Re: [jboss-dev-forums] [JBoss AS 7 Development] - WildFly Web Container Security Use Cases
by Anil Saldhana
Anil Saldhana [https://community.jboss.org/people/anil.saldhana] commented on the document
"WildFly Web Container Security Use Cases"
To view all comments on this document, visit: https://community.jboss.org/docs/DOC-48612#comment-11931
--------------------------------------------------
> Darran Lofthouse wrote:
>
>
>
> Hello Anil - this article is good and highlights the next areas I will look into for integration, however one small point.
>
> I would suggest not placing 'Interceptor Mechanism' as a requirement, that is an implementation detail. The Authenticator/Valve intercetpro approach is one of the main reasons it was very difficult to combine authentication mechanisms in the past - what we really need is integration of these three items with the Undertow mechanisms.
>
Darran - I changed the wording.
--------------------------------------------------
10 years, 11 months
[JBoss AS 7 Development] - Access control notes
by Heiko Braun
Heiko Braun [https://community.jboss.org/people/heiko.braun] modified the document:
"Access control notes"
To view the document, visit: https://community.jboss.org/docs/DOC-48596
--------------------------------------------------------------
h1. Objective
By early September to implement a simplified domain management access control solution (administrative security) suitable for both AS 8 and EAP 6.x.
The primary objective is to establish a simple set of roles with which users can be associated, with clear sets of operation execution permissions associated with each role. The second critical objective is to develop an architecture for authorization that will allow for a much more generic/flexible authorization scheme to be implemented in future releases without breaking the simple scheme we do now.
Actually providing a generic scheme is out of scope for AS 8.
h1. Team and Timeline
Full time: Heiko Braun, Darran Lofthouse, Kabir Khan, Brian Stansberry
Available to assist as needed: Jason Greene, Anil Saldhana, subsystem leads
Design Phase I:
+ Lay out the fundamental architecture, identify the main requirements and intended approach for meeting each
+ 2 weeks
+ Completion allows some aspects of dev to begin (which, TBD)
+ Inability to get the stated time commitments from all participants delays completion by that amount of time
Design Phase II:
+ Design in detail some of the fundamental areas where either coordinated design is required or a sub-team needs to flesh out details
+ 2 weeks
Dev Phase:
+ 2.5 months
+ Achieve feature completion
+ See tasks below
++ need to assign resources and timelines to each task.
Dev Test Phase:
+ hardening period
+ 1 month
+ ends Sept 6
QE Phase:
+ begins following September 6 end of Dev Test Phase
h1. Tasks
*General Tasks*
- Provide a security policy model, storage and API
- Provide the integration of the security policy model with (external) user registries
- Enable configuration of the security policy model and mapping to users
- Provide operations to retrieve security meta data and/or todo pre-flight authorisation checks
- Enforce permissions in core management compoments (mapping of policies against resources)
- Respect permissions in web console (GUI should be aware and respect the policies: i.e. suppression of interaction units)
- Respect permissions in CLI (CLI should be aware and respect the policies: i.e: restriction of command line syntax)
- Provide methodologies and strategies to assure completeness of security policies and their enforcement
*Component Breakdown*
Core Management Components
*
*
interface to decision point
+ information about resource access request
+ information about user
+ other information about request (time of day, interface, etc)
misc op authorization
+ basic control over op execution
write-attribute/undefine-attribute authorization
add op authorization
+ trick here is cases where certain attributes can't be written
++ my instinct is to reject the add; no sophisticated rules
read-attribute authorization
read-resource authorization, output control to use response header to indicate content was filtered
configuration of our default decision point
user info configuration (what data to provide decision point, where to get it)
read-resource-access op (an op to learn about user's ability to use API; based on read-resource-description)
+ uses
++ general information
++ allow caller to disable features that will be non-functional (e.g. buttons for misc ops that are not available)
model-reference issues
+ general issue of resources in a tree being affected by other resources
+ server groups
++ user has rights to a resource that affects an SG, but not to the SG itself
+ hosts
++ similar issue
++ twist is host-specific config vs domain-wide config affecting server's on a host
+ others?
+ notion: enforce this at domain rollout time?
++ problem: what about an admin-only HC situation? -- no rollout
Configuration propagation
++ master HC to slave
JMX security
+ AS domains depend on core security, as they just delegate
++ provide some information about access mechanism
+ other mbeans
++ what policy?
++ what control point?
Admin Console
+ the interface structure doesn't necessarily refelct the model structure
++ i.e. some coarse grained interface compoments rely on a number of resources across the model
+ distinction between interface structure (interaction units) and DMR payload
+ suppression of interaction units can only be done if the screens properly bootstrap from the model
++ relates to "read-resource-access"
++ currently not the case and a major change (intended first prototype for AS8)
+ distinction between logical entities and resource tree structure
++ i.e. /subsystem=datasources is resource tree structure
++ datasource=ExampleDS is a logical entity within the tree structure
++ makes a diference for address pattern matching...
+ do we support security constraints for logical entities? (can see datasource "Foo" but not datasource "Bar")
++ relates to "model-reference issues".
CLI
+ basic handling of low-level (should be ok)
+ disable high-level commands in advance?
+ ls -- high-level equivalent to read-resource
Misc issues:
sniffing for resources -- request a resource to learn it exists from the failure response
h1. Resource and Action Attributes
The following describes attributes required as inputs to a authorization mechanism, which that mechanism would use to enforce some permission schemes we've heard of. The assumption was the authorization mechanism would be some form of Attribute Based Access Control, although the use of ABAC is not a requirement. The terms "Resource Attributes" and "Action Attributes" is derived from the XACML spec, which notes that "Information security policies operate upon attributes of subjects, the resource, the action and the environment in order to arrive at an authorization decision." This section is concerned with identifying relevant attributes of the management resources toward which an operations is targetted, as well as the relevant attributes of the operation itself.
DMR API and Wireformat
+ separate static security meta data from dynamic runtime headers?
++ static: part of "read-resource-access"
++ dynamic: indication of enforced constraints as part of a DMR response (i.e suppressed elements)
h4. Scheme 1:
Monitor:
-- read-only flag on the operation
Configurator:
-- Storage flag on attribute
-- flag on operation to indicate runtime-only
-- "security privileged" flag attribute
-- "security privileged" flag on resource
-- attribute value is a vault expression?
Operator:
-- Storage flag on attribute
-- flag on operation to indicate runtime-only
-- "security privileged" flag attribute
-- "security privileged" flag on resource
-- attribute value is a vault expression?
Administrator
-- resource address
Deployer
-- resource address
Admin Security Manager
-- I would consider the equivalent for us to be the ability to configure the access control policies
-- resource address
Auditor
-- resource address
h4. Scheme 2:
Anonymous
-- N/A
Admin
-- none; user is root
Deployer
seems equivalent to Scheme 3's read-write
-- "security privileged" flag attribute
-- "security privileged" flag on resource
-- attribute value is a vault expression?
Operator
-- read-only flag on the operation
-- resource-address
-- operation name
-- "security privileged" flag attribute
-- "security privileged" flag on resource
-- attribute value is a vault expression?
Monitor
-- read-only flag on the operation
-- "security privileged" flag attribute
-- "security privileged" flag on resource
-- attribute value is a vault expression?
h4. Scheme 3:
Read-only
-- read-only flag on the operation
-- "security privileged" flag attribute
-- "security privileged" flag on resource
-- attribute value is a vault expression?
Read-write
-- "security privileged" flag attribute
-- "security privileged" flag on resource
-- attribute value is a vault expression?
Privileged
-- none; user is root
This is basically equivalent to Scheme 2, without Scheme 2's "Operator".
h4. Scheme 4:
Administrator
view or modify anything; deploy apps, perform lifecycle functions
-- none; user is root
Deployer
view anything, deploy apps, perform lifecycle functions
-- read-only flag on the operation
-- resource-address
-- operation name
Operator
view anything, perform lifecycle
-- read-only flag on the operation
-- resource-address
-- operation name
Monitor
view anything
-- read-only flag on the operation
h2. Gloassary of terms
|| *Term* || *Description* ||
| Security Policy | A security policy is an association between a resource and one or more users, groups, or security roles. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
--------------------------------------------------------------
Comment by going to Community
[https://community.jboss.org/docs/DOC-48596]
Create a new document in JBoss AS 7 Development at Community
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10 years, 11 months
[JBoss AS 7 Development] - Access control notes
by Heiko Braun
Heiko Braun [https://community.jboss.org/people/heiko.braun] modified the document:
"Access control notes"
To view the document, visit: https://community.jboss.org/docs/DOC-48596
--------------------------------------------------------------
h1. Objective
By early September to implement a simplified domain management access control solution suitable for both AS 8 and EAP 6.x.
The primary objective is to establish a simple set of roles with which users can be associated, with clear sets of operation execution permissions associated with each role. The second critical objective is to develop an architecture for authorization that will allow for a much more generic/flexible authorization scheme to be implemented in future releases without breaking the simple scheme we do now.
Actually providing a generic scheme is out of scope for AS 8.
h1. Team and Timeline
Full time: Heiko Braun, Darran Lofthouse, Kabir Khan, Brian Stansberry
Available to assist as needed: Jason Greene, Anil Saldhana, subsystem leads
Design Phase I:
+ Lay out the fundamental architecture, identify the main requirements and intended approach for meeting each
+ 2 weeks
+ Completion allows some aspects of dev to begin (which, TBD)
+ Inability to get the stated time commitments from all participants delays completion by that amount of time
Design Phase II:
+ Design in detail some of the fundamental areas where either coordinated design is required or a sub-team needs to flesh out details
+ 2 weeks
Dev Phase:
+ 2.5 months
+ Achieve feature completion
+ See tasks below
++ need to assign resources and timelines to each task.
Dev Test Phase:
+ hardening period
+ 1 month
+ ends Sept 6
QE Phase:
+ begins following September 6 end of Dev Test Phase
h1. Tasks
*General Tasks*
- Provide a permission model, storage and API
- Enable configuration of the permission model
- Provide operations to retrieve permission meta data
- Enforce permissions in core management compoments (mapping of permission model against resources)
- Respect permissions in web console (mapping of permission model against interaction units and use cases)
- Respect permissions in CLI (mapping of permission model against command line syntax and use cases)
*Component Breakdown*
Core Management Compoments
*
*
interface to decision point
+ information about resource access request
+ information about user
+ other information about request (time of day, interface, etc)
misc op authorization
+ basic control over op execution
write-attribute/undefine-attribute authorization
add op authorization
+ trick here is cases where certain attributes can't be written
++ my instinct is to reject the add; no sophisticated rules
read-attribute authorization
read-resource authorization, output control to use response header to indicate content was filtered
configuration of our default decision point
user info configuration (what data to provide decision point, where to get it)
read-resource-access op (an op to learn about user's ability to use API; based on read-resource-description)
+ uses
++ general information
++ allow caller to disable features that will be non-functional (e.g. buttons for misc ops that are not available)
model-reference issues
+ general issue of resources in a tree being affected by other resources
+ server groups
++ user has rights to a resource that affects an SG, but not to the SG itself
+ hosts
++ similar issue
++ twist is host-specific config vs domain-wide config affecting server's on a host
+ others?
+ notion: enforce this at domain rollout time?
++ problem: what about an admin-only HC situation? -- no rollout
Configuration propagation
++ master HC to slave
JMX security
+ AS domains depend on core security, as they just delegate
++ provide some information about access mechanism
+ other mbeans
++ what policy?
++ what control point?
Web Console
+ the interface structure doesn't necessarily refelct the model structure
++ i.e. some coarse grained interface compoments rely on a number of resources across the model
+ distinction between interface structure (interaction units) and DMR payload
+ suppression of interaction units can only be done if the screens properly bootstrap from the model
++ relates to "read-resource-access"
++ currently not the case and a major change (intended first prototype for AS8)
+ distinction between logical entities and resource tree structure
++ i.e. /subsystem=datasources is resource tree structure
++ datasource=ExampleDS is a logical entity within the tree structure
++ makes a diference for address pattern matching...
+ do we support security constraints for logical entities? (can see datasource "Foo" but not datasource "Bar")
++ relates to "model-reference issues".
CLI
+ basic handling of low-level (should be ok)
+ disable high-level commands in advance?
+ ls -- high-level equivalent to read-resource
Misc issues:
sniffing for resources -- request a resource to learn it exists from the failure response
h2. Permission Model
+ Should we aim for a mapping of resources onto a permission model?
++ Do we provide the permission model?
++ For a starting point see: https://community.jboss.org/docs/DOC-47854 https://community.jboss.org/wiki/ManagementLayerAccessControl
h1. Resource and Action Attributes
The following describes attributes required as inputs to a authorization mechanism, which that mechanism would use to enforce some permission schemes we've heard of. The assumption was the authorization mechanism would be some form of Attribute Based Access Control, although the use of ABAC is not a requirement. The terms "Resource Attributes" and "Action Attributes" is derived from the XACML spec, which notes that "Information security policies operate upon attributes of subjects, the resource, the action and the environment in order to arrive at an authorization decision." This section is concerned with identifying relevant attributes of the management resources toward which an operations is targetted, as well as the relevant attributes of the operation itself.
DMR API and Wireformat
+ separate static security meta data from dynamic runtime headers?
++ static: part of "read-resource-access"
++ dynamic: indication of enforced constraints as part of a DMR response (i.e suppressed elements)
h4. Scheme 1:
Monitor:
-- read-only flag on the operation
Configurator:
-- Storage flag on attribute
-- flag on operation to indicate runtime-only
-- "security privileged" flag attribute
-- "security privileged" flag on resource
-- attribute value is a vault expression?
Operator:
-- Storage flag on attribute
-- flag on operation to indicate runtime-only
-- "security privileged" flag attribute
-- "security privileged" flag on resource
-- attribute value is a vault expression?
Administrator
-- resource address
Deployer
-- resource address
Admin Security Manager
-- I would consider the equivalent for us to be the ability to configure the access control policies
-- resource address
Auditor
-- resource address
h4. Scheme 2:
Anonymous
-- N/A
Admin
-- none; user is root
Deployer
seems equivalent to Scheme 3's read-write
-- "security privileged" flag attribute
-- "security privileged" flag on resource
-- attribute value is a vault expression?
Operator
-- read-only flag on the operation
-- resource-address
-- operation name
-- "security privileged" flag attribute
-- "security privileged" flag on resource
-- attribute value is a vault expression?
Monitor
-- read-only flag on the operation
-- "security privileged" flag attribute
-- "security privileged" flag on resource
-- attribute value is a vault expression?
h4. Scheme 3:
Read-only
-- read-only flag on the operation
-- "security privileged" flag attribute
-- "security privileged" flag on resource
-- attribute value is a vault expression?
Read-write
-- "security privileged" flag attribute
-- "security privileged" flag on resource
-- attribute value is a vault expression?
Privileged
-- none; user is root
This is basically equivalent to Scheme 2, without Scheme 2's "Operator".
h4. Scheme 4:
Administrator
view or modify anything; deploy apps, perform lifecycle functions
-- none; user is root
Deployer
view anything, deploy apps, perform lifecycle functions
-- read-only flag on the operation
-- resource-address
-- operation name
Operator
view anything, perform lifecycle
-- read-only flag on the operation
-- resource-address
-- operation name
Monitor
view anything
-- read-only flag on the operation
--------------------------------------------------------------
Comment by going to Community
[https://community.jboss.org/docs/DOC-48596]
Create a new document in JBoss AS 7 Development at Community
[https://community.jboss.org/choose-container!input.jspa?contentType=102&c...]
10 years, 11 months
Re: [jboss-dev-forums] [JBoss AS 7 Development] - Access control notes
by Darran Lofthouse
Darran Lofthouse [https://community.jboss.org/people/dlofthouse] commented on the document
"Access control notes"
To view all comments on this document, visit: https://community.jboss.org/docs/DOC-48596#comment-11926
--------------------------------------------------
I am finding it hard to find a single word to describe the client side but I think safer terminology might be along the lines of: -
"Interpretation of the security configuration for the current user to provide an intuitive user interface."
As we design the feature this could range all the way from duplicating all authorization code in all consoles to identify what a user can access through to having sufficient meta-data provided by the management interfaces to make the decisions.
--------------------------------------------------
10 years, 11 months