tuned for fast discovery > >> (especially in Kubernetes) and a big warning saying "You are in > >> development mode, do not use this in production". > >>>> > >>>> Just something very easy to get you going. > >>>> > >>>> On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 12:16 PM Galder Zamarreño > >> <galder(a)redhat.com <mailto:galder@redhat.com>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> Galder Zamarreño > >>>> Infinispan, Red Hat > >>>> > >>>>> On 13 Apr 2017, at 09:50, Gustavo Fernandes > >> <gustavo(a)infinispan.org <mailto:gustavo@infinispan.org>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 6:38 AM, Galder Zamarreño > >> <galder(a)redhat.com <mailto:galder@redhat.com>> wrote: > >>>>> Hi all, > >>>>> > >>>>> As per some discussions we had yesterday on IRC w/ Tristan, > >> Gustavo and Sebastian, I've created a docker image snapshot that > >> reverts the change stop protected caches from requiring security > >> enabled [1]. > >>>>> > >>>>> In other words, I've removed [2]. The reason for temporarily > >> doing that is because with the change as is, the changes required > >> for a default server distro require that the entire cache manager's > >> security is enabled. This is in turn creates a lot of problems with > >> health and running checks used by Kubernetes/OpenShift amongst other > >> things. > >>>>> > >>>>> Judging from our discussions on IRC, the idea is for such > >> change to be present in 9.0.1, but I'd like to get final > >> confirmation from Tristan et al. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> +1 > >>>>> > >>>>> Regarding the "security by default" discussion, I think we > >> should ship configurations cloud.xml, clustered.xml and > >> standalone.xml with security enabled and disabled variants, and let > >> users > >>>>> decide which one to pick based on the use case. > >>>> > >>>> I think that's a better idea. > >>>> > >>>> We could by default have a secured one, but switching to an > >> insecure configuration should be doable with minimal effort, e.g. > >> just switching config file. > >>>> > >>>> As highlighted above, any secured configuration should work > >> out-of-the-box with our docker images, e.g. WRT healthy/running > checks. > >>>> > >>>> Cheers, > >>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Gustavo. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Cheers, > >>>>> > >>>>> [1] https://hub.docker.com/r/galderz/infinispan-server/tags/ > >> (9.0.1-SNAPSHOT tag for anyone interested) > >>>>> [2] > >> https://github.com/infinispan/infinispan/blob/master/server/ > hotrod/src/main/java/org/infinispan/server/hotrod/CacheDecod > eContext.java#L114-L118 > >>>>> -- > >>>>> Galder Zamarreño > >>>>> Infinispan, Red Hat > >>>>> > >>>>>> On 30 Mar 2017, at 14:25, Tristan Tarrant <ttarrant(a)redhat.com > >> <mailto:ttarrant@redhat.com>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Dear all, > >>>>>> > >>>>>> after a mini chat on IRC, I wanted to bring this to > >> everybody's attention. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> We should make the Hot Rod endpoint require authentication in the > >>>>>> out-of-the-box configuration. > >>>>>> The proposal is to enable the PLAIN (or, preferably, DIGEST) SASL > >>>>>> mechanism against the ApplicationRealm and require users to > >> run the > >>>>>> add-user script. > >>>>>> This would achieve two goals: > >>>>>> - secure out-of-the-box configuration, which is always a good idea > >>>>>> - access to the "protected" schema and script caches which is > >> prevented > >>>>>> when not on loopback on non-authenticated endpoints. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Tristan > >>>>>> -- > >>>>>> Tristan Tarrant > >>>>>> Infinispan Lead > >>>>>> JBoss, a division of Red Hat > >>>>>> _______________________________________________ > >>>>>> infinispan-dev mailing list > >>>>>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > >> <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> > >>>>>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> _______________________________________________ > >>>>> infinispan-dev mailing list > >>>>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > >> <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> > >>>>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > >>>>> > >>>>> _______________________________________________ > >>>>> infinispan-dev mailing list > >>>>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > >> <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> > >>>>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> _______________________________________________ > >>>> infinispan-dev mailing list > >>>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > >> <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> > >>>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > >>>> -- > >>>> SEBASTIAN ŁASKAWIEC > >>>> INFINISPAN DEVELOPER > >>>> Red Hat EMEA > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> _______________________________________________ > >>>> infinispan-dev mailing list > >>>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > >> <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> > >>>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > >>>> > >>>> _______________________________________________ > >>>> infinispan-dev mailing list > >>>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > >> <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> > >>>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > >>> > >>> > >>> _______________________________________________ > >>> infinispan-dev mailing list > >>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > >> <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> > >>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > >>> > >> > >> -- > >> Tristan Tarrant > >> Infinispan Lead > >> JBoss, a division of Red Hat > >> _______________________________________________ > >> infinispan-dev mailing list > >> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.j > boss.org> > >> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > >> > >> -- > >> > >> SEBASTIANŁASKAWIEC > >> > >> INFINISPAN DEVELOPER > >> > >> Red HatEMEA <https://www.redhat.com/> > >> > >> <https://red.ht/sig> > >> > >> > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> infinispan-dev mailing list > >> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > >> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > >> > > > > -- > > Tristan Tarrant > > Infinispan Lead > > JBoss, a division of Red Hat > > _______________________________________________ > > infinispan-dev mailing list > > infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > > https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > > > _______________________________________________ > infinispan-dev mailing list > infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > _______________________________________________ infinispan-dev mailing list infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev

On 6 Sep 2017, at 11:03, Katia Aresti <karesti(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: @Emmanuel, sure it't not a big deal, but starting fast and smooth without any trouble helps adoption. Concerning the ticket, there is already one that was acted. I can work on that, even if is assigned to Galder now. @Gustavo Yes, as I read - better - now on the security part, it is said for the console that we need those. My head skipped that paragraph or I read that badly, and I was wondering if it was more something related to "roles" rather than a user. My bad, because I read too fast sometimes and skip things ! Maybe the paragraph of the security in the console should be moved down to the console part, which is small to read now ? When I read there "see the security part bellow" I was like : ok, the security is done !! :) Thank you for your replies ! Katia On Wed, Sep 6, 2017 at 10:52 AM, Gustavo Fernandes <gustavo(a)infinispan.org&gt; wrote: Comments inlined On Tue, Sep 5, 2017 at 5:03 PM, Katia Aresti <karesti(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: And then I want to go to the console, requires me to put again the user/password. And it does not work. And I don't see how to disable security. And I don't know what to do. And I'm like : why do I need security at all here ? The console credentials are specified with MGMT_USER/MGMT_PASS env variables, did you try those? It will not work for APP_USER/APP_PASS. I wonder if you want to reconsider the "secured by default" point after my experience. The outcome of the discussion is that the clustered.xml will be secured by default, but you should be able to launch a container without any security by simply passing an alternate xml in the startup, and we'll ship this XML with the server. Gustavo My 2 cents, Katia On Tue, May 9, 2017 at 2:24 PM, Galder Zamarreño <galder(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: Hi all, Tristan and I had chat yesterday and I've distilled the contents of the discussion and the feedback here into a JIRA [1]. The JIRA contains several subtasks to handle these aspects: 1. Remove auth check in server's CacheDecodeContext. 2. Default server configuration should require authentication in all entry points. 3. Provide an unauthenticated configuration that users can easily switch to. 4. Remove default username+passwords in docker image and instead show an info/warn message when these are not provided. 5. Add capability to pass in app user role groups to docker image easily, so that its easy to add authorization on top of the server. Cheers, [1] https://issues.jboss.org/browse/ISPN-7811 -- Galder Zamarreño Infinispan, Red Hat > On 19 Apr 2017, at 12:04, Tristan Tarrant <ttarrant(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: > > That is caused by not wrapping the calls in PrivilegedActions in all the > correct places and is a bug. > > Tristan > > On 19/04/2017 11:34, Sebastian Laskawiec wrote: >> The proposal look ok to me. >> >> But I would also like to highlight one thing - it seems you can't access >> secured cache properties using CLI. This seems wrong to me (if you can >> invoke the cli, in 99,99% of the cases you have access to the machine, >> so you can do whatever you want). It also breaks healthchecks in Docker >> image. >> >> I would like to make sure we will address those concerns. >> >> On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 10:59 AM Tristan Tarrant <ttarrant(a)redhat.com >> <mailto:ttarrant@redhat.com>> wrote: >> >> Currently the "protected cache access" security is implemented as >> follows: >> >> - if authorization is enabled || client is on loopback >> allow >> >> The first check also implies that authentication needs to be in place, >> as the authorization checks need a valid Subject. >> >> Unfortunately authorization is very heavy-weight and actually overkill >> even for "normal" secure usage. >> >> My proposal is as follows: >> - the "default" configuration files are "secure" by default >> - provide clearly marked "unsecured" configuration files, which the user >> can use >> - drop the "protected cache" check completely >> >> And definitely NO to a dev switch. >> >> Tristan >> >> On 19/04/2017 10:05, Galder Zamarreño wrote: >>> Agree with Wolf. Let's keep it simple by just providing extra >> configuration files for dev/unsecure envs. >>> >>> Cheers, >>> -- >>> Galder Zamarreño >>> Infinispan, Red Hat >>> >>>> On 15 Apr 2017, at 12:57, Wolf Fink <wfink(a)redhat.com >> <mailto:wfink@redhat.com>> wrote: >>>> >>>> I would think a "switch" can have other impacts as you need to >> check it in the code - and might have security leaks here >>>> >>>> So what is wrong with some configurations which are the default >> and secured. >>>> and a "*-dev or *-unsecure" configuration to start easy. >>>> Also this can be used in production if there is no need for security >>>> >>>> On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 4:13 PM, Sebastian Laskawiec >> <slaskawi(a)redhat.com <mailto:slaskawi@redhat.com>> wrote: >>>> I still think it would be better to create an extra switch to >> run infinispan in "development mode". This means no authentication, >> no encryption, possibly with JGroups stack tuned for fast discovery >> (especially in Kubernetes) and a big warning saying "You are in >> development mode, do not use this in production". >>>> >>>> Just something very easy to get you going. >>>> >>>> On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 12:16 PM Galder Zamarreño >> <galder(a)redhat.com <mailto:galder@redhat.com>> wrote: >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Galder Zamarreño >>>> Infinispan, Red Hat >>>> >>>>> On 13 Apr 2017, at 09:50, Gustavo Fernandes >> <gustavo(a)infinispan.org <mailto:gustavo@infinispan.org>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 6:38 AM, Galder Zamarreño >> <galder(a)redhat.com <mailto:galder@redhat.com>> wrote: >>>>> Hi all, >>>>> >>>>> As per some discussions we had yesterday on IRC w/ Tristan, >> Gustavo and Sebastian, I've created a docker image snapshot that >> reverts the change stop protected caches from requiring security >> enabled [1]. >>>>> >>>>> In other words, I've removed [2]. The reason for temporarily >> doing that is because with the change as is, the changes required >> for a default server distro require that the entire cache manager's >> security is enabled. This is in turn creates a lot of problems with >> health and running checks used by Kubernetes/OpenShift amongst other >> things. >>>>> >>>>> Judging from our discussions on IRC, the idea is for such >> change to be present in 9.0.1, but I'd like to get final >> confirmation from Tristan et al. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> +1 >>>>> >>>>> Regarding the "security by default" discussion, I think we >> should ship configurations cloud.xml, clustered.xml and >> standalone.xml with security enabled and disabled variants, and let >> users >>>>> decide which one to pick based on the use case. >>>> >>>> I think that's a better idea. >>>> >>>> We could by default have a secured one, but switching to an >> insecure configuration should be doable with minimal effort, e.g. >> just switching config file. >>>> >>>> As highlighted above, any secured configuration should work >> out-of-the-box with our docker images, e.g. WRT healthy/running checks. >>>> >>>> Cheers, >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Gustavo. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Cheers, >>>>> >>>>> [1] https://hub.docker.com/r/galderz/infinispan-server/tags/ >> (9.0.1-SNAPSHOT tag for anyone interested) >>>>> [2] >> https://github.com/infinispan/infinispan/blob/master/server/hotrod/src/ma... >>>>> -- >>>>> Galder Zamarreño >>>>> Infinispan, Red Hat >>>>> >>>>>> On 30 Mar 2017, at 14:25, Tristan Tarrant <ttarrant(a)redhat.com >> <mailto:ttarrant@redhat.com>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Dear all, >>>>>> >>>>>> after a mini chat on IRC, I wanted to bring this to >> everybody's attention. >>>>>> >>>>>> We should make the Hot Rod endpoint require authentication in the >>>>>> out-of-the-box configuration. >>>>>> The proposal is to enable the PLAIN (or, preferably, DIGEST) SASL >>>>>> mechanism against the ApplicationRealm and require users to >> run the >>>>>> add-user script. >>>>>> This would achieve two goals: >>>>>> - secure out-of-the-box configuration, which is always a good idea >>>>>> - access to the "protected" schema and script caches which is >> prevented >>>>>> when not on loopback on non-authenticated endpoints. >>>>>> >>>>>> Tristan >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Tristan Tarrant >>>>>> Infinispan Lead >>>>>> JBoss, a division of Red Hat >>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>> infinispan-dev mailing list >>>>>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >> <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> >>>>>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> infinispan-dev mailing list >>>>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >> <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> >>>>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >>>>> >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> infinispan-dev mailing list >>>>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >> <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> >>>>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> infinispan-dev mailing list >>>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >> <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> >>>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >>>> -- >>>> SEBASTIAN ŁASKAWIEC >>>> INFINISPAN DEVELOPER >>>> Red Hat EMEA >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> infinispan-dev mailing list >>>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >> <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> >>>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> infinispan-dev mailing list >>>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >> <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> >>>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> infinispan-dev mailing list >>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >> <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> >>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >>> >> >> -- >> Tristan Tarrant >> Infinispan Lead >> JBoss, a division of Red Hat >> _______________________________________________ >> infinispan-dev mailing list >> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> >> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >> >> -- >> >> SEBASTIANŁASKAWIEC >> >> INFINISPAN DEVELOPER >> >> Red HatEMEA <https://www.redhat.com/> >> >> <https://red.ht/sig> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> infinispan-dev mailing list >> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >> > > -- > Tristan Tarrant > Infinispan Lead > JBoss, a division of Red Hat > _______________________________________________ > infinispan-dev mailing list > infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev _______________________________________________ infinispan-dev mailing list infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev _______________________________________________ infinispan-dev mailing list infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev _______________________________________________ infinispan-dev mailing list infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev _______________________________________________ infinispan-dev mailing list infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev

Sorry for reviving this thread, but I want to make sure we all agree on the following points. DEFAULT CONFIGURATIONS - The endpoints MUST be secure by default (authentication MUST be enabled and required) in all of the supplied default configurations. - We can ship non-secure configurations, but these need to be clearly marked as such in the configuration filename (e.g. standalone-unsecured.xml). - Memcached MUST NOT be enabled by default as we do not implement the binary protocol which is the only one that can do authn/encryption - The default configurations (standalone.xml, domain.xml, cloud.xml) MUST enable only non-plaintext mechs (e.g. digest et al) SERVER CHANGES - Warn if a plain text mech is enabled on an unencrypted endpoint API - We MUST NOT add a "trust all certs" switch to the client config as that would thwart the whole purpose of encryption. OPENSHIFT - In the context of OpenShift, all pods MUST trust the master CA. This means that the CA must be injected into the trusted CAs for the pods AND into the JDK cacerts file. This MUST be done by the OpenShift JDK image automatically. (Debian does this on startup: [1]) Tristan [1] https://git.mikael.io/mikaelhg/ca-certificates-java/blob/debian/20170531/... On 9/14/17 5:45 PM, Galder Zamarreño wrote: > Gustavo's reply was the agreement reached. Secured by default and an easy way to use it unsecured is the best middle ground IMO. > > So, we've done the securing part partially, which needs to be completed by [2] (currently assigned to Tristan). > > More importantly, we also need to complete [3] so that we have ship the unsecured configuration, and then show people how to use that (docus, examples...etc). > > If you want to help, taking ownership of [3] would be best. > > Cheers, > > [2] https://issues.jboss.org/browse/ISPN-7815 > [3] https://issues.jboss.org/browse/ISPN-7818 > >> On 6 Sep 2017, at 11:03, Katia Aresti <karesti(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: >> >> @Emmanuel, sure it't not a big deal, but starting fast and smooth without any trouble helps adoption. Concerning the ticket, there is already one that was acted. I can work on that, even if is assigned to Galder now. >> >> @Gustavo >> Yes, as I read - better - now on the security part, it is said for the console that we need those. My head skipped that paragraph or I read that badly, and I was wondering if it was more something related to "roles" rather than a user. My bad, because I read too fast sometimes and skip things ! Maybe the paragraph of the security in the console should be moved down to the console part, which is small to read now ? When I read there "see the security part bellow" I was like : ok, the security is done !! :) >> >> Thank you for your replies ! >> >> Katia >> >> >> On Wed, Sep 6, 2017 at 10:52 AM, Gustavo Fernandes <gustavo(a)infinispan.org&gt; wrote: >> Comments inlined >> >> On Tue, Sep 5, 2017 at 5:03 PM, Katia Aresti <karesti(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: >> And then I want to go to the console, requires me to put again the user/password. And it does not work. And I don't see how to disable security. And I don't know what to do. And I'm like : why do I need security at all here ? >> >> >> The console credentials are specified with MGMT_USER/MGMT_PASS env variables, did you try those? It will not work for APP_USER/APP_PASS. >> >> >> I wonder if you want to reconsider the "secured by default" point after my experience. >> >> >> The outcome of the discussion is that the clustered.xml will be secured by default, but you should be able to launch a container without any security by simply passing an alternate xml in the startup, and we'll ship this XML with the server. >> >> >> Gustavo >> >> >> My 2 cents, >> >> Katia >> >> On Tue, May 9, 2017 at 2:24 PM, Galder Zamarreño <galder(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: >> Hi all, >> >> Tristan and I had chat yesterday and I've distilled the contents of the discussion and the feedback here into a JIRA [1]. The JIRA contains several subtasks to handle these aspects: >> >> 1. Remove auth check in server's CacheDecodeContext. >> 2. Default server configuration should require authentication in all entry points. >> 3. Provide an unauthenticated configuration that users can easily switch to. >> 4. Remove default username+passwords in docker image and instead show an info/warn message when these are not provided. >> 5. Add capability to pass in app user role groups to docker image easily, so that its easy to add authorization on top of the server. >> >> Cheers, >> >> [1] https://issues.jboss.org/browse/ISPN-7811 >> -- >> Galder Zamarreño >> Infinispan, Red Hat >> >>> On 19 Apr 2017, at 12:04, Tristan Tarrant <ttarrant(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: >>> >>> That is caused by not wrapping the calls in PrivilegedActions in all the >>> correct places and is a bug. >>> >>> Tristan >>> >>> On 19/04/2017 11:34, Sebastian Laskawiec wrote: >>>> The proposal look ok to me. >>>> >>>> But I would also like to highlight one thing - it seems you can't access >>>> secured cache properties using CLI. This seems wrong to me (if you can >>>> invoke the cli, in 99,99% of the cases you have access to the machine, >>>> so you can do whatever you want). It also breaks healthchecks in Docker >>>> image. >>>> >>>> I would like to make sure we will address those concerns. >>>> >>>> On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 10:59 AM Tristan Tarrant <ttarrant(a)redhat.com >>>> <mailto:ttarrant@redhat.com>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Currently the "protected cache access" security is implemented as >>>> follows: >>>> >>>> - if authorization is enabled || client is on loopback >>>> allow >>>> >>>> The first check also implies that authentication needs to be in place, >>>> as the authorization checks need a valid Subject. >>>> >>>> Unfortunately authorization is very heavy-weight and actually overkill >>>> even for "normal" secure usage. >>>> >>>> My proposal is as follows: >>>> - the "default" configuration files are "secure" by default >>>> - provide clearly marked "unsecured" configuration files, which the user >>>> can use >>>> - drop the "protected cache" check completely >>>> >>>> And definitely NO to a dev switch. >>>> >>>> Tristan >>>> >>>> On 19/04/2017 10:05, Galder Zamarreño wrote: >>>>> Agree with Wolf. Let's keep it simple by just providing extra >>>> configuration files for dev/unsecure envs. >>>>> >>>>> Cheers, >>>>> -- >>>>> Galder Zamarreño >>>>> Infinispan, Red Hat >>>>> >>>>>> On 15 Apr 2017, at 12:57, Wolf Fink <wfink(a)redhat.com >>>> <mailto:wfink@redhat.com>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> I would think a "switch" can have other impacts as you need to >>>> check it in the code - and might have security leaks here >>>>>> >>>>>> So what is wrong with some configurations which are the default >>>> and secured. >>>>>> and a "*-dev or *-unsecure" configuration to start easy. >>>>>> Also this can be used in production if there is no need for security >>>>>> >>>>>> On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 4:13 PM, Sebastian Laskawiec >>>> <slaskawi(a)redhat.com <mailto:slaskawi@redhat.com>> wrote: >>>>>> I still think it would be better to create an extra switch to >>>> run infinispan in "development mode". This means no authentication, >>>> no encryption, possibly with JGroups stack tuned for fast discovery >>>> (especially in Kubernetes) and a big warning saying "You are in >>>> development mode, do not use this in production". >>>>>> >>>>>> Just something very easy to get you going. >>>>>> >>>>>> On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 12:16 PM Galder Zamarreño >>>> <galder(a)redhat.com <mailto:galder@redhat.com>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Galder Zamarreño >>>>>> Infinispan, Red Hat >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 13 Apr 2017, at 09:50, Gustavo Fernandes >>>> <gustavo(a)infinispan.org <mailto:gustavo@infinispan.org>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 6:38 AM, Galder Zamarreño >>>> <galder(a)redhat.com <mailto:galder@redhat.com>> wrote: >>>>>>> Hi all, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> As per some discussions we had yesterday on IRC w/ Tristan, >>>> Gustavo and Sebastian, I've created a docker image snapshot that >>>> reverts the change stop protected caches from requiring security >>>> enabled [1]. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In other words, I've removed [2]. The reason for temporarily >>>> doing that is because with the change as is, the changes required >>>> for a default server distro require that the entire cache manager's >>>> security is enabled. This is in turn creates a lot of problems with >>>> health and running checks used by Kubernetes/OpenShift amongst other >>>> things. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Judging from our discussions on IRC, the idea is for such >>>> change to be present in 9.0.1, but I'd like to get final >>>> confirmation from Tristan et al. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> +1 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Regarding the "security by default" discussion, I think we >>>> should ship configurations cloud.xml, clustered.xml and >>>> standalone.xml with security enabled and disabled variants, and let >>>> users >>>>>>> decide which one to pick based on the use case. >>>>>> >>>>>> I think that's a better idea. >>>>>> >>>>>> We could by default have a secured one, but switching to an >>>> insecure configuration should be doable with minimal effort, e.g. >>>> just switching config file. >>>>>> >>>>>> As highlighted above, any secured configuration should work >>>> out-of-the-box with our docker images, e.g. WRT healthy/running checks. >>>>>> >>>>>> Cheers, >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Gustavo. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Cheers, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> [1] https://hub.docker.com/r/galderz/infinispan-server/tags/ >>>> (9.0.1-SNAPSHOT tag for anyone interested) >>>>>>> [2] >>>> https://github.com/infinispan/infinispan/blob/master/server/hotrod/src/ma... >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> Galder Zamarreño >>>>>>> Infinispan, Red Hat >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 30 Mar 2017, at 14:25, Tristan Tarrant <ttarrant(a)redhat.com >>>> <mailto:ttarrant@redhat.com>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Dear all, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> after a mini chat on IRC, I wanted to bring this to >>>> everybody's attention. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> We should make the Hot Rod endpoint require authentication in the >>>>>>>> out-of-the-box configuration. >>>>>>>> The proposal is to enable the PLAIN (or, preferably, DIGEST) SASL >>>>>>>> mechanism against the ApplicationRealm and require users to >>>> run the >>>>>>>> add-user script. >>>>>>>> This would achieve two goals: >>>>>>>> - secure out-of-the-box configuration, which is always a good idea >>>>>>>> - access to the "protected" schema and script caches which is >>>> prevented >>>>>>>> when not on loopback on non-authenticated endpoints. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Tristan >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> Tristan Tarrant >>>>>>>> Infinispan Lead >>>>>>>> JBoss, a division of Red Hat >>>>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>>>> infinispan-dev mailing list >>>>>>>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >>>> <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> >>>>>>>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>>> infinispan-dev mailing list >>>>>>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >>>> <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> >>>>>>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >>>>>>> >>>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>>> infinispan-dev mailing list >>>>>>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >>>> <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> >>>>>>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>> infinispan-dev mailing list >>>>>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >>>> <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> >>>>>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >>>>>> -- >>>>>> SEBASTIAN ŁASKAWIEC >>>>>> INFINISPAN DEVELOPER >>>>>> Red Hat EMEA >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>> infinispan-dev mailing list >>>>>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >>>> <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> >>>>>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >>>>>> >>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>> infinispan-dev mailing list >>>>>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >>>> <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> >>>>>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> infinispan-dev mailing list >>>>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >>>> <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> >>>>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Tristan Tarrant >>>> Infinispan Lead >>>> JBoss, a division of Red Hat >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> infinispan-dev mailing list >>>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org <mailto:infinispan-dev@lists.jboss.org> >>>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >>>> >>>> -- >>>> >>>> SEBASTIANŁASKAWIEC >>>> >>>> INFINISPAN DEVELOPER >>>> >>>> Red HatEMEA <https://www.redhat.com/> >>>> >>>> <https://red.ht/sig> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> infinispan-dev mailing list >>>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >>>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> Tristan Tarrant >>> Infinispan Lead >>> JBoss, a division of Red Hat >>> _______________________________________________ >>> infinispan-dev mailing list >>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> infinispan-dev mailing list >> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> infinispan-dev mailing list >> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> infinispan-dev mailing list >> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >> >> _______________________________________________ >> infinispan-dev mailing list >> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > > -- > Galder Zamarreño > Infinispan, Red Hat > > > _______________________________________________ > infinispan-dev mailing list > infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > -- Tristan Tarrant Infinispan Lead and Data Grid Chief Architect JBoss, a division of Red Hat _______________________________________________ infinispan-dev mailing list infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev

On 19 Apr 2017, at 10:57, Tristan Tarrant <ttarrant(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: Currently the "protected cache access" security is implemented as follows: - if authorization is enabled || client is on loopback allow The first check also implies that authentication needs to be in place, as the authorization checks need a valid Subject. Unfortunately authorization is very heavy-weight and actually overkill even for "normal" secure usage. My proposal is as follows: - the "default" configuration files are "secure" by default - provide clearly marked "unsecured" configuration files, which the user can use - drop the "protected cache" check completely And definitely NO to a dev switch. Tristan On 19/04/2017 10:05, Galder Zamarreño wrote: > Agree with Wolf. Let's keep it simple by just providing extra configuration files for dev/unsecure envs. > > Cheers, > -- > Galder Zamarreño > Infinispan, Red Hat > >> On 15 Apr 2017, at 12:57, Wolf Fink <wfink(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: >> >> I would think a "switch" can have other impacts as you need to check it in the code - and might have security leaks here >> >> So what is wrong with some configurations which are the default and secured. >> and a "*-dev or *-unsecure" configuration to start easy. >> Also this can be used in production if there is no need for security >> >> On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 4:13 PM, Sebastian Laskawiec <slaskawi(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: >> I still think it would be better to create an extra switch to run infinispan in "development mode". This means no authentication, no encryption, possibly with JGroups stack tuned for fast discovery (especially in Kubernetes) and a big warning saying "You are in development mode, do not use this in production". >> >> Just something very easy to get you going. >> >> On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 12:16 PM Galder Zamarreño <galder(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: >> >> -- >> Galder Zamarreño >> Infinispan, Red Hat >> >>> On 13 Apr 2017, at 09:50, Gustavo Fernandes <gustavo(a)infinispan.org&gt; wrote: >>> >>> On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 6:38 AM, Galder Zamarreño <galder(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: >>> Hi all, >>> >>> As per some discussions we had yesterday on IRC w/ Tristan, Gustavo and Sebastian, I've created a docker image snapshot that reverts the change stop protected caches from requiring security enabled [1]. >>> >>> In other words, I've removed [2]. The reason for temporarily doing that is because with the change as is, the changes required for a default server distro require that the entire cache manager's security is enabled. This is in turn creates a lot of problems with health and running checks used by Kubernetes/OpenShift amongst other things. >>> >>> Judging from our discussions on IRC, the idea is for such change to be present in 9.0.1, but I'd like to get final confirmation from Tristan et al. >>> >>> >>> +1 >>> >>> Regarding the "security by default" discussion, I think we should ship configurations cloud.xml, clustered.xml and standalone.xml with security enabled and disabled variants, and let users >>> decide which one to pick based on the use case. >> >> I think that's a better idea. >> >> We could by default have a secured one, but switching to an insecure configuration should be doable with minimal effort, e.g. just switching config file. >> >> As highlighted above, any secured configuration should work out-of-the-box with our docker images, e.g. WRT healthy/running checks. >> >> Cheers, >> >>> >>> Gustavo. >>> >>> >>> Cheers, >>> >>> [1] https://hub.docker.com/r/galderz/infinispan-server/tags/ (9.0.1-SNAPSHOT tag for anyone interested) >>> [2] https://github.com/infinispan/infinispan/blob/master/server/hotrod/src/ma... >>> -- >>> Galder Zamarreño >>> Infinispan, Red Hat >>> >>>> On 30 Mar 2017, at 14:25, Tristan Tarrant <ttarrant(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: >>>> >>>> Dear all, >>>> >>>> after a mini chat on IRC, I wanted to bring this to everybody's attention. >>>> >>>> We should make the Hot Rod endpoint require authentication in the >>>> out-of-the-box configuration. >>>> The proposal is to enable the PLAIN (or, preferably, DIGEST) SASL >>>> mechanism against the ApplicationRealm and require users to run the >>>> add-user script. >>>> This would achieve two goals: >>>> - secure out-of-the-box configuration, which is always a good idea >>>> - access to the "protected" schema and script caches which is prevented >>>> when not on loopback on non-authenticated endpoints. >>>> >>>> Tristan >>>> -- >>>> Tristan Tarrant >>>> Infinispan Lead >>>> JBoss, a division of Red Hat >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> infinispan-dev mailing list >>>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >>>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> infinispan-dev mailing list >>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> infinispan-dev mailing list >>> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >>> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> infinispan-dev mailing list >> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >> -- >> SEBASTIAN ŁASKAWIEC >> INFINISPAN DEVELOPER >> Red Hat EMEA >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> infinispan-dev mailing list >> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev >> >> _______________________________________________ >> infinispan-dev mailing list >> infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org >> https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > > > _______________________________________________ > infinispan-dev mailing list > infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org > https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev > -- Tristan Tarrant Infinispan Lead JBoss, a division of Red Hat _______________________________________________ infinispan-dev mailing list infinispan-dev(a)lists.jboss.org https://lists.jboss.org/mailman/listinfo/infinispan-dev