[Design of JBoss ESB] - Re: jBPM in JBossESB
by bill.burke@jboss.com
Esteban,
Have you considered at all using JBPM as a backbone for the ESB? I see a lot of overlap/similarities between the core ESB engine and JBPM. Maybe ESB actions could be written as JBPM nodes or actions? For instance, take a look at the Seam Drools JBPM decision handler. Looks almost exactly the same as ESB's. ESB's split/aggragate are similar to JBPMs fork/join. Context variables are very analogous to a message map.
What are the advantages/disadvantages to using JBPM as the core process engine? Here's some I thought of off the top of my head:
Advantages:
* JBPM eclipse designer
* JBPM persistence
* JBPM asynchronicity
* versioning
* richer IoC
* parameter/context mappings
Disadvantages:
* A little extra verbose for small tasks (I think this could be overcome by writing our own node type.)
I don't know, what do you think??? In the least, we should create some JBPM adapters so that ESB actions/nodes could be used as JBPM nodes/actions.
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19 years, 1 month
[Design of Security on JBoss] - Re: AS 4.2.0 binding to localhost
by ryan.campbell@jboss.com
"dimitris(a)jboss.org" wrote : First of all, better don't make assumption about how users will react to the change. If jboss binds to 0.0.0.0 since year 1999 and now this has changed to localhost, I think this is already a big change and will at the very least make people wonder why's that. Release notes and blogging will help explain the problem, too.
We are both making assumptions about how users will react. The difference is you are being optimistic, and I am being pessimistic. I agree veteran users will notice a change, but they are likely not the source of our "problem."
If the goal is to provide legalistic arguments that we are secure by default, the status quo is fine. If the goal is to reduce the perception that we are insecure, we won't make any progress with the existing solution.
I completely agree it is the job of the deployer to secure the jmx-console and other vulnerable access points, but they are consistently not doing their jobs and we are getting the blame.
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19 years, 1 month
[Design of Security on JBoss] - Re: AS 4.2.0 binding to localhost
by dimitris@jboss.org
First of all, better don't make assumption about how users will react to the change. If jboss binds to 0.0.0.0 since year 1999 and now this has changed to localhost, I think this is already a big change and will at the very least make people wonder why's that. Release notes and blogging will help explain the problem, too.
Second, for the really naive users without any jboss knowledge that just unzip jboss, throw in a webapp, and they are done, or the case where a jboss server is installed by default and is just waiting there, unused, this measure offers some really basic but essential protection. Remember that we received negative comments about "remotely accessing a default jboss installation" and this is what we are fixing here.
>From the point where somone starts messing with command line parameters and configuration options he/she must assume responsibility for his/hers doings.
I agree we can assist a user to create a more secure environment, but this is done either in the installer, or some post installation script. Besides, there are many points you need to secure, not just the jmx-console.
In my understanding, if we lock up everying in the default developer-oriented .zip distro, we'll just manage to enrage developers. And don't forget that the .zip distro IS primarily made for developers.
In a production environment where you'll have to make quite a few configuration changes before installing/testing/fine-tuning a server, securing the server is really one of the standard items in your checklist.
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19 years, 1 month
[Design of Security on JBoss] - Re: AS 4.2.0 binding to localhost
by mjc@redhat.com
"ryan.campbell(a)jboss.com" wrote : I'm skeptical that the existing approach will actually push users to read any documentation.
Binding to localhost does at least stop us being insecure by default and is something we do in Red Hat Enterprise Linux with servers such as sendmail.
However we've also discussed a better solution -- having HTTP Basic authentication turned on by default for any consoles, with no username and password configured. A user browsing the console for the first time (if they don't use the installer) would be prompted to log in and when failing to log in a custom "403 Authentication Required" response would be displayed and could point them at the documentation. Using the installer would by default give the user the ability to setup this user/password.
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19 years, 1 month